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  1. The Probable and the Provable.L. J. Cohen - 1977 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):279-292.
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  • The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism.Laurence BonJour - 1999 - In John Greco & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology. Malden, Ma: Blackwell. pp. 117-144.
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  • Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems.Judea Pearl - 1988 - Morgan Kaufmann.
    The book can also be used as an excellent text for graduate-level courses in AI, operations research, or applied probability.
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  • What Went Wrong? Reflections on Science by Observation and the Bell Curve.Clark Glymour - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (1):1-32.
    The Bell Curve aims to establish a set of causal claims. I argue that the methodology of The Bell Curve is typical of much of contemporary social science and is intrinsically defective. I claim better methods are available for causal inference from observational data, but that those methods would yield no causal conclusions from the data used in the formal analyses in The Bell Curve. Against the laissez-faire social policies advocated in the book, I claim that when combined with common (...)
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  • What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):246-272.
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  • A Bayesian Account of the Virtue of Unification.Wayne Myrvold - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (2):399-423.
    A Bayesian account of the virtue of unification is given. On this account, the ability of a theory to unify disparate phenomena consists in the ability of the theory to render such phenomena informationally relevant to each other. It is shown that such ability contributes to the evidential support of the theory, and hence that preference for theories that unify the phenomena need not, on a Bayesian account, be built into the prior probabilities of theories.
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  • Explaining the Limits of Olsson's Impossibility Result.Gregory Wheeler - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):136-150.
    In his groundbreaking book, Against Coherence (2005), Erik Olsson presents an ingenious impossibility theorem that appears to show that there is no informative relationship between probabilistic measures of coherence and higher likelihood of truth. Although Olsson's result provides an important insight into probabilistic models of epistemological coherence, the scope of his negative result is more limited than generally appreciated. The key issue is the role conditional independence conditions play within the witness testimony model Olsson uses to establish his result. Olsson (...)
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  • Focused Correlation and Confirmation.Gregory Wheeler - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):79-100.
    This essay presents results about a deviation from independence measure called focused correlation . This measure explicates the formal relationship between probabilistic dependence of an evidence set and the incremental confirmation of a hypothesis, resolves a basic question underlying Peter Klein and Ted Warfield's ‘truth-conduciveness’ problem for Bayesian coherentism, and provides a qualified rebuttal to Erik Olsson's claim that there is no informative link between correlation and confirmation. The generality of the result is compared to recent programs in Bayesian epistemology (...)
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  • Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.
    Several forms of symmetry in degrees of evidential support areconsidered. Some of these symmetries are shown not to hold in general. This has implications for the adequacy of many measures of degree ofevidential support that have been proposed and defended in the philosophical literature.
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  • An Impossibility Result for Coherence Rankings.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):77-91.
    If we receive information from multiple independent and partially reliable information sources, then whether we are justified to believe these information items is affected by how reliable the sources are, by how well the information coheres with our background beliefs and by how internally coherent the information is. We consider the following question. Is coherence a separable determinant of our degree of belief, i.e. is it the case that the more coherent the new information is, the more justified we are (...)
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  • Causation, Prediction, and Search.Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour & Richard Scheines - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):113-123.
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  • Is Coherence Truth Conducive?T. Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338-345.
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  • Coherence and Truth Conducive Justification.C. B. Cross - 1999 - Analysis 59 (3):186-193.
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  • Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification.Erik J. Olsson - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
    It is tempting to think that, if a person's beliefs are coherent, they are also likely to be true. This truth conduciveness claim is the cornerstone of the popular coherence theory of knowledge and justification. Erik Olsson's new book is the most extensive and detailed study of coherence and probable truth to date. Setting new standards of precision and clarity, Olsson argues that the value of coherence has been widely overestimated. Provocative and readable, Against Coherence will make stimulating reading for (...)
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  • The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Lawrence Bonjour - 1985 - Critica 18 (54):112-115.
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  • The Probable and the Provable.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1977 - Synthese 44 (1):149-159.
