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Phenomenal Conservatism and the Principle of Credulity.William G. Lycan - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 293-305.details
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Believable Evidence.Veli Mitova - 2017 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-22.details
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Knowledge Is Belief For Sufficient (Objective and Subjective) Reason.Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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How knowledge works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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