Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. 精神状态的性质.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In W. H. Capitan & D. D. Merrill (eds.), 艺术、思想和宗教. Pittsburgh University Press. pp. 1--223.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   217 citations  
  • When Physical Systems Realize Functions.Matthias Scheutz - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (2):161-196.
    After briefly discussing the relevance of the notions computation and implementation for cognitive science, I summarize some of the problems that have been found in their most common interpretations. In particular, I argue that standard notions of computation together with a state-to-state correspondence view of implementation cannot overcome difficulties posed by Putnam's Realization Theorem and that, therefore, a different approach to implementation is required. The notion realization of a function, developed out of physical theories, is then introduced as a replacement (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • Other Bodies, Other Minds: A Machine Incarnation of an Old Philosophical Problem. [REVIEW]Stevan Harnad - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (1):43-54.
    Explaining the mind by building machines with minds runs into the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   78 citations  
  • Triviality Arguments Against Functionalism.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):273 - 295.
    “Triviality arguments” against functionalism in the philosophy of mind hold that the claim that some complex physical system exhibits a given functional organization is either trivial or has much less content than is usually supposed. I survey several earlier arguments of this kind, and present a new one that overcomes some limitations in the earlier arguments. Resisting triviality arguments is possible, but requires functionalists to revise popular views about the “autonomy” of functional description.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • What is Computation?B. Jack Copeland - 1996 - Synthese 108 (3):335-59.
    To compute is to execute an algorithm. More precisely, to say that a device or organ computes is to say that there exists a modelling relationship of a certain kind between it and a formal specification of an algorithm and supporting architecture. The key issue is to delimit the phrase of a certain kind. I call this the problem of distinguishing between standard and nonstandard models of computation. The successful drawing of this distinction guards Turing's 1936 analysis of computation against (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   73 citations  
  • Representation and Mental Representation.Robert D. Rupert - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):204-225.
    This paper engages critically with anti-representationalist arguments pressed by prominent enactivists and their allies. The arguments in question are meant to show that the “as-such” and “job-description” problems constitute insurmountable challenges to causal-informational theories of mental content. In response to these challenges, a positive account of what makes a physical or computational structure a mental representation is proposed; the positive account is inspired partly by Dretske’s views about content and partly by the role of mental representations in contemporary cognitive scientific (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • True Believers : The Intentional Strategy and Why It Works.Daniel C. Dennett - 1981 - In A. F. Heath (ed.), Scientific Explanation: Papers Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford. Clarendon Press. pp. 150--167.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   124 citations  
  • Computing Mechanisms Without Proper Functions.Joe Dewhurst - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (3):569-588.
    The aim of this paper is to begin developing a version of Gualtiero Piccinini’s mechanistic account of computation that does not need to appeal to any notion of proper functions. The motivation for doing so is a general concern about the role played by proper functions in Piccinini’s account, which will be evaluated in the first part of the paper. I will then propose a potential alternative approach, where computing mechanisms are understood in terms of Carl Craver’s perspectival account of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • A Theory of Computational Implementation.Michael Rescorla - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1277-1307.
    I articulate and defend a new theory of what it is for a physical system to implement an abstract computational model. According to my descriptivist theory, a physical system implements a computational model just in case the model accurately describes the system. Specifically, the system must reliably transit between computational states in accord with mechanical instructions encoded by the model. I contrast my theory with an influential approach to computational implementation espoused by Chalmers, Putnam, and others. I deploy my theory (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • The Case for Connectionism.William Bechtel - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 71 (2):119-54.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Does a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton?David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Synthese 108 (3):309-33.
    Hilary Putnam has argued that computational functionalism cannot serve as a foundation for the study of the mind, as every ordinary open physical system implements every finite-state automaton. I argue that Putnam's argument fails, but that it points out the need for a better understanding of the bridge between the theory of computation and the theory of physical systems: the relation of implementation. It also raises questions about the class of automata that can serve as a basis for understanding the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   125 citations  
  • Why Everything Doesn't Realize Every Computation.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):403-20.
    Some have suggested that there is no fact to the matter as to whether or not a particular physical system relaizes a particular computational description. This suggestion has been taken to imply that computational states are not real, and cannot, for example, provide a foundation for the cognitive sciences. In particular, Putnam has argued that every ordinary open physical system realizes every abstract finite automaton, implying that the fact that a particular computational characterization applies to a physical system does not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 1980 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   438 citations  
  • Computing Machinery and Intelligence.Alan M. Turing - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   460 citations  
  • Mechanisms, Wide Functions, and Content: Towards a Computational Pluralism.Jonny Lee - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):221-244.
    In recent years, the ‘mechanistic view’ has developed as a popular alternative to the ‘semantic view’ concerning the identity of physical computation. However, semanticists have provided powerful arguments that suggest the mechanistic view fails to deliver essential distinctions between paradigmatic computational operations. This article reviews responses on behalf of the mechanist and uses this opportunity to propose a type of pluralism about computational identity. This pluralism contends that there are multiple ‘levels’ of properties and relations pertaining to computation that can (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Troubles with Functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 231.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   264 citations  
  • The Mind-Body Problem.Jerry Fodor - 1981 - Scientific American 244 (1):114-25.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   176 citations  
  • Computing Machinery and Intelligence.Alan M. Turing - 1950 - Mind 59 (October):433-60.
    I propose to consider the question, "Can machines think?" This should begin with definitions of the meaning of the terms "machine" and "think." The definitions might be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this attitude is dangerous, If the meaning of the words "machine" and "think" are to be found by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the meaning and the answer to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   720 citations  
  • Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1982 - Ethics 95 (2):342-352.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   183 citations  
  • Minds, Brains, and Programs.John R. Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1457 citations  
  • Form, Function and Feel.William G. Lycan - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (January):24-50.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   229 citations  
  • A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition.David Chalmers - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.
    Computation is central to the foundations of modern cognitive science, but its role is controversial. Questions about computation abound: What is it for a physical system to implement a computation? Is computation sufficient for thought? What is the role of computation in a theory of cognition? What is the relation between different sorts of computational theory, such as connectionism and symbolic computation? In this paper I develop a systematic framework that addresses all of these questions. Justifying the role of computation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  • Is the Brain a Digital Computer?John R. Searle - 1990 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 64 (3):21-37.
    There are different ways to present a Presidential Address to the APA; the one I have chosen is simply to report on work that I am doing right now, on work in progress. I am going to present some of my further explorations into the computational model of the mind.\**.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  • Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search.Allen Newell & H. A. Simon - 1976 - Communications of the Acm 19:113-126.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   126 citations  
  • Representation and Reality.Robert Stalnaker - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):359.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   249 citations  
  • A Simplicity Criterion for Physical Computation.Tyler Millhouse - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):153-178.
    The aim of this paper is to offer a formal criterion for physical computation that allows us to objectively distinguish between competing computational interpretations of a physical system. The criterion construes a computational interpretation as an ordered pair of functions mapping (1) states of a physical system to states of an abstract machine, and (2) inputs to this machine to interventions in this physical system. This interpretation must ensure that counterfactuals true of the abstract machine have appropriate counterparts which are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Marr’s Computational Level and Delineating Phenomena.Oron Shagrir & William Bechtel - unknown
    A key component of scientific inquiry, especially inquiry devoted to developing mechanistic explanations, is delineating the phenomenon to be explained. The task of delineating phenomena, however, has not been sufficiently analyzed, even by the new mechanistic philosophers of science. We contend that Marr’s characterization of what he called the computational level provides a valuable resource for understanding what is involved in delineating phenomena. Unfortunately, the distinctive feature of Marr’s computational level, his dual emphasis on both what is computed and why (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Explaining the Computational Mind.Marcin Miłkowski - 2013 - MIT Press.
    In the book, I argue that the mind can be explained computationally because it is itself computational—whether it engages in mental arithmetic, parses natural language, or processes the auditory signals that allow us to experience music. All these capacities arise from complex information-processing operations of the mind. By analyzing the state of the art in cognitive science, I develop an account of computational explanation used to explain the capacities in question.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   80 citations  
  • Computation in Physical Systems: A Normative Mapping Account.Paul Schweizer - 2019 - In Matteo Vincenzo D'Alfonso & Don Berkich (eds.), On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence. Springer Verlag. pp. 27-47.
    The relationship between abstract formal procedures and the activities of actual physical systems has proved to be surprisingly subtle and controversial, and there are a number of competing accounts of when a physical system can be properly said to implement a mathematical formalism and hence perform a computation. I defend an account wherein computational descriptions of physical systems are high-level normative interpretations motivated by our pragmatic concerns. Furthermore, the criteria of utility and success vary according to our diverse purposes and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Computation Vs. Information Processing: Why Their Difference Matters to Cognitive Science.Gualtiero Piccinini & Andrea Scarantino - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):237-246.
