Berkeley's idealism started a revolution in philosophy. As one of the great empiricist thinkers he not only influenced British philosophers from Hume to Russell and the logical positivists in the twentieth century, he also set the scene for the continental idealism of Hegel and even the philosophy of Marx. -/- There has never been such a radical critique of common sense and perception as that given in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). His views were met with disfavour, and his (...) response to his critics was the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. -/- This edition of Berkeley's two key works has an introduction which examines and in part defends his arguments for idealism, as well as offering a detailed analytical contents list, extensive philosophical notes and an index. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME ON SPACE AND GEOMETRY Hume's discussion of our ideas of space, time and mathematics in Book One of the Treatise is referred to by one recent commentator as 'the least admired part' of this work, while another finds it to be 'one of the least satis2 factory Parts'. Hume himself, it would appear, was not far from endorsing such opinions. The omission of any detailed comment on these (...) subjects from the first Enquiry can be taken as indicating his dissatisfaction with the earlier exposition as well as a felt incompetence to offer a suitable revision. For there was certainly no loss of interest on Hume's part in the philosophical problems of mathematics. In a letter to William Strahan in 1772 he speaks of an essay prepared for publication around 1755 entitled: On the Metaphysical Principles of Geometry, which he withdrew upon the advice of his friend the mathematician Lord Stanhope, who convinced me that either there was some defeat in the argument or in its perspicuity; I forget which... Defects of both kinds are present in the Treatise discussion of geometry and the infinite divisibility of space, which taken together with certain remarks in the Abstract of the Treatise and in the Enquiry, suggest that the problem defying satisfactory solution was the relation between these. Hume was of the opinion that the theory of infinite divisibility constituted an affront to human reason by virtue of the paradoxes it involved. Such paradoxes, he thought, must open the door to scepticism about the certainty of mathematical knowledge, since in the field of abstract reasoning reason is thrown into a kind of amazement and suspence, which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives her a diffidence of herself, and of the ground on which she treads. (E157) Hume's attempted solution involved the rejection of those abstract ideas employed in mathematics and most fundamentally, that of infinite divisibility, but he never succeeded in working out a theory of geometry 2. which preserved its desired status as a body of certain knowledge and yet was at the same time consistent with his empiricism. In this paper I set out to examine the relation between Hume's view of space and his theory of geometry. Firstly I take a detailed look at Hume's arguments against infinite divisibility in an attempt to discover why they take the form they do, and to understand what Hume has in mind when he speaks of that 'minimum' idea which is an 'adequate representation" of the most minute possible part of extension. The second section deals with Hume's account of the genesis of our idea of space. I propose, contrary to some commentators, that Hume does not treat the idea of space on an exact parallel with that of time. Although both are said to be abstract ideas they differ in the relation in which they first stand to impressions. My comments on time are confined to drawing attention to this difference since fuller discussion of passages dealing exclusively with time would require a separate paper. In the final section Hume's remarks about geometry are examined. Here I argue that Hume entertains two views of geometry in the Treatise, one of which is abandoned in the Enquiry while the other remains largely unaltered. Hume opens his account of our ideas of space and time with an attack on the thesis of infinite divisibility which he regards as belonging to that body of doctrines which are greedily embrac'd by philosophers, as shewing the superiority of their science, which cou' d discover opinions so remote from vulgar conception. (T26) Two principles, boti taken to be evident, form the basis of his argument. I shal] refer to them hereafter as principles A and B. Principle A: the capacity of the mind is limited, and can never attain a full and adequate conception of infinity. 3. Principle B: whatever is capable of being divided in infinitum, must consist of an infinite number of parts, and ( ) 'tis impossible to set any bounds to the number of parts, without setting bounds at the same time to the division. (T26, 27) From these two principles Hume draws the conclusion that... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume on Space (and Time) BEN MIJUSKOVIC HUME'S LABYRINTHINE ANALYSES of our ideas of space and time, textually occuring so early in the Treatise, 1clearly testify to his conviction of their central role in the physical sciences, then making such fantastic progress. Furthermore, quite early in the Treatise, Hume indicates his ambition to effect a revolution in the mental sciences comparable to the one Newton had achieved in the (...) physical disciplines, through the latter's conception of the force and effects of gravity. Accordingly, Hume regards the three principles or laws of the association of ideas as a "kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural" (T, 12-13). In pursuit of his investigations Hume commences, in the first part of the Treatise, by insisting on the principle that all our simple ideas are derived from simple impressions and that impressions always precede their correspondent ideas (T, 4, 7). This being firmly established, Hume nevertheless immediately proceeds in the very next part of the work to declare, paradoxically enough, that our ideas of space and time are complex ideas that lie beyond the nature of each and all of our simple impressions. Differently put, Hume is insisting that our ideas of space and time, unlike our idea of, say, a shade of blue, are not derived unproblematically from a precedent, simple mental impression (or physiological sensation, ~ la Locke). Thus, according to Hume, our idea of space is not sensationally given; it is not traceable to an antecedent extended impression as our idea of blue is derived from a precedent impression of blue. Hume's insistence that our conception of space is nonsensational has perplexed competent commentators on Hume. Consequently, even so able an interpreteter as Kemp Smith has been puzzled "why it was that [Hume] did not take the more easy line of allowing 'extensity' to the sensations of sight and touch. ''2 Or again, "How is it that [Hume] has not taken what would seem to be for him the easier and more obvious course, at least as regards space--the course usually taken by those who hold a sensationalist theory of knowledge--that extensity is a feature of certain of our sensations (those given through the senses of touch and sight), and in consequence sensibly imaged?" (PDH, 280). Of this simpler solution both Hobbes (Leviathan, Pt. I, 1; De Corpore, Pt. II, 7, 8) and Locke (Essay, II, 8) had availed themselves prior to Hume. Hence, Kemp Smith has found the section to be tough going indeed and has contented himself, to a great extent, in simply offering a number of historical appendices, suggesting lines of influence on Hume, through passages discovered in the works of Pierre Bayle, Nicholas de Malezieu, and Isaac Barrow. Now, without denying that Hume studied and was influenced in part by the ' A Treatise of Hurnan Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford, 1888); hereafter cited as T. 2 The Philosophy of David Hume (New York, 1964), p. 277; hereafter cited as PDH. [3871 388 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY thinking of these authors (as well as by Francis Hutcheson), I wish to take up and develop in this paper a "historical" suggestion first offered by a student of Kemp Smith's, Charles Hendel; and I shall extend Hendel's point and try to argue a "theoretic" one, namely, that Hume's phenomenalism in the section devoted to space and time is derived from, and closely akin to, a form of Leibnizian idealism. In 1925, Hendel argued that Hume was directly influenced by the Leibniz-Clarke debate over the ontological and epistemological status of space and time; and he held that for Hume space and time, as appearances, were ultimately grounded in the associative power of the imagination.' Thirty years later, in a second edition, Hendel disavowed his earlier claim concerning the imagination and avoided discussion of his prior view that Hume was influenced by the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence (1963 edition, pp. 501, 503). In Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature, which first appeared in 1932 (reissued by Archon, 1967; see pp. 64-65, 67, 73, 77), John Laird also intimated that... (shrink)

