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Game theory and rational decision

Erkenntnis 47 (3):379-410 (1997)

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  1. The backward induction paradox.Philip Pettit & Robert Sugden - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):169-182.
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  • Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.Robert Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa - 1957 - New York: Wiley.
    "The best book available for non-mathematicians." — Contemporary Psychology. Superb nontechnical introduction to game theory and related disciplines, primarily as applied to the social sciences. Clear, comprehensive coverage of utility theory, 2-person zero-sum games, 2-person non-zero-sum games, n-person games, individual and group decision-making, much more. Appendixes. Bibliography. Graphs and figures.
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  • Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John Von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
    This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, when Princeton University Press published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry (...)
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  • (6 other versions)Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
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  • Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    _ Convention_ was immediately recognized as a major contribution to the subject and its significance has remained undiminished since its first publication in 1969. Lewis analyzes social conventions as regularities in the resolution of recurring coordination problems-situations characterized by interdependent decision processes in which common interests are at stake. Conventions are contrasted with other kinds of regularity, and conventions governing systems of communication are given special attention.
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  • The Strategy of Conflict: With a New Preface by the Author.Thomas C. Schelling - 1960 - Harvard University Press.
    Analyzes the nature of international disagreements and conflict resolution in terms of game theory and non-zero-sum games.
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  • The minimax theory and expected-utility reasoning.Edward F. McClennen - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory: Vol.II: Epistemic and Social Applications. D. Reidel. pp. 337--367.
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  • Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations.John C. Harsanyi - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a paperback edition of a major contribution to the field, first published in hard covers in 1977. The book outlines a general theory of rational behaviour consisting of individual decision theory, ethics, and game theory as its main branches. Decision theory deals with a rational pursuit of individual utility; ethics with a rational pursuit of the common interests of society; and game theory with an interaction of two or more rational individuals, each pursuing his own interests in a (...)
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  • The theory of rationality for ideal games.Edward McClennen - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):193 - 215.
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  • Some formal problems with the Von Neumann and Morgenstern theory of two-person, zero-sum games, I: The direct proof.Edward F. McClennen - 1976 - Theory and Decision 7 (1-2):1-28.
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  • Self-refuting theories of strategic interaction: A paradox of common knowledge. [REVIEW]Cristina Bicchieri - 1989 - Erkenntnis 30 (1-2):69 - 85.
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