Switch to: Citations

References in:

Should Law track Morality?

Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (2):205-223 (2017)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. “Already Punished Enough”.Douglas N. Husak - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (1):79-99.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Already Punished Enough.Douglas N. Husak - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (1):79-99.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Rescuing Justice and Equality.G. A. Cohen (ed.) - 2008 - Harvard University Press.
    In this stimulating work of political philosophy, acclaimed philosopher G. A. Cohen sets out to rescue the egalitarian thesis that in a society in which distributive justice prevails, peopleâes material prospects are roughly equal. Arguing against the Rawlsian version of a just society, Cohen demonstrates that distributive justice does not tolerate deep inequality. In the course of providing a deep and sophisticated critique of Rawlsâes theory of justice, Cohen demonstrates that questions of distributive justice arise not only for the state (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   377 citations  
  • Robotic Rape and Robotic Child Sexual Abuse: Should They Be Criminalised?John Danaher - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (1):71-95.
    Soon there will be sex robots. The creation of such devices raises a host of social, legal and ethical questions. In this article, I focus in on one of them. What if these sex robots are deliberately designed and used to replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse? Should the creation and use of such robots be criminalised, even if no person is harmed by the acts performed? I offer an argument for thinking that they should be. The argument (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Towards a Modest Legal Moralism.R. A. Duff - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):217-235.
    After distinguishing different species of Legal Moralism I outline and defend a modest, positive Legal Moralism, according to which we have good reason to criminalize some type of conduct if it constitutes a public wrong. Some of the central elements of the argument will be: the need to remember that the criminal law is a political, not a moral practice, and therefore that in asking what kinds of conduct we have good reason to criminalize, we must begin not with the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Agent-Neutral Deontology.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):527-537.
    According to the “Textbook View,” there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of the fact that only the latter defend “agent-relative” principles—principles that require an agent to have a special concern with making sure that she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology. I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequentialist, as characterized by the Textbook View.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Natural Law and Natural Rights.Richard Tuck - 1981 - Philosophical Quarterly 31 (124):282-284.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   195 citations  
  • The Expressive Function of Punishment.Joel Feinberg - 1965 - The Monist 49 (3):397-423.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  • Introduction to the Special Issue on Deontology and the Criminal Law.Alec Walen - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (4):741-743.
    Deontology holds that the rules or principles that govern the permissibility of actions cannot be derived simply from the goal of promoting good consequences. The definition has to be given negatively because there is still much disagreement about what positively grounds these rules or principles. The articles in this special issue—collected mostly from papers presented at a conference sponsored by the Institute for Law and Philosophy at Rutgers UniversityOne paper in this issue, from Gerhard Øverland, was not presented at the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Defending Why Law Matters: Responses to Commentaries.Alon Harel - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (4):847-859.
    Why Law Matters examines various legal and political institutions and procedures and argues that the desirability of these institutions and procedures is not contingent and does not hinge on the prospects that these institutions are conducive to the realization of valuable ends. Instead, various legal institutions and legal procedures that are often perceived as contingent means to facilitate the realization of valuable ends matter as such.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Justification Under Uncertainty.Re’em Segev - 2012 - Law and Philosophy 31 (5):523-563.
    There is a controversy as to the moral status of an action in the face of uncertainty concerning a non-moral fact that is morally significant (according to an applicable moral standard): According to the objective conception, the right action is determined in light of the truth, namely the actual state of affairs (regarding the pertinent fact), whereas according to the subjective conception, the right action depends on the epistemic state of the agent, namely her (justified) belief (concerning the pertinent fact). (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Rehabilitating Retributivism.Mitchell N. Berman - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (1):83-108.
    This review essay of Victor Tadros’s new book, “The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law,” responds to Tadros’s energetic and sophisticated attacks on retributivist justifications for criminal punishment. I argue, in a nutshell, that those attacks fail. In defending retributivism, however, I also sketch original views on two questions that retributivism must address but that many or most retributivists have skated past. First, what do wrongdoers deserve – to suffer? to be punished? something else? Second, what does (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Duty to Criminalize*: To Be Tortured Would Be Terrible; but to Be Tortured and Also to Be Someone It Was Not Wrong to Torture Would Be Even Worse†.Alon Harel - 2015 - Law and Philosophy 34 (1):1-22.