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  • The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 64 (12):396-400.
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  • Bayes or Bust.John Earman - 1992 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):399-424.
    The central problem with Bayesian philosophy of science is that it cannot take account of the relevance of simplicity and unification to confirmation, induction, and scientific inference. The standard Bayesian folklore about factoring simplicity into the priors, and convergence theorems as a way of grounding their objectivity are some of the myths that Earman's book does not address adequately.
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  • On Bayesian Measures of Evidential Support: Theoretical and Empirical Issues.Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori & and Michel Gonzalez - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (2):229-252.
    Epistemologists and philosophers of science have often attempted to express formally the impact of a piece of evidence on the credibility of a hypothesis. In this paper we will focus on the Bayesian approach to evidential support. We will propose a new formal treatment of the notion of degree of confirmation and we will argue that it overcomes some limitations of the currently available approaches on two grounds: (i) a theoretical analysis of the confirmation relation seen as an extension of (...)
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  • A Corrective to Bovens and Hartmann’s Measure of Coherence.Wouter Meijs - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):151 - 180.
    Bovens and Hartmann (Bayesian Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) propose to analyze coherence as a confidence-boosting property. On the basis of this idea, they construct a new probabilistic theory of coherence. In this paper, I will attempt to show that the resulting measure of coherence clashes with some of the intuitions that motivate it. Also, I will try to show that this clash is not due to the view on coherence as a confidence-boosting property or to the general features (...)
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  • Focused Correlation, Confirmation, and the Jigsaw Puzzle of Variable Evidence.Maximilian Schlosshauer & Gregory Wheeler - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (3):376-92.
    Focused correlation compares the degree of association within an evidence set to the degree of association in that evidence set given that some hypothesis is true. A difference between the confirmation lent to a hypothesis by one evidence set and the confirmation lent to that hypothesis by another evidence set is robustly tracked by a difference in focused correlations of those evidence sets on that hypothesis, provided that all the individual pieces of evidence are equally, positively relevant to that hypothesis. (...)
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  • Probability and Coherence Justification.Michael Huemer - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):463-472.
    In The Structure of Empirical Knowledge , Laurence BonJour argues that coherence among a set of empirical beliefs can provide justification for those beliefs, in the sense of rendering them likely to be true. He also repudiates all forms of foundationalism for empirical beliefs, including what he calls "weak foundationalism" (the weakest form of foundationalism he can find). In the following, I will argue that coherence cannot provide any justification for our beliefs in the manner BonJour suggests unless some form (...)
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  • Coherentism, Reliability and Bayesian Networks.Luc Bovens & EJ Olsson - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):685-719.
    The coherentist theory of justification provides a response to the sceptical challenge: even though the independent processes by which we gather information about the world may be of dubious quality, the internal coherence of the information provides the justification for our empirical beliefs. This central canon of the coherence theory of justification is tested within the framework of Bayesian networks, which is a theory of probabilistic reasoning in artificial intelligence. We interpret the independence of the information gathering processes (IGPs) in (...)
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  • Solving the Riddle of Coherence.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):601-634.
    A coherent story is a story that fits together well. This notion plays a central role in the coherence theory of justification and has been proposed as a criterion for scientific theory choice. Many attempts have been made to give a probabilistic account of this notion. A proper account of coherence must not start from some partial intuitions, but should pay attention to the role that this notion is supposed to play within a particular context. Coherence is a property of (...)
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  • Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Probabilistic models have much to offer to philosophy. We continually receive information from a variety of sources: from our senses, from witnesses, from scientific instruments. When considering whether we should believe this information, we assess whether the sources are independent, how reliable they are, and how plausible and coherent the information is. Bovens and Hartmann provide a systematic Bayesian account of these features of reasoning. Simple Bayesian Networks allow us to model alternative assumptions about the nature of the information sources. (...)
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  • An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.C. I. Lewis - 1946 - Open Court.
    We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.
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  • Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence: A Reply to Andrew Wayne.Wayne C. Myrvold - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (4):661-665.