This essay examines David Hume's principal criticism of the idea of the infinite divisibility of extension in the ink-spot experiment of _Treatise<D>, Book I, Part II, and his arguments for his positive theory of finitely divisible space as composed of finitely many sensible extensionless indivisibles or _minima sensibilia<D>. The essay considers Hume's strict finitist metaphysics of space in the context of his reactions to a trilemma about the impossibility of the divisibility of extension on any theory posed by Pierre Bayle (...) in the article on "Zeno of Elea" in his _Dictionary Historical and Critical<D>. I evaluate Hume's arguments in light of complaints raised by contemporary commentators, and I compare the inference of the _Treatise<D> with Hume's final words on the subject, in the cryptic Berkeleyan 'hint' of the first _Enquiry<D>, to the effect that the idea of infinite divisibility is subject to general objections to 'all _abstract<D> reasonings'. (shrink)

According to a standard interpretation of Hume’s argument against infinite divisibility, Hume is raising a purely formal problem for mathematical constructions of infinite divisibility, divorced from all thought of the stuffing or filling of actual physical continua. I resist this. Hume’s argument must be understood in the context of a popular early modern account of the metaphysical status of the parts of physical quantities. This interpretation disarms the standard mathematical objections to Hume’s reasoning; I also defend it on textual and (...) contextual grounds. (shrink)

Throughout history, almost all mathematicians, physicists and philosophers have been of the opinion that space and time are infinitely divisible. That is, it is usually believed that space and time do not consist of atoms, but that any piece of space and time of non-zero size, however small, can itself be divided into still smaller parts. This assumption is included in geometry, as in Euclid, and also in the Euclidean and non- Euclidean geometries used in modern physics. Of the few (...) who have denied that space and time are infinitely divisible, the most notable are the ancient atomists, and Berkeley and Hume. All of these assert not only that space and time might be atomic, but that they must be. Infinite divisibility is, they say, impossible on purely conceptual grounds. (shrink)

Scholars have almost universally agreed that Hume's account of space and time as manners of disposition of impressions is inconsistent with one of the most fundamental tenets of his empiricism: the thesis that all ideas are derived from simple impressions. This paper challenges that view and argues that Hume's position on the origin of our ideas of space and time is a profound, original, virtually unique, and even courageous approach to the problem of original space and time cognition, and a (...) theory that allows for hitherto unrecognized expansions to the resources available to his empiricism. (shrink)

Hume seems to argue unconvincingly against the infinite divisibility of finite regions of space. I show that his conclusion is entailed by respectable metaphysical principles which he held. One set of principles entails that there are partless (unextended) things. Another set entails that these cannot be ordered so that an infinite number of them compose a finite interval.