    The state has a duty to protect individuals from violations of their basic rights to life and liberty. But does the state have a duty to criminalize such violations? Further, if there is a duty on the part of the state to criminalize violations, should the duty be constitutionally entrenched? This paper argues that the answer to both questions is positive. The state has a duty not merely to effectively prevent violations of our rights to life and liberty, but also (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Expressivist Theory of Punishment Defended.Joshua Glasgow - 2015 - Law and Philosophy 34 (6):601-631.
    Expressivist theories of punishment received largely favorable treatment in the 1980s and 1990s. Perhaps predictably, the 2000s saw a slew of critical rejections of the view. It is now becoming evident that, while several objections to expressivism have found their way into print, three concerns are proving particularly popular. So the time is right for a big picture assessment. What follows is an attempt to show that these three dominant objections are not decisive reasons to give up the most plausible (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Sub-Optimal Justification and Justificatory Defenses.Re’em Segev - 2010 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):57-76.
    Justificatory defenses apply to actions that are generally wrong and illegal—mainly since they harm people—when they are justified—usually since they prevent harm to others. A strict conception of justification limits justificatory defenses to actions that reflect all pertinent principles in the optimal manner. A more relaxed conception of justification applies to actions that do not reflect all pertinent principles optimally due to mistake but are not too far from this optimum. In the paper, I consider whether justificatory defenses should reflect (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • What is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice.John Gardner - 2011 - Law and Philosophy 30 (1):1-50.
    In this paper I discuss the proposal that the law of torts exists to do justice, more specifically corrective justice, between the parties to a tort case. My aims include clarifying the proposal and defending it against some objections (as well as saving it from some defences that it could do without). Gradually the paper turns to a discussion of the rationale for doing corrective justice. I defend what I call the ‘continuity thesis’ according to which at least part of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Wrong by Convention.David Owens - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):553-575.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • On Liberty.John Stuart Mill - 1956 - Broadview Press.
    In this work, Mill reflects on the struggle between liberty and authority and defends the view that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” He questions the justification for the limits of freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of speech, freedom of action, and the nature of liberalism itself. This new Broadview Edition demonstrates the ways in which Mill’s intellectual landscape differed (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • American Legal Realism.Brian Leiter - 2005 - In Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Blackwell.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • The Malum Prohibitum—Malum in Se Distinction and the Wrongfulness Constraint on Criminalization.Susan Dimock - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (1):9-32.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Political Legitimacy of Retribution: Two Reasons for Skepticism.Benjamin Ewing - 2015 - Law and Philosophy 34 (4):369-396.
    Retributivism is often portrayed as a rights-respecting alternative to consequentialist justifications of punishment. However, I argue that the political legitimacy of retribution is doubtful precisely because retribution privileges a controversial conception of the good over citizens’ rights and more widely shared, publicly accessible interests. First, even if retribution is valuable, the best accounts of its value fail to show that it can override or partially nullify offenders’ rights to the fundamental forms of liberty of which criminal punishment paradigmatically deprives them. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Should We Prevent Deontological Wrongdoing?Re’em Segev - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2049-2068.
    Is there a reason to prevent deontological wrongdoing—an action that is wrong due to the violation of a decisive deontological constraint? This question is perplexing. On the one hand, the intuitive response seems to be positive, both when the question is considered in the abstract and when it is considered with regard to paradigmatic cases of deontological wrongdoing such as Bridge and Transplant. On the other hand, common theoretical accounts of deontological wrongdoing do not entail this answer, since not preventing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Natural Law Theory.Mark C. Murphy - 2005 - In Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Blackwell. pp. 15--28.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Justification Under Authority.John Gardner - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 23 (1):71-98.
    In a recent paper in the Yale Law Journal, Malcolm Thorburn argued that to enjoy a justificatory defence in the criminal law is to have a normative power that is exercised in the circumstances which give rise to the justification. He also argued that where such powers are conferred on private citizens, those citizens should be understood as acting as public officials pro tempore when they exercise them. In this extended reply, I resist both propositions and reply to some of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Physician‐Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1999 - Ethics 109 (3):497-518.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • Justifications, Powers, and Authority.Malcolm Thorburn - 2008 - Yale Law Journal 117:1070.
    Criminal law theory made a significant advance roughly thirty years ago when George Fletcher popularized the important conceptual distinction between justifications and excuses. In the intervening years, however, very little progress has been made in exploring the structure and function of justification defenses. The reason for this failure, I suggest, is a widely shared misconception about their place within the criminal law’s institutional structure. Contrary to what is generally believed, it is not up to trial courts to decide ex post (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations