Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

I present an annotated development of the basic ideas of the Geneva School approach to the foundations of physics and the structures which emerge as mathematical representations of the physically dual notions of state and property.

Piron's axioms for a realistically interpreted quantum mechanics are analyzed in detail within the context of a formal mathematical structure expressed in the conventional set-theoretic idiom of mathematics. As a result, some of the serious misconceptions that have encouraged recent criticisms of Piron's axioms are exposed.

I present an annotated development of the basic ideas of the Geneva School approach to the foundations of physics and the structures which emerge as mathematical representations of the physically dual notions of state and property.

The abstract description of a physical system is developed, along lines originally suggested by Birkhoff and von Neumann, in terms of the complete lattice of propositions associated with that system, and the distinction between classical and quantum systems is made precise. With the help of the notion of state, a propositional system is defined: it is remarked that every irreducible propositional system (of more than three dimensions) is isomorphic to the lattice of all closed subspaces of a Hilbert space constructed (...) on some division ring with involution. The propositional system consisting of a family of separable complex Hilbert spaces is treated as a particular case which is sufficiently general to include both classical and quantum mechanics. The theory of the Galilean particle without spin is given as an illustration. Finally, the basis for the statistical interpretation of wave mechanics is developed with the help of Gleason's theorem. In an appendix, a proof of essentially the first part of Gleason's theorem is given which is a little different (perhaps more geometric) from that originally given by Gleason. (shrink)

In their paper “A note on Misunderstandings of Piron's Axioms for Quantum Mechanics,” Foulis and Randall undertake a reply to our critique of Piron's “question-proposition system” (qp-s) which appeared in previous issues of this journal. In the present paper, we want briefly to refute the points of criticism raised by Foulis and Randall (FR). We argue that the “misunderstandings” are not ours, and we prove it.