    Since the cognitive revolution, it has become commonplace that cognition involves both computation and information processing. Is this one claim or two? Is computation the same as information processing? The two terms are often used interchangeably, but this usage masks important differences. In this paper, we distinguish information processing from computation and examine some of their mutual relations, shedding light on the role each can play in a theory of cognition. We recommend that theorists of cognition be explicit and careful (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Cognitive Computation Sans Representation.Paul Schweizer - 2017 - In Thomas Powers (ed.), Philosophy and Computing: Essays in epistemology, philosophy of mind, logic, and ethics,. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 65-84.
    The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) holds that cognitive processes are essentially computational, and hence computation provides the scientific key to explaining mentality. The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) holds that representational content is the key feature in distinguishing mental from non-mental systems. I argue that there is a deep incompatibility between these two theoretical frameworks, and that the acceptance of CTM provides strong grounds for rejecting RTM. The focal point of the incompatibility is the fact that representational content is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science.Stephen Stich - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143):261-278.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   382 citations  
  • Mr. Russell's Causal Theory of Perception.M. H. A. Newman - 1928 - Mind 37 (146):26-43.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   122 citations  
  • The Language of Thought.Patricia Smith Churchland - 1975 - Noûs 14 (1):120-124.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1273 citations  
  • Why Computers Can’T Feel Pain.Mark Bishop - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):507-516.
    The most cursory examination of the history of artificial intelligence highlights numerous egregious claims of its researchers, especially in relation to a populist form of ‘strong’ computationalism which holds that any suitably programmed computer instantiates genuine conscious mental states purely in virtue of carrying out a specific series of computations. The argument presented herein is a simple development of that originally presented in Putnam’s monograph, “Representation & Reality”, which if correct, has important implications for turing machine functionalism and the prospect (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Why Computers Can't Feel Pain.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):507-516.
    The most cursory examination of the history of artificial intelligence highlights numerous egregious claims of its researchers, especially in relation to a populist form of ‘strong’ computationalism which holds that any suitably programmed computer instantiates genuine conscious mental states purely in virtue of carrying out a specific series of computations. The argument presented herein is a simple development of that originally presented in Putnam’s (Representation & Reality, Bradford Books, Cambridge in 1988 ) monograph, “Representation & Reality”, which if correct, has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Content, Computation and Externalism.Oron Shagrir - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):369-400.
    The paper presents an extended argument for the claim that mental content impacts the computational individuation of a cognitive system (section 2). The argument starts with the observation that a cognitive system may simultaneously implement a variety of different syntactic structures, but that the computational identity of a cognitive system is given by only one of these implemented syntactic structures. It is then asked what are the features that determine which of implemented syntactic structures is the computational structure of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • Functional Individuation, Mechanistic Implementation: The Proper Way of Seeing the Mechanistic View of Concrete Computation.Dimitri Coelho Mollo - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3477-3497.
    I examine a major objection to the mechanistic view of concrete computation, stemming from an apparent tension between the abstract nature of computational explanation and the tenets of the mechanistic framework: while computational explanation is medium-independent, the mechanistic framework insists on the importance of providing some degree of structural detail about the systems target of the explanation. I show that a common reply to the objection, i.e. that mechanistic explanation of computational systems involves only weak structural constraints, is not enough (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1033 citations  
  • Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   574 citations  
  • Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science.Epistemology and Cognition.Zenon W. Pylyshyn & Alvin T. Goldman - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):526-532.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   302 citations  
  • Computation, Individuation, and the Received View on Representation.Mark Sprevak - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):260-270.
    The ‘received view’ about computation is that all computations must involve representational content. Egan and Piccinini argue against the received view. In this paper, I focus on Egan’s arguments, claiming that they fall short of establishing that computations do not involve representational content. I provide positive arguments explaining why computation has to involve representational content, and how that representational content may be of any type. I also argue that there is no need for computational psychology to be individualistic. Finally, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Computation and Consciousness.Tim Maudlin - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (8):407.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • Levels of Computational Explanation.Michael Rescorla - 2017 - In Thomas Powers (ed.), Philosophy and Computing: Essays in Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Logic, and Ethics. Springer.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Why Everything Doesn't Realize Every Computation.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):403-420.
    Some have suggested that there is no fact to the matter as to whether or not a particular physical system relaizes a particular computational description. This suggestion has been taken to imply that computational states are not real, and cannot, for example, provide a foundation for the cognitive sciences. In particular, Putnam has argued that every ordinary open physical system realizes every abstract finite automaton, implying that the fact that a particular computational characterization applies to a physical system does not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Why Computers Can't Feel Pain.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):507-516.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Representation and Reality.H. Putnam - 1990 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 52 (1):168-168.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   203 citations