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Evidence, Hypothesis, and Grue

Erkenntnis 79 (3):571-591 (2014)

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  1. Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...)
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  • Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic.Brian Skyrms - 1966 - Belmont, CA, USA: Belmont, Calif., Dickenson Pub. Co..
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  • Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability.R. Carnap & R. Jeffrey (eds.) - 1971 - University of California Press.
    A basic system of inductive logic; An axiomatic foundation for the logic of inductive generalization; A survey of inductive systems; On the condition of partial exchangeability; Representation theorems of the de finetti type; De finetti's generalizations of excahngeability; The structure of probabilities defined on first-order languages; A subjectivit's guide to objective chance.
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  • Grue!: The New Riddle of Induction.Douglas Frank Stalker - 1994 - Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court.
    Introduction 1 1 Inductive Inference: A New Approach 19 2 Luck, License, and Lingo 31 3 Natural Kinds 41 4 Concerning a Fiction about How Facts Are Forecast 57 5 Grue 79 6 Concepts of Projectibility and the Problems of Induction 97 7 Induction, Conceptual Spaces, and AI 117 8 The Projectibility Constraint 135 9 Simplicity as a Pragmatic Criterion for Deciding What Hypotheses to Take Seriously 153 10 A Grue Thought in a Bleen Shade: ’Grue’ as a Disjunctive Predicate (...)
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  • Choice and Chance: An Introduction to Inductive Logic.Brian Skyrms - 1966 - Belmont, CA, USA: Dickenson Pub. Co..
    Preface. I. BASICS OF LOGIC. Introduction. The Structure of Simple Statements. The Structure of Complex Statements. Simple and Complex Properties. Validity. 2. PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC. Introduction. Arguments. Logic. Inductive versus Deductive Logic. Epistemic Probability. Probability and the Problems of Inductive Logic. 3. THE TRADITIONAL PROBLEM OF INDUCTION. Introduction. Hume’s Argument. The Inductive Justification of Induction. The Pragmatic Justification of Induction. Summary. IV. THE GOODMAN PARADOX AND THE NEW RIDDLE OF INDUCTION. Introduction. Regularities and Projection. The Goodman Paradox. The Goodman (...)
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  • Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
    APA PsycNET abstract: This is the first volume of a two-volume work on Probability and Induction. Because the writer holds that probability logic is identical with inductive logic, this work is devoted to philosophical problems concerning the nature of probability and inductive reasoning. The author rejects a statistical frequency basis for probability in favor of a logical relation between two statements or propositions. Probability "is the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis (or conclusion) on the basis of some given evidence (...)
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  • Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Philosophy 31 (118):268-269.
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  • Evidence and Knowledge.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):241-262.
    According to Williamson, your evidence consists of all and only what you know (E = K). According to his critics, it doesn’t. While E = K calls for revision, the revisions it calls for are minor. E = K gets this much right. Only true propositions can constitute evidence and anything you know non-inferentially is part of your evidence. In this paper, I defend these two theses about evidence and its possession from Williamson’s critics who think we should break more (...)
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  • Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
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  • Logical Foundations of Probability, 2nd Edition.R. Carnap - 1962 - Chicago Univeresity Press.
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  • On the Application of Inductive Logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8 (1):133-148.
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  • Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
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  • Reply to Israel on the New Riddle of Induction.Robert Kowalenko - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):549-552.
    Israel 2004 claims that numerous philosophers have misinterpreted Goodman’s original ‘New Riddle of Induction’, and weakened it in the process, because they do not define ‘grue’ as referring to past observations. Both claims are false: Goodman clearly took the riddle to concern the maximally general problem of “projecting” any type of characteristic from a given realm of objects into another, and since this problem subsumes Israel’s, Goodman formulated a stronger philosophical challenge than the latter surmises.
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  • Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1965 - New York: The Free Press.
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  • Two Interpretations of ‘Grue’– or How to Misunderstand the New Riddle of Induction.Rami Israel - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):335–339.
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  • Goodman’s “New Riddle‘.Branden Fitelson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613-643.
    First, a brief historical trace of the developments in confirmation theory leading up to Goodman's infamous "grue" paradox is presented. Then, Goodman's argument is analyzed from both Hempelian and Bayesian perspectives. A guiding analogy is drawn between certain arguments against classical deductive logic, and Goodman's "grue" argument against classical inductive logic. The upshot of this analogy is that the "New Riddle" is not as vexing as many commentators have claimed. Specifically, the analogy reveals an intimate connection between Goodman's problem, and (...)
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  • Grue.Frank Jackson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (5):113-131.
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  • Studies in the Logic of Confirmation (I.).Carl Gustav Hempel - 1945 - Mind 54 (213):1-26.
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  • Studies in the Logic of Confirmation (II.).Carl Gustav Hempel - 1945 - Mind 54 (214):97-121.
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  • Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
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  • Aspects of Scientific Explanation.Carl Hempel - 1965 - In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Free Press. pp. 504.
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  • Natural Kinds.W. V. O. Quine - 1991 - In Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science. MIT Press. pp. 159--170.
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  • Natural Kinds.W. V. Quine - 1970 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 5.
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  • On the New Riddle of Induction.S. F. Barker & Peter Achinstein - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (4):511-522.
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  • Natural Kinds.W. V. O. Quine - 2011 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 234-248.
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  • Two Interpretations of 'Grue'- or How to Misunderstand the New Riddle of Induction.R. Israel - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):335-339.
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  • A Purely Syntactical Definition of Confirmation.Carl G. Hempel - 1943 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):122-143.
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  • Studies in the Logic of Confirmation.Carl A. Hempel - 1983 - In Peter Achinstein (ed.), The Concept of Evidence. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-26.
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