In the subsequent pages, I want to develop a distinction between wanting and valuing which will enable the familiar view of freedom to make sense of the notion of an unfree action. The contention will be that, in the case of actions that are unfree, the agent is unable to get what he most wants, or values, and this inability is due to his own "motivational system." In this case the obstruction to the action that he most wants to do (...) is his own will. It is in this respect that the action is unfree: the agent is obstructed in and by the very performance of the action. (shrink)

What is that makes an act subject to either praise or blame? The question has often been taken to depend entirely on the free will debate for an answer, since it is widely agreed that an agent’s act is subject to praise or blame only if it was freely willed, but moral theory, action theory, and moral psychology are at least equally relevant to it. In the last quarter-century, following the lead of Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) seminal article “Freedom of the (...) Will and the Concept of a Person,” the interdisciplinary nature of the question has been emphasized by various authors. Going beyond the boundaries of the traditional free will debate, they have attempted to describe the requirements for agent accountability by appeal to theories of personality, rational agency, and ethical choice. The approach has been a breath of fresh air in the often-stagnant free will debate, bringing new considerations to bear and provoking new lines of argument, and it is an approach that we will adopt in this paper. In the following pages, we hope to show that an under-noticed phenomenon of moral psychology, inverse akrasia, exemplified by Huckleberry Finn, has something to contribute to the understanding of agency and accountability. After presenting the phenomenon in section I, we will move in section II to a quick survey of a family of Frankfurt-inspired views and a critique of them based on the phenomenon in sections III and IV. A new theory will be offered in section V, and potential objections addressed in the final section of the paper. (shrink)

Harry Frankfurt has argued that acting autonomously requires the reflective endorsement of the motives which move one to action. I agree with Frankfurt's thesis as a starting point; but I believe that a richer, more textured account is needed. Several deficiencies in Frankfurt's account have been noted by critics, and there are many who challenge Frankfurt's endorsement thesis. In addition, I identify two problems with Frankfurt's account which have heretofore gone unnoticed and which, in my view, necessitate revision. ;One problem (...) is that reflective evaluation is not required to penetrate to the agent's ends in wanting to act. In Frankfurt's own examples, reflective evaluation focuses on the action promoted by the agent's motives, and does not get to the agent's ends. I submit, however, that action and end can come apart with respect to endorsement, and that reflective evaluation which penetrates only to the action promoted by the agent's motives cannot secure autonomy. The scope of the reflective evaluation requirement must be extended to cover the agent's ends in wanting to act. Second, there are no restrictions on the basis upon which reflective evaluations may be formed. Frankfurt appeals to reflective endorsements as representative of core attitudes, but sets nothing in place to ensure this representation. To the contrary, he insists that there need be no restrictions on the formation of endorsements, that they may be formed capriciously and irresponsibly, on any or no basis. But there is no reason to think that endorsements so formed will bear any connection to core attitudes. I argue that a grounding for endorsements must be found which ensures that essential attitudes are reflected, while at the same time allowing for uniqueness in what those attitudes may be. ;I propose an account which builds on Frankfurt's insight and is responsive to these difficulties. Specifically, I propose a care-based, extended reflective endorsement account. On this account, acting autonomously requires the reflective endorsement of motives, extending both to the ends and actions promoted, grounded in what the agent cares about. (shrink)