Double-effect reasoning (DER) is attributed to Aquinas "tout court". Aquinas's account, however, differs from contemporary DER insofar as Thomas considers the ethical status of "risking" an assailant's life while contemporary accounts focus on actions causing harm inevitably. Since one cannot claim to risk the inevitable, and since there is a significant difference between risking harm and causing harm inevitably. Thomas's account does not extend to cases of inevitable harm. Thus, the received understanding of Aquinas's account is flawed and leads to (...) untenable attributions of the direction of intention to Aquinas and to misunderstandings of contemporary DER. (shrink)

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In this paper, I argue that Thomson's famous attempt to reconcile the fetus's putative right to life with robust abortion rights is not tenable. Given her view, whether or not an abortion violates the fetus's right to life depends on the abortion procedure utilised. And I argue that Thomson's view implies that any late term abortion that involves feticide is impermissible. In particular, this would rule out the partial birth abortion technique which has been so controversial of late.