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Provides comprehensive coverage of logical structure as well as the techniques of formal reasoning. |
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The "problem of counterfactuals," as proposed by Goodman and Chisholm, cannot be solved. However, a similar program, pioneered by Hiż and Mrs. Milmed, but largely neglected, can be completed and promises a satisfactory analysis of subjunctive conditionals. |
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The discrepancy between English if's and the horseshoe is far from being negligible. That is not a reason for distrusting the horseshoe, which is useful so long as it is taken to mean just what it is defined to mean; and it is not a reason for distrusting our English if's, which in spite of their ambiguities are indispensable to our daily discourse. But it is a reason for distrusting the current logical pedagogy that leads students to take the two (...) |
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This paper examines a neglected puzzle about conditionals: namely, the fact that each of a pair of conditionals with incompatible consequents, [A > C] and [B > C*], may be properly affirmable in circumstances when one does not believe, and is not entitled to infer, the denial of the conjunction of the antecedents, i.e. ~(A & B). The puzzle is why this should be so, since the conditionals entail the conjunction on the popular accounts of conditionals. I present a pragmatic (...) |
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Classic work by one of the most brilliant figures in post-war analytic philosophy. |
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Counterfactuals is David Lewis' forceful presentation of and sustained argument for a particular view about propositions which express contrary to fact conditionals, including his famous defense of realism about possible worlds and his theory of laws of nature. |
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In his 1987 book _Conditionals |
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This collection introduces the reader to some of the most interesting current work on conditionals. Particular attention is paid to possible world semantics for conditionals, the role of conditional probability in helping us to understand conditionals, implicature and the material conditional, and subjunctive versus indicative conditionals. Contributors include V.H. Dudman, Dorothy Edgington, Nelson Goodman, H.P. Grice, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker. |
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The standard propositional exposition of necessary and sufficient conditions, as available in introductory logic texts, leads to a contradiction. It should be abolished. |
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The purpose of this note is to dispute Michael Ayers' claim that "there is no special problem of subjunctive conditionals". |
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Conditional sentences are among the most intriguing and puzzling features of language, and analysis of their meaning and function has important implications for, and uses in, many areas of philosophy. Jonathan Bennett, one of the world's leading experts, distils many years' work and teaching into this book, making it the fullest and most authoritative treatment of the subject. |
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This book contends that insufficient attention has been paid to the syntax of conditionals, as investigated by linguists. |
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Solves what is sometimes, but not always, referred to as the third paradox of material implication. Readers downloading this piece should please also download the corrigendum. Note that "pragmatic" is here used in its original sense of context-sensitive, that is, adjacency. (This comment is made in response to an article in a student journal published in the western U.S. which claimed that I said that because something involves translation it must be pragmatic; that is so, in the original sense; only (...) |
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