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Rationality and the Reactive Attitudes

European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (1):45-58 (2008)

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The objective attitude.Tamler Sommers - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):321–341.details I aim to alleviate the pessimism with which some philosophers regard the 'objective attitude', thereby removing a particular obstacle which P.F. Strawson and others have placed in the way of more widespread scepticism about moral responsibility. First, I describe what I consider the objective attitude to be, and then address concerns about this raised by Susan Wolf. Next, I argue that aspects of certain attitudes commonly thought to be opposed to the objective attitude are in fact compatible with it. Finally, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 60 citations
Why content must be a matter of truth conditions.Angus Ross - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):257-275.details It is argued that if, with Dummett, we see assertion as an act governed by conditions of correctness which makes a claim to the effect that these conditions are met, then the conditions of correctness that determine its content must have the impersonal character of a requirement of truth, rather than the speaker-relative character of a requirement of justification or assertibility. For otherwise it would be impossible for different speakers to use the same words to make an assertion with the (...) same content. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.details The doyen of living English philosophers, by these reflections, took hold of and changed the outlook of a good many other philosophers, if not quite enough. He did so, essentially, by assuming that talk of freedom and responsibility is talk not of facts or truths, in a certain sense, but of our attitudes. His more explicit concern was to look again at the question of whether determinism and freedom are consistent with one another -- by shifting attention to certain personal (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1272 citations
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 2003 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.details Download Export citation Bookmark 741 citations
Accountability.Jonathan Bennett - unknowndetails I shall present a problem about accountability, and its solution by Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Some readers of this don’t see it as a profound contribution to moral philosophy, and I want to help them. It may be helpful to follow up Strawson’s gracefully written discussion with a more staccato presentation. My treatment will also be angled somewhat differently from his, so that its lights and shadows will fall with a certain difference, which may make it serviceable even to the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 65 citations
Why Do We Believe What We Are Told?Angus Ross - 1986 - Ratio (1):69-88.details It is argued that reliance on the testimony of others cannot be viewed as reliance on a kind of evidence. Speech being essentially voluntary, the speaker cannot see his own choice of words as evidence of their truth, and so cannot honestly offer them to others as such. Rather, in taking responsibility for the truth of what he says, the speaker offers a guarantee or assurance of its truth, and in believing him the hearer accepts this assurance. I argue that, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 73 citations

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