    Andrew Wayne discusses some recent attempts to account, within a Bayesian framework, for the "common methodological adage" that "diverse evidence better confirms a hypothesis than does the same amount of similar evidence". One of the approaches considered by Wayne is that suggested by Howson and Urbach and dubbed the "correlation approach" by Wayne. This approach is, indeed, incomplete, in that it neglects the role of the hypothesis under consideration in determining what diversity in a body of evidence is relevant diversity. (...)
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  • What Price Coherence?Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):129 - 132.
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  • The Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (13):362-364.
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  • Coherence and Truth Conducive Justification.Charles B. Cross - 1999 - Analysis 59 (3):186–193.
    In a 1994 ANALYSIS article Peter Klein and Ted Warfield show that an epistemically more coherent set of beliefs often has a smaller unconditional probability of joint truth than some of its less coherent subsets. They conclude that epistemic justification, as understood in one version of a coherence theory of justification, is not truth conducive. After getting clear about what truth conduciveness requires, I show that their argument does not tell against BonJour's coherence theory.
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  • A Corrective to Bovens and Hartmann’s Measure of Coherence.Wouter Meijs - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (2):151-180.
    Bovens and Hartmann propose to analyze coherence as a confidence-boosting property. On the basis of this idea, they construct a new probabilistic theory of coherence. In this paper, I will attempt to show that the resulting measure of coherence clashes with some of the intuitions that motivate it. Also, I will try to show that this clash is not due to the view on coherence as a confidence-boosting property or to the general features of the model that Bovens and Hartmann (...)
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  • Idealism: A Critical Survey.A. C. Ewing - 1934 - Philosophy 9 (36):476-482.
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  • An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.Clarence Irving Lewis - 1948 - Journal of Philosophy 45 (19):524-532.
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  • Linearity Properties of Bayes Nets with Binary Variables.David Danks & Clark Glymour - unknown
    It is “well known” that in linear models: (1) testable constraints on the marginal distribution of observed variables distinguish certain cases in which an unobserved cause jointly influences several observed variables; (2) the technique of “instrumental variables” sometimes permits an estimation of the influence of one variable on another even when the association between the variables may be confounded by unobserved common causes; (3) the association (or conditional probability distribution of one variable given another) of two variables connected by a (...)
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  • Measuring Coherence.Igor Douven & Wouter Meijs - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):405 - 425.
    This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of the notion of coherence by explicating in probabilistic terms, step by step, what seem to be our most basic intuitions about that notion, to wit, that coherence is a matter of hanging or fitting together, and that coherence is a matter of degree. A qualitative theory of coherence will serve as a stepping stone to formulate a set of quantitative measures of coherence, each of which seems to capture well the aforementioned (...)
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  • Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification.Erich P. Schellhammer - 2007 - Review of Metaphysics 61 (2):438-439.
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  • A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence.B. Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):194-199.
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  • Probabilistic Logic and Probabilistic Networks. Haenni, R., Romeijn, J.-W., Wheeler, G. & Williamson, J. - unknown
    While in principle probabilistic logics might be applied to solve a range of problems, in practice they are rarely applied at present. This is perhaps because they seem disparate, complicated, and computationally intractable. However, we shall argue in this programmatic paper that several approaches to probabilistic logic into a simple unifying framework: logically complex evidence can be used to associate probability intervals or probabilities with sentences.
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  • The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology.John Greco & Ernest Sosa - 2002 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (2):405-405.
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  • Idealism : A Critical Survey.Alfred C. Ewing - 1934 - Routledge.
    First published in 1934, this book evaluates the characteristic doctrines of the idealism which dominated philosophy during the last century. It seeks to combine realism, as to epistemology and physical objects, with a greater appreciation of views which emphasize the unity and rationality of the universe. This work is not a history and does not try to compete with any histories of idealism but it instead reaches an independent conclusion on certain philosophical problems by criticising what others have said. The (...)
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  • Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):377-379.
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