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In-between believing.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):76-82.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.details
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Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?Adam Pautz - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 194-234.details
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Finkish dispositions.David Kellogg Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.details
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Structured Propositions as Types.Peter W. Hanks - 2011 - Mind 120 (477):11-52.details
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Dissonance and Moorean Propositions.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):107-127.details
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Occurrent states.Gary Bartlett - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):1-17.details
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Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe.Robert Audi - 1994 - Noûs 28 (4):419-34.details
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Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.details
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Propositional Content.Peter Hanks - 2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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The Sources of Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Cognitive propositions.Scott Soames - 2014 - In Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames & Jeff Speaks (eds.), New Thinking About Propositions. Oxford University Press.details
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Alief and belief.Tamar Gendler - 2019 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Wiley.details
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The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.details
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When is perception conscious?Jesse J. Prinz - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 310--332.details
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The concept of believing.Robert Audi - 1972 - Personalist 53 (1):43-52.details
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Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics.Angela Mendelovici - 2010 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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Unconscious Belief and Conscious Thought.Tim Crane - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford, UK: Oup Usa. pp. 156.details
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The Concept of Believing.Robert Audi - 1972 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1):43.details
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