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  1. Counterfactual Scorekeeping.Anthony S. Gillies - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):329 - 360.
    Counterfactuals are typically thought--given the force of Sobel sequences--to be variably strict conditionals. I go the other way. Sobel sequences and (what I call) Hegel sequences push us to a strict conditional analysis of counterfactuals: counterfactuals amount to some necessity modal scoped over a plain material conditional, just which modal being a function of context. To make this worth saying I need to say just how counterfactuals and context interact. No easy feat, but I have something to say on the (...)
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  • Epistemic Logic in the Later Middle Ages.Ivan Boh - 1993 - Routledge.
    _Epistemic Logic_ studies statements containing verbs such as 'know' and 'wish'. It is one of the most exciting areas in medieval philosophy. Neglected almost entirely after the end of the Middle Ages, it has been rediscovered by philosophers of the present century. This is the first comprehensive study of the subject. Ivan Boh explores the rules for entailment between epistemic statements, the search for the conditions of knowing contingent propositions, the problems of substitutivity in intentional contexts, the relationship between epistemic (...)
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  • Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
    David Lewis (1941-2001) was Class of 1943 University Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. His contributions spanned philosophical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and epistemology. In On the Plurality of Worlds, he defended his challenging metaphysical position, "modal realism." He was also the author of the books Convention, Counterfactuals, Parts of Classes, and several volumes of collected papers.
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  • How to Believe a Conditional.D. H. Mellor - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (5):233-248.
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  • Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
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  • The Problem of True-True Counterfactuals.Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):276-285.
    Early commentators on David Lewis's account of counterfactuals noted that certain examples suggest that some counterfactuals with true antecedents and true consequents are false. Lewis's account has the consequence that all such counterfactuals are true, leaving us to choose between explaining away our intuitions about the examples in question or offering an alternative to Lewis's account. Here I argue that a simple modification of the familiar Lewisian truth conditions yields the intuitively correct verdicts about these examples, and so we can (...)
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  • Why Hypothetical Syllogism is Invalid for Indicative Conditionals.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):40-43.
    In this article, I present a schema for generating counterexamples to the argument form known as Hypothetical Syllogism with indicative conditionals. If my schema for generating counterexamples to HS works as I think it does, then HS is invalid for indicative conditionals.
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  • Counterfactuals and Context.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):39–46.
    It is widely agreed that contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism fail for subjunctive conditionals. The following putative counter-examples are frequently cited, respectively.
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  • Peirce's Challenge to Material Implication as a Model of 'If'.Brendan S. Gillon - 1995 - Analysis 55 (4):280 - 282.
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  • Why We Need a Relevant Theory of Conditionals.Edwin D. Mares - 1994 - Topoi 13 (1):31-36.
    This paper presents ConR (Conditional R), a logic of conditionals based on Anderson and Belnap''s system R. A Routley-Meyer-style semantics for ConR is given for the system (the completeness of ConR over this semantics is proved in E. Mares and A. Fuhrmann, A Relevant Theory of Conditionals (unpublished MS)). Moreover, it is argued that adopting a relevant theory of conditionals will improve certain theories that utilize conditionals, i.e. Lewis'' theory of causation, Lewis'' dyadic deontic logic, and Chellas'' dyadic deontic logic.
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  • On Some Claims Aboutif-Then.Martin D. S. Braine - 1979 - Linguistics and Philosophy 3 (1):35 - 47.
    The paper has sought to show two things. One is that the apparent variety of Stalnaker and Lewis's counterexamples is misleading. Several of their examples are quite unsatisfactory because they depend on unguarded language behavior. There is in fact only one type of counterexample that is worth serious discussion, and that has the form of Barense's.For Barense's example, I try to show that it fails as a counterexample to transitivity because one of the premisses is false within the context of (...)
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  • Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards.Stewart Cohen - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):3 - 26.
    This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives reply to skepticism in (...)
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  • Subjunctive Conditionals: Two Parameters Vs. Three.Pavel Tichý - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (2):147 - 179.
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  • Ifs and Hooks: A Rejoinder.Michael Clark - 1974 - Analysis 34 (January):77-83.
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  • Interesting Theorems in Symbolic Logic.C. I. Lewis - 1913 - Journal of Philosophy 10 (9):239.
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  • On the Switches Paradox.Daniel Gogol - 1972 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 32 (3):410-411.
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  • Comparative World Similarity and What is Held Fixed in Counterfactuals.C. B. Cross - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):91-96.
    Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (Counterfactuals and Context, ANALYSIS 68 (2008): 39-46) argue that the standard Stalnaker-Lewis counterexamples to hypothetical syllogism, strengthening the antecedent, and contraposition trade on a failure to hold fixed the context in which truth values are determined for the premises and conclusion in each counterexample. I argue that no contextual fallacy is committed in the standard counterexamples, and I offer a different view of what it is for a fact to be held fixed by a counterfactual (...)
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  • It's Immaterial (a Reply to Sinnott-Armstrong).William G. Lycan - 1999 - Philosophical Papers 28 (2):133-136.
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  • Conditionals Are Not Truth-Functional: An Argument From Peirce.Stephen Read - 1992 - Analysis 52 (1):5 - 12.
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  • MPP, Rip.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:411-428.
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  • If-Iculties.Charles L. Stevenson - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):27-49.
    The discrepancy between English if's and the horseshoe is far from being negligible. That is not a reason for distrusting the horseshoe, which is useful so long as it is taken to mean just what it is defined to mean; and it is not a reason for distrusting our English if's, which in spite of their ambiguities are indispensable to our daily discourse. But it is a reason for distrusting the current logical pedagogy that leads students to take the two (...)
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  • The Switches Paradox: Which Switch?Tom Settle - 1973 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 33 (3):421-428.
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  • Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
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  • David Lewis on Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals.R. J. Fogelin - 1998 - Analysis 58 (4):286-289.
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  • Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?Dorothy Edgington - 1986 - Instituto de Investigaciones Filosófica, Unam.
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  • Against the Brogaard-Salerno Stricture.Tristan Haze - 2016 - The Reasoner 10 (4):29-30.
    'It is widely agreed that contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism fail for subjunctive conditionals', write Brogaard and Salerno in (2008: Counterfactuals and context, Analysis 68.1, 39–46). In that article they argue that the putative counterexamples to these principles are actually no threat, on the grounds that they involve a certain kind of illicit contextual shift. -/- Here I argue that this particular kind of contextual shift, if it is properly so called, is not generally illicit, and that therefore (...)
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  • Some Remarks On Ernest Adams' Theory Of Indicative Conditionals.C. Chakraborti - 1998 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 25 (4):495-510.
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  • Three Dogmas of 'If'.Rani Lill Anjum - 2008 - In A. Leirfall & T. Sandmel (eds.), Enhet i Mangfold. Unipub.
    In this paper I argue that a truth functional account of conditional statements ‘if A then B’ not only is inadequate, but that it eliminates the very conditionality expressed by ‘if’. Focusing only on the truth-values of the statements ‘A’ and ‘B’ and different combinations of these, one is bound to miss out on the conditional relation expressed between them. But this is not a flaw only of truth functionality and the material conditional. All approaches that try to treat conditionals (...)
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