Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Russellian Monism or Nagelian Monism?Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Two notions of necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   249 citations  
  • Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):153-226.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   179 citations  
  • Consciousness and its Place in Nature.David J. Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Malden, MA, USA: Blackwell. pp. 102–142.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction1 The Problem Arguments Against Materialism Type‐A Materialism Type‐B Materialism15 The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Type‐B Materialism Type‐C Materialism Interlude Type‐D Dualism Type‐E Dualism Type‐F Monism Conclusions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  • The Structure and Dynamics Argument against Materialism.Torin Alter - 2015 - Noûs 50 (4):794-815.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Constructing the World.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by Rudolf Carnap's Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt, David J. Chalmers argues that the world can be constructed from a few basic elements. He develops a scrutability thesis saying that all truths about the world can be derived from basic truths and ideal reasoning. This thesis leads to many philosophical consequences: a broadly Fregean approach to meaning, an internalist approach to the contents of thought, and a reply to W. V. Quine's arguments against the analytic and the a priori. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   280 citations  
  • The character of consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    What is consciousness? How does the subjective character of consciousness fit into an objective world? How can there be a science of consciousness? In this sequel to his groundbreaking and controversial The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers develops a unified framework that addresses these questions and many others. Starting with a statement of the "hard problem" of consciousness, Chalmers builds a positive framework for the science of consciousness and a nonreductive vision of the metaphysics of consciousness. He replies to many critics (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   259 citations  
  • Phenomenal Structuralism.David J. Chalmers - 2012 - In Constructing the World. pp. 412-422.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   155 citations  
  • Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.
    Consciousness fits uneasily into our conception of the natural world. On the most common conception of nature, the natural world is the physical world. But on the most common conception of consciousness, it is not easy to see how it could be part of the physical world. So it seems that to find a place for consciousness within the natural order, we must either revise our conception of consciousness, or revise our conception of nature. In twentieth-century philosophy, this dilemma is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   260 citations  
  • Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2014 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Consciousness (Key Concepts in Philosophy). Polity.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • What is Russellian Monism?Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):67–95.
    Russellian monism offers a distinctive perspective on the relationship between the physical and the phenomenal. For example, on one version of the view, phenomenal properties are the categorical bases of fundamental physical properties, such as mass and charge, which are dispositional. Russellian monism has prominent supporters, such as Bertrand Russell, Grover Maxwell, Michael Lockwood, and David Chalmers. But its strengths and shortcomings are often misunderstood. In this paper we try to eliminate confusions about the view and defend it from criticisms. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • Four Kinds of Russellian Monism.Daniel Stoljar - 2014 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 17.
    “Russellian Monism” is a name given to a family of views in philosophy of mind. The family is exciting because it seems to present an alternative both to materialism and to dualism. After briefly setting out the need for this alternative, I distinguish four different kinds of Russellian Monism (RM), and assess their pros and cons. My own feeling, as will emerge in the final section of the paper, is that only the fourth of these represents a viable version of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Russellian Monism and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties.Derk Pereboom - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 40.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Tom McClelland - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):125 - 151.
    We have reason to believe that phenomenal properties are nothing over and above certain physical properties. However, doubt is cast on this by the apparent epistemic gap that arises for attempts to account for phenomenal properties in physical terms. I argue that the epistemic gap should be divided into two more fundamental conceptual gaps. The first of these pertains to the distinctive subjectivity of phenomenal states, and the second pertains to the intrinsicality of phenomenal qualities. Stoljars ignorance hypothesis (IH) attempts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations