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  1. How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Visual Imagery. E. Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):35-53.
    Philosophers tend to assume that we have excellent knowledge of our own current conscious experience or 'phenomenology'. I argue that our knowledge of one aspect of our experience, the experience of visual imagery, is actually rather poor. Precedent for this position is found among the introspective psychologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two main arguments are advanced toward the conclusion that our knowledge of our own imagery is poor. First, the reader is asked to form a visual (...)
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  • Auguste Comte and Positivism.John Stuart Mill - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    Reissued in its revised 1866 second edition, this work by John Stuart Mill discusses the positivist views of the French philosopher and social scientist Auguste Comte. Comte is regarded as the founder of positivism, the doctrine that all knowledge must derive from sensory experience. The two-part text was originally printed as two articles in the Westminster Review in 1865. Part 1 offers an analysis of Comte's earlier works on positivism in the natural and social sciences, while Part 2 considers its (...)
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  • Verbal Reports on the Contents of Consciousness: Reconsidering Introspectionist Methodology.Eddy A. Nahmias - 2002 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 8.
    Doctors must now take a fifth vital sign from their patients: pain reports. I use this as a case study to discuss how different schools of psychology (introspectionism, behaviorism, cognitive psychology) have treated verbal reports about the contents of consciousness. After examining these differences, I suggest that, with new methods of mapping data about neurobiological states with behavioral data and with verbal reports about conscious experience, we should reconsider some of the introspectionists' goals and methods. I discuss examples from cognitive (...)
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  • Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are the Bonds Too Tight?Andy Clark - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):495-519.
    How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and (I shall argue) philosophically influential conception, the links are often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this idea (which I (...)
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  • Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are the Bonds Too Tight?Andy Clark - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (4):495.
    How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do the conscious contents of visual experience guide, bear upon, or otherwise inform our ongoing motor activities? According to an intuitive and philosophically influential conception, the links are often quite direct. The contents of conscious visual experience, according to this conception, are typically active in the control and guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-dimensional world. But this idea is hostage to empirical fortune. (...)
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  • Consciousness in Action.Jennifer Church & S. L. Hurley - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):465.
    Hurley’s is a difficult book to work through—partly because of its length and the complexity of its arguments, but also because each of the ten essays of which it is composed has a rather different starting point and focus, and because few of her arguments achieve real closure. Essay 2 discusses competing interpretations of Kant, essay 4 articulates nonconceptual forms of self-consciousness, essay 5 offers fresh interpretations of commissurotomy patients’ behavior, essay 6 develops an objection to Wittgenstein on rule following, (...)
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  • Is Experience Transparent?Charles Siewert - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):15-41.
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  • Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry.Helen E. Longino (ed.) - 1990 - Princeton University Press.
    This is an important book precisely because there is none other quite like it.
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  • The Intelligent Eye.Richard Gregory - 1970 - Mcgraw-Hill.
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  • Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2000 - MIT Press.
    A further development of Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness along with replies to common objections.
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  • Sense and Sensibilia.J. L. AUSTIN - 1962 - Oxford University Press.
    This book is the one to put into the hands of those who have been over-impressed by Austin 's critics....[Warnock's] brilliant editing puts everybody who is concerned with philosophical problems in his debt.
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  • Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.Richard E. Nisbett & Lee Ross - 1980 - Prentice-Hall.
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  • Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Harvard University Press.
    In this important book, Susan Hurley sheds new light on consciousness by examining its relationships to action from various angles. She assesses the role of agency in the unity of a conscious perspective, and argues that perception and action are more deeply interdependent than we usually assume. A standard view conceives perception as input from world to mind and action as output from mind to world, with the serious business of thought in between. Hurley criticizes this picture, and considers how (...)
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  • Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories, and explores a number of important issues: the (...)
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  • The Psychology of Consciousness.G. W. Farthing - 1992 - Prentice-Hall.
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  • Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - MIT Press.
    In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
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  • Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Penguin Books.
    Little, Brown, 1992 Review by Glenn Branch on Jul 5th 1999 Volume: 3, Number: 27.
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  • The Foundations Of Empirical Knowledge.A. J. Ayer - 1940 - Macmillan.
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  • The Structure of Justification.Robert Audi - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...)
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  • Why Did We Think We Dreamed in Black and White?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (4):649-660.
    In the 1950s, dream researchers commonly thought that dreams were predominantly a black and white phenomenon, although both earlier and later treatments of dreaming assume or assert that dreams have color. The first half of the twentieth century saw the rise of black and white film media, and it is likely that the emergence of the view that dreams are black and white was connected to this change in film technology. If our opinions about basic features of our dreams can (...)
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  • On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
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  • Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.
    In 1995, in my book, Ten Problems of Consciousness, I proposed a version of the theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. The present book, in part, consists of a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. It is also concerned with two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness: the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In addition, it connects representationalism with two more general issues: the nature of color and the location of (...)
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  • A Text-Book of Psychology.James Rowland Angell & Edward Bradford Titchener - 1911 - Philosophical Review 20 (5):545.
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  • Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention.Edwin B. Holt & Edward Bradford Titchener - 1909 - Philosophical Review 18 (3):338.
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  • How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46.
    Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our conscious, perceptual experience. Despite this, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be seriously mistaken about our own current conscious experience.
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  • How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation.Eric Schwitzgebel & Michael S. Gordon - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):235-246.
    Researchers from the 1940's through the present have found that normal, sighted people can echolocate - that is, detect properties of silent objects by attending to sound reflected from them. We argue that echolocation is a normal part of our perceptual experience and that there is something 'it is like' to echolocate. Furthermore, we argue that people are often grossly mistaken about their experience of echolocation. If so, echolocation provides a counterexample to the view that we cannot be mistaken about (...)
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  • Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
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  • Sense and Sensibilia.R. J. Hirst - 1963 - Philosophical Quarterly 13 (51):162-170.
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  • The Structure of Justification.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):394-397.
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  • Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes.Roswell P. Angier - 1912 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 9 (5):131-138.
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  • Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes.Robert Macdougall - 1910 - Philosophical Review 19 (3):341-344.
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  • The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge.[author unknown] - 1942 - Philosophy 17 (65):86-88.
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  • Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.
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  • Visual Illusions Affect Planning but Not Control.S. Glover - 2002 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6 (7):288-292.
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  • What is It Like to Be Me?Hilary Kornblith - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):48-60.
    Introspection plays an ineliminable role in affording us with self-knowledge, or so it is widely believed. It is argued here that introspective evidence, by itself, is often insufficient to ground reasonable belief about many of our mental states, and the knowledge we do have of much of our mental life is crucially dependent on other sources.
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  • Subjective Colours and the After-Image: Their Significance for the Theory of Attention.Margaret Floy Washburn - 1899 - Mind 8 (29):25-34.
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  • Implications of the Flight of Colors.H. Barry & W. A. Bousfield - 1934 - Psychological Review 41 (3):300-305.
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  • Mental Paint and Mental Latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.
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  • Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought-Processes.E. B. Titchener - 1911 - Mind 20 (77):108-112.
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  • Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention.E. B. Titchener - 1910 - Mind 19 (76):570-574.
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  • Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem.F. Varela - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):330-349.
    This paper starts with one of Chalmers’ basic points: first-hand experience is an irreducible field of phenomena. I claim there is no ‘theoretical fix’ or ‘extra ingredient’ in nature that can possibly bridge this gap. Instead, the field of conscious phenomena requires a rigorous method and an explicit pragmatics for its exploration and analysis. My proposed approach, inspired by the style of inquiry of phenomenology, I have called neurophenomenology. It seeks articulations by mutual constraints between phenomena present in experience and (...)
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  • Subjective Colors and After-Images: Their Significance for the Theory of Attention.M. F. Washburn - 1899 - Philosophical Review 8:430.
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  • Auguste Comte and Positivism.John Stuart Mill - 1962 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):272-272.
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  • A beginner's psychology.Edward Bradford Titchener - 1916 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 82:586-595.
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  • The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1891 - International Journal of Ethics 1 (2):143-169.
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  • The Schema of Introspection.E. B. Titchener - 1913 - Philosophical Review 22:97.
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  • A Text-Book of Psychology.Edward Bradford Titchener - 1910 - Mind 19 (75):414-418.
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  • Figure-Ground Reversal as a Function of Visual Satiation.Julian E. Hochberg - 1950 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 40 (5):682.
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  • .Hilary Kornblith - 1998
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