Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic.Duncan Pritchard - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (3):283 – 307.
    G. E. Moore famously offered a strikingly straightforward response to the radical sceptic which simply consisted of the claim that one could know, on the basis of one's knowledge that one has hands, that there exists an external world. In general, the Moorean response to scepticism maintains that we can know the denials of sceptical hypotheses on the basis of our knowledge of everyday propositions. In the recent literature two proposals have been put forward to try to accommodate, to varying (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  • Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
    Counterfactuals is David Lewis' forceful presentation of and sustained argument for a particular view about propositions which express contrary to fact conditionals, including his famous defense of realism about possible worlds and his theory of laws of nature.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   976 citations  
  • Studies in the Way of Words.D. E. Over - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (160):393-395.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   428 citations  
  • On Certainty (Ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - Harper Torchbooks.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   527 citations  
  • Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
    So argues a leading epistemologist in this work of fundamental importance to philosophical thinking.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   616 citations  
  • Epistemic Operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   508 citations  
  • How Must Knowledge Be Modally Related to What Is Known?Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):373-384.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   691 citations  
  • What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
    Something about this argument sounds funny. As we’ll see, though, it takes some care to identify exactly what Moore has done wrong. Iwill assume that Moore knows premise (2) to be true. One could inquire into how he knows it, and whether that knowledge can be defeated; but Iwon’t. I’ll focus instead on what epistemic relations Moore has to premise (1) and to his conclusion (3). It may matter which epistemic relations we choose to consider. Some philosophers will diagnose Moore’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   250 citations  
  • Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   340 citations  
  • Externalism and Armchair Knowledge.Martin Davies - 2000 - In Paul A. Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori. Oxford University Press. pp. 384--414.
    [I]f you could know a priori that you are in a given mental state, and your being in that state conceptually or logically implies the existence of external objects, then you could know a priori that the external world exists. Since you obviously _can.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • An Internalist Externalism.William Alston - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):265 - 283.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   106 citations  
  • On Justifying and Being Justified.Adam Leite - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):219–253.
    We commonly speak of people as being ‘‘justified’’ or ‘‘unjustified’’ in believing as they do. These terms describe a person’s epistemic condition. To be justified in believing as one does is to have a positive epistemic status in virtue of holding one’s belief in a way which fully satisfies the relevant epistemic requirements or norms. This requires something more (or other) than simply believing a proposition whose truth is well-supported by evidence, even by evidence which one possesses oneself, since one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Transmission Failure Failure.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (1):71-102.
    I set out the standard view about alleged examples of failure of transmission of warrant, respond to two cases for the view, and argue that the view is false. The first argument for the view neglects the distinction between believing a proposition on the basis of a justification and merely having a justification to believe a proposition. The second argument for the view neglects the position that one's justification for believing a conclusion can be one's premise for the conclusion, rather (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  • Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant.Martin Davies - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 321-363.
    This paper addresses a problem about epistemic warrant. The problem is posed by philosophical arguments for externalism about the contents of thoughts, and similarly