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  1. The Taming of the True.Michael Glanzberg & Neil Tennant - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):290.
    The Taming of the True continues the project Neil Tennant began in Anti-realism and Logic of investigating and defending anti-realism. Tennant’s earlier book anticipated a second volume, in which issues related to empirical discourse would be addressed in greater detail. The Taming of the True provides this sequel. It also attempts a ground-clearing project, by addressing challenges to some of the presuppositions and implications of Tennant’s anti-realist position. Finally, it takes an opportunity to revisit some of the issues examined in (...)
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  • The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam & James Conant - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):519-527.
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  • Fitch's Paradox of Knowability.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2010 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The paradox of knowability is a logical result suggesting that, necessarily, if all truths are knowable in principle then all truths are in fact known. The contrapositive of the result says, necessarily, if in fact there is an unknown truth, then there is a truth that couldn't possibly be known. More specifically, if p is a truth that is never known then it is unknowable that p is a truth that is never known. The proof has been used to argue (...)
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  • The Taming of the True.Neil Tennant - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
    The Taming of the True poses a broad challenge to realist views of meaning and truth that have been prominent in recent philosophy. Neil Tennant argues compellingly that every truth is knowable, and that an effective logical system can be based on this principle. He lays the foundations for global semantic anti-realism and extends its consequences from the philosophy of mathematics and logic to the theory of meaning, metaphysics, and epistemology.
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  • Some Remarks on Restricting the Knowability Principle.Martin Fischer - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):63-88.
    The Fitch paradox poses a serious challenge for anti-realism. This paper investigates the option for an anti-realist to answer the challenge by restricting the knowability principle. Based on a critical discussion of Dummett's and Tennant's suggestions for a restriction desiderata for a principled solution are developed. In the second part of the paper a different restriction is proposed. The proposal uses the notion of uniform formulas and diagnoses the problem arising in the case of Moore sentences in the different status (...)
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  • Discovering Knowability: A Semantic Analysis.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3349-3376.
    In this paper, we provide a semantic analysis of the well-known knowability paradox stemming from the Church–Fitch observation that the meaningful knowability principle /all truths are knowable/, when expressed as a bi-modal principle F --> K♢F, yields an unacceptable omniscience property /all truths are known/. We offer an alternative semantic proof of this fact independent of the Church–Fitch argument. This shows that the knowability paradox is not intrinsically related to the Church–Fitch proof, nor to the Moore sentence upon which it (...)
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  • Knowability as Potential Knowledge.André Fuhrmann - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1627-1648.
    The thesis that every truth is knowable is usually glossed by decomposing knowability into possibility and knowledge. Under elementary assumptions about possibility and knowledge, considered as modal operators, the thesis collapses the distinction between truth and knowledge (as shown by the so-called Fitch-argument). We show that there is a more plausible interpretation of knowability—one that does not decompose the notion in the usual way—to which the Fitch-argument does not apply. We call this the potential knowledge-interpretation of knowability. We compare our (...)
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  • Factive Knowability and the Problem of Possible Omniscience.Jan Heylen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):65-87.
    Famously, the Church–Fitch paradox of knowability is a deductive argument from the thesis that all truths are knowable to the conclusion that all truths are known. In this argument, knowability is analyzed in terms of having the possibility to know. Several philosophers have objected to this analysis, because it turns knowability into a nonfactive notion. In addition, they claim that, if the knowability thesis is reformulated with the help of factive concepts of knowability, then omniscience can be avoided. In this (...)
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  • Why There Isn't a Ready-Made World.Hilary Putnam - 1982 - Synthese 51 (2):205--228.
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  • Actual Truth, Possible Knowledge.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Krister Segerberg - 1994 - Topoi 13 (2):101-115.
    The well-known argument of Frederick Fitch, purporting to show that verificationism (= Truth implies knowability) entails the absurd conclusion that all the truths are known, has been disarmed by Dorothy Edgington''s suggestion that the proper formulation of verificationism presupposes that we make use of anactuality operator along with the standardly invoked epistemic and modal operators. According to her interpretation of verificationism, the actual truth of a proposition implies that it could be known in some possible situation that the proposition holds (...)
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  • Knowability and the Capacity to Know.Michael Fara - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):53 - 73.
    This paper presents a generalized form of Fitch's paradox of knowability, with the aim of showing that the questions it raises are not peculiar to the topics of knowledge, belief, or other epistemic notions. Drawing lessons from the generalization, the paper offers a solution to Fitch's paradox that exploits an understanding of modal talk about what could be known in terms of capacities to know. It is argued that, in rare cases, one might have the capacity to know that p (...)
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  • Williamson’s Woes.Neil Tennant - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):9-23.
    This is a reply to Timothy Williamson ’s paper ‘Tennant’s Troubles’. It defends against Williamson ’s objections the anti-realist’s knowability principle based on the author’s ‘local’ restriction strategy involving Cartesian propositions, set out in The Taming of the True. Williamson ’s purported Fitchian reductio, involving the unknown number of books on his table, is analyzed in detail and shown to be fallacious. Williamson ’s attempt to cause problems for the anti-realist by means of a supposed rigid designator generates a contradiction (...)
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  • On the Paradox of Knowability.Timothy Williamson - 1987 - Mind 96 (382):256-261.
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  • The Paradox of Knowability.Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Mind 94 (376):557-568.
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  • Possible Knowledge of Unknown Truth.Dorothy Edgington - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):41 - 52.
    Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p , there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual (...)
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  • Quantum Mechanics and the Observer.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Erkenntnis 16 (2):193--219.
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  • The Knowability Paradox and the Prospects for Anti-Realism.Jonathan Kvanvig - 1995 - Noûs 29 (4):481-500.
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  • The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael DUMMETT - 1991 - Harvard University Press.
    Such a conception, says Dummett, will form "a base camp for an assault on the metaphysical peaks: I have no greater ambition in this book than to set up a base ...
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  • Fitch's Proof, Verificationism, and the Knower Paradox.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247.
    I have argued that without an adequate solution to the knower paradox Fitch's Proof is- or at least ought to be-ineffective against verificationism. Of course, in order to follow my suggestion verificationists must maintain that there is currently no adequate solution to the knower paradox, and that the paradox continues to provide prima facie evidence of inconsistent knowledge. By my lights, any glimpse at the literature on paradoxes offers strong support for the first thesis, and any honest, non-dogmatic reflection on (...)
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  • Is Every Truth Knowable? Reply to Williamson.Neil Tennant - 2001 - Ratio 14 (3):263–280.
    This paper addresses an objection raised by Timothy Williamson to the ‘restriction strategy’ that I proposed, in The Taming of The True, in order to deal with the Fitch paradox. Williamson provides a new version of a Fitch-style argument that purports to show that even the restricted principle of knowability suffers the same fate as the unrestricted one. I show here that the new argument is fallacious. The source of the fallacy is a misunderstanding of the condition used in stating (...)
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  • Tennant on Knowable Truth.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Ratio 13 (2):99–114.
    The paper responds to Neil Tennant's recent discussion of Fitch's so-called paradox of knowability in the context of intuitionistic logic. Tennant's criticisms of the author's earlier work on this topic are shown to rest on a principle about the assertability of disjunctions with the absurd consequence that everything we could make true already is true. Tennant restricts the anti-realist principle that truth implies knowability in order to escape Fitch's argument, but a more complex variant of the argument is shown to (...)
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  • Victor Vanquished.Neil Tennant - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):135–142.
    The naive anti-realist holds the following principle: (◊K) All truths are knowable. This unrestricted generalization (◊K), as is now well known, falls prey to Fitch’s Paradox (Fitch 1963: 38, Theorem 1). It can be used as the only suspect principle, alongside others that cannot be impugned, to prove quite generally, and constructively, that the set {p, ¬Kp} is inconsistent (Tennant 1997: 261). From this it would follow, intuitionistically, that any proposition that is never actually known to be true (by anyone, (...)
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  • Is Every Truth Knowable? Reply to Hand and Kvanvig.N. Tennant - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):107 – 113.
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  • Victor Vanquished.Neil Tennant - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):135-142.
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  • Tennant's Troubles.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--204.
    First, some reminiscences. In the years 1973-80, when I was an undergraduate and then graduate student at Oxford, Michael Dummett’s formidable and creative philosophical presence made his arguments impossible to ignore. In consequence, one pole of discussion was always a form of anti-realism. It endorsed something like the replacement of truth-conditional semantics by verification-conditional semantics and of classical logic by intuitionistic logic, and the principle that all truths are knowable. It did not endorse the principle that all truths are known. (...)
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  • Revamping the Restriction Strategy.Neil Tennant - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    This study continues the anti-realist’s quest for a principled way to avoid Fitch’s paradox. It is proposed that the Cartesian restriction on the anti-realist’s knowability principle ‘ϕ, therefore 3Kϕ’ should be formulated as a consistency requirement not on the premise ϕ of an application of the rule, but rather on the set of assumptions on which the relevant occurrence of ϕ depends. It is stressed, by reference to illustrative proofs, how important it is to have proofs in normal form before (...)
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  • A SOLUTION TO FITCH'S PARADOX OF KNOWABILITY.Helge Rückert - 2004 - In S. Rahman J. Symons (ed.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Kluwer Academic Publisher. pp. 351--380.
    There is an argument (first presented by Fitch), which tries to show by formal means that the anti-realistic thesis that every truth might possibly be known, is equivalent to the unacceptable thesis that every truth is actually known (at some time in the past, present or future). First, the argument is presented and some proposals for the solution of Fitch's Paradox are briefly discussed. Then, by using Wehmeier's modal logic with subjunctive marks (S5*), it is shown how the derivation can (...)
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