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  1. The Emergence of Human Consciousness: From Fetal to Neonatal Life.Hugo Lagercrantz & Jean-Pierre Changeux - 2009 - Pediatric Research 65 (3):255-60.
    A simple definition of consciousness is sensory awareness of the body, the self, and the world. The fetus may be aware of the body, for example by perceiving pain. It reacts to touch, smell, and sound, and shows facial expressions responding to exter- nal stimuli. However, these reactions are probably preprogrammed and have a subcortical nonconscious origin. Furthermore, the fetus is almost continuously asleep and unconscious partially due to endog- enous sedation. Conversely, the newborn infant can be awake, exhibit sensory (...)
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  • After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?Alberto Giubilini & Francesca Minerva - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (5):261-263.
    Abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the fetus' health. By showing that (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have the same moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact that both are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3) adoption is not always in the best interest of actual people, the authors argue that what we call ‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion (...)
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  • A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness.Robert Van Gulick - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (2):149 - 181.
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  • (2 other versions)Abortion and infanticide.Michael Tooley - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1):37-65.
    This essay deals with the question of the morality of abortion and infanticide. The fundamental ethical objection traditionally advanced against these practices rests on the contention that human fetuses and infants have a right to life, and it is this claim that is the primary focus of attention here. Consequently, the basic question to be discussed is what properties a thing must possess in order to have a serious right to life. The approach involves defending, then, a basic principle specifying (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Two distinctions in goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
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  • (1 other version)When does a person begin?Lynne Rudder Baker - 2005 - Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):25-48.
    According to the Constitution View of persons, a human person is wholly constituted by (but not identical to) a human organism. This view does justice both to our similarities to other animals and to our uniqueness. As a proponent of the Constitution View, I defend the thesis that the coming-into-existence of a human person is not simply a matter of the coming-into-existence of an organism, even if that organism ultimately comes to constitute a person. Marshalling some support from developmental psychology, (...)
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  • Ethics.William Frankena - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (1):74-74.
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  • (1 other version)Why abortion is immoral.Don Marquis - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):183-202.
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  • Abortion and Infanticide.Nancy Davis - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (3):436.
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  • Practical Ethics.John Martin Fischer - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):264.
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  • Are we essentially persons? Olson, Baker, and a reply.David Degrazia - 2002 - Philosophical Forum 33 (1):81-99.
    In the literature on persons and their identity, it is customary to distinguish the issue of the nature of personhood—“What is a person?”—from the issue of per- sonal identity—“What are the persistence conditions of a person over time?” In recent years, Eric Olson and Lynne Rudder Baker have brought to the forefront of discussion the related, but often neglected, issue of our essence: “What are we, most fundamentally (essentially)—human animals, persons, or something else?” -/- Attacking what he calls the Standard (...)
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  • Consciousness and the Moral Permissibility of Infanticide1.Nicole Hassoun - 2008 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (1):45-55.
    abstract In this paper, we present a conditional argument for the moral permissibility of some kinds of infanticide. The argument is based on a certain view of consciousness and the claim that there is an intimate connection between consciousness and infanticide. In bare outline, the argument is this: it is impermissible to intentionally kill a creature only if the creature is conscious; it is reasonable to believe that there is some time at which human infants are not conscious; therefore, it (...)
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  • Principia Ethica.Evander Bradley McGilvary - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (3):351.
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  • (1 other version)So you think you exist? — In defense of nolipsism.John L. Pollock & Jenann Ismael - 2006 - In Thomas M. Crisp, Matthew Davidson & David Vander Laan (eds.), Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Dordrecht: Springer.
    Human beings think of themselves in terms of a privileged non-descriptive designator — a mental “I”. Such thoughts are called “_de se_” thoughts. The mind/body problem is the problem of deciding what kind of thing I am, and it can be regarded as arising from the fact that we think of ourselves non-descriptively. Why do we think of ourselves in this way? We investigate the functional role of “I” (and also “here” and “now”) in cognition, arguing that the use of (...)
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