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  1. Reduction of Mind.David K. Lewis - 1994 - In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 412-431.
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  • Causation, Nomic Subsumption, and the Concept of Event.Jaegwon Kim - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (8):217-236.
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  • Mind Matters.Ernest Le Pore & Barry Loewer - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (11):630 - 642.
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  • Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation.Barry Loewer & Jaegwon Kim - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (6):315.
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  • Coining Terms In The Language of Thought: Innateness, Emergence, and the Lot of Cummins’s Argument Against the Causal Theory of Mental Content.Robert D. Rupert - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (10):499-530.
    Robert Cummins argues that any causal theory of mental content (CT) founders on an established fact of human psychology: that theory mediates sensory detection. He concludes,.
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  • Qualia and Analytical Conditionals.David Braddon-Mitchell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):111-135.
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  • Robust Nonreductive Materialism.Derk Pereboom - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (10):499-531.
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  • Robust Nonreductive Materialism.Derk Pereboom - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (10):499.
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  • Form, Function and Feel.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (January):24-50.
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  • Causes and Counterfactuals.Jaegwon Kim - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):570-572.
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  • An Argument for the Identity Theory.David K. Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.
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  • Causation and the Price of Transitivity.Ned Hall - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):198.
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  • Aspect Causation.L. A. Paul - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):235.
    A theory of the causal relate as aspects or property instances is developed. A supposed problem for transitivity is assessed and then resolved with aspects as the causal relata.
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  • The Divide and Conquer Path to Analytical Functionalism.David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):71-88.
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  • More on Making Mind Matter.Ernest LePore & Barry Loewer - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):175-191.
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  • More on Making Mind Matter.Ernest LePore & Barry Loewer - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):175-191.
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  • Psychological Laws.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):9-38.
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  • Psychological Laws.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (3):9-38.
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  • Some Varieties of Functionalism.Sydney Shoemaker - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.
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  • Some Varieties of Functionalism.Sydney Shoemaker - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.
    Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties. Empirical functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false. A terrific, in-depth paper.
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  • Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology.Ned Block - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):615-678.
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  • Causality, Identity and Supervenience in the Mind-Body Problem.Jaegwon Kim - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):31-49.
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  • Causality, Identity, and Supervenience in the Mind‐Body Problem.Jaegwon Kim - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):31-49.
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  • The Rise of Physicalism.David Papineau - 2000 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.). Cambridge University Press.
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  • (Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1987 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics. London: Academic Press. pp. 55–81.
    CRS says that the meanings of expressions of a language or other symbol system or the contents of mental states are determined and explained by the way symbols are used in thinking. According to CRS one.
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  • The Properties of Mental Causation.David Robb - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
    Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that 'properties' is used in different senses (...)
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  • Causal and Metaphysical Necessity.Shoemaker Sydney - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):59-77.
    Any property has two sorts of causal features: “forward‐looking” ones, having to do with what its instantiation can contribute to causing, and ldquo;backward‐looking” ones, having to do with how its instantiation can be caused. Such features of a property are essential to it, and properties sharing all of their causal features are identical. Causal necessity is thus a special case of metaphysical necessity. Appeals to imaginability have no more force against this view than they do against the Kripkean view that (...)
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  • Minds and Machines.Hilary Putnam - 1960 - In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Minds. New York, USA: New York University Press. pp. 138-164.
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  • The Best Test Theory of Extension: First Principle(S).Robert D. Rupert - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (3):321–355.
    This paper presents the leading idea of my doctoral dissertation and thus has been shaped by the reactions of all the members of my thesis committee: Charles Chastain, Walter Edelberg, W. Kent Wilson, Dorothy Grover, and Charles Marks. I am especially grateful for the help of Professors Chastain, Edelberg, and Wilson; each worked closely with me at one stage or another in the development of the ideas contained in the present work. Shorter versions of this paper were presented at the (...)
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  • The Divide and Conquer Path to Analytical Functionalism David Braddon-Mitchell.F. Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):39-70.
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  • On the Relationship Between Naturalistic Semantics and Individuation Criteria for Terms in a Language of Thought.Robert D. Rupert - 1998 - Synthese 117 (1):95-131.
    Naturalistically minded philosophers hope to identify a privileged nonsemantic relation that holds between a mental representation m and that which m represents, a relation whose privileged status underwrites the assignment of reference to m. The naturalist can accomplish this task only if she has in hand a nonsemantic criterion for individuating mental representations: it would be question-begging for the naturalist to characterize m, for the purpose of assigning content, as 'the representation with such and such content'. If we individuate mental (...)
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  • Events as Property Exemplifications.Jaegwon Kim - 1976 - In M. Brand & D. Walton (eds.), Action Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 310-326.
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  • Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back.Ned Block - 1997 - Noûs 31 (s11):107-132.
    For nearly thirty years, there has been a consensus (at least in English-speaking countries) that reductionism is a mistake and that there are autonomous special sciences. This consensus has been based on an argument from multiple realizability. But Jaegwon Kim has argued persuasively that the multiple realizability argument is flawed.1 I will sketch the recent history of the debate, arguing that much --but not all--of the anti-reductionist consensus survives Kim's critique. This paper was originally titled "Anti-Reductionism Strikes Back", but in (...)
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  • Reduction with Autonomy.Louise M. Antony & Joseph Levine - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:83-105.
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  • Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion.Terence E. Horgan - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:165-84.
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  • Mental Quausation.Terence Horgan - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:47-74.
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  • Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical.Brian P. McLaughlin - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:109-135.
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  • Holism: A Shopper's Guide.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1992 - Blackwell.
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  • Mad Pain and Martian Pain.David Lewis - 1980 - In Ned Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. Harvard University Press. pp. 216-222.
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  • Psychological Predicates.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In W. H. Capitan & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 37--48.
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  • Mind in a Physical World.Jaegwon Kim - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):671-680.
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  • Minds and Machines.Joseph S. Ullian - 1971 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (1):177-177.
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  • Realization and Mental Causation.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:23-33.
    A common conception of what it is for one property to “realize” another suggests that it is the realizer property that does the causal work, and that the realized property is epiphenomenal. The same conception underlies George Bealer’s argument that functionalism leads to the absurd conclusion that what we take to be self-ascriptions of a mental state are really self-ascriptions of “first-order” properties that realize that state. This paper argues for a different concept of realization. A property realizes another if (...)
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  • Some Problems for Reductive Physicalism. [REVIEW]Pierre Jacob - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):648-654.
    I examine and discuss Jaegwon Kim's arguments against non-reductive physicalism in his book, Mind in a Physical World. I first examine the supervenience argument and then the multiple realization argument. Finally, I raise some questions about Kim's overall attitude towards mental realism, i.e., realism about mental properties.
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  • Sunburn: Independence Conditions on Causal Relevance.Anthony Dardis - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):577-598.
    Causally committed properties are properties which require that their instances have a cause (or an effect) of a certain kind. Sunburn, for instance, must be caused by the sun. Causal relevance is a contingent dependency relation between properties of events. The connection between a causally committed property and the property to which it is committed is not contingent. Hence a pair consisting of a causally committed property and the property to which it is committed should not be in the causal (...)
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  • Historical Kinds and the “Special Sciences”.Millikan Ruth Garrett - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1):45-65.
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  • Historical Kinds and the "Special Sciences".Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):45-65.
    There are no "special sciences" in Fodor's sense. There is a large group of sciences, "historical sciences," that differ fundamentally from the physical sciences because they quantify over a different kind of natural or real kind, nor are the generalizations supported by these kinds exceptionless. Heterogeneity, however, is not characteristic of these kinds. That there could be an univocal empirical science that ranged over multiple realizations of a functional property is quite problematic. If psychological predicates name multiply realized functionalist properties, (...)
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  • Making Sense of Emergence.Jaegwon Kim - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
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  • Mental Representation.Hartry Field - 1978 - Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-61.
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  • Panglossian Functionalism and the Philosophy of Mind.Elliott Sober - 1985 - Synthese 64 (August):165-93.
    I want to explore what happens to two philosophical issues when we assume that the mind, a functional device, is to be understood by the same sort of functional analysis that guides biological investigation of other organismic systems and characteristics. The first problem area concerns the concept of rationality, its connection with reliability and reproductive success, and the status of rationality hypotheses in attribution of beliefs. It has been argued that ascribing beliefs to someone requires the assumption that that person (...)
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