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Two kinds of agency.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 138–162.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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No exception for belief.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
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Reasonable religious disagreements.Richard Feldman - 2010 - In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oup Usa. pp. 194-214.details
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The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
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Are epistemic reasons normative?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):670-695.details
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The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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Instrumental reasons for belief: elliptical talk and elusive properties.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 109-125.details
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Change in view: Principles of reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 2008 - In . Cambridge University Press. pp. 35-46.details
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The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2016 - Theoria 83 (1):4-28.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Moral dimensions: permissibility, meaning, blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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What We Owe to Each Other.T. M. Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Harvard University Press.details
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Just Deserts: Debating Free Will.Gregg D. Caruso & Daniel C. Dennett - 2021 - 2021: Polity. Edited by Gregg D. Caruso.details
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The Value of Rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.details
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The Value of Rationality. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):153-157.details
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Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-9.details
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XI-Mental Ballistics or The Involuntariness of Spontaneity.Galen Strawson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):227-256.details
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Mental Ballistics Or The Involuntariness Of Spontaneity.Gale Strawson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):227-256.details
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Mental ballistics: the involuntariness of spontaneity.Galen J. Strawson - unknowndetails
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Mental ballistics or the involuntariness of spontaniety.Gale Strawson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):227-257.details
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Epistemic partiality in friendship.Sarah Stroud - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):498-524.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.details
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An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.details
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Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.details
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Responsibility as Answerability.Angela M. Smith - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):99-126.details
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Rationality and Responsibility.Sebastian Schmidt - 2020 - Australasian Philosophical Review 4 (4):379-385.details
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No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.details
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Against the New Evidentialists.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):208-223.details
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Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief.Andrew Reisner - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):17 - 27.details
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Foundations of an Ethics of Belief.Anne Meylan - 2013 - De Gruyter.details
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The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2016 - Theoria 82 (4):4-28.details
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Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further.Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):199-216.details
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Do epistemic reasons bear on the ought simpliciter?Susanne Mantel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):214-227.details
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The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
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Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.details
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Rationality as the Rule of Reason.Antti Kauppinen - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):538-559.details
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Weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief.Christopher Howard - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2227-2243.details
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Is Evidence Normative?Frank Hofmann - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):1-18.details
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Is Evidence Normative?Frank Hofmann - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):667-684.details
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The force and fairness of blame.Pamela Hieronymi - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):115–148.details
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Reflection and Responsibility.Pamela Hieronymi - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1):3-41.details
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Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.details
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Controlling attitudes.Pamela Hieronymi - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.details
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Believing reasonably.John Heil - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):47-61.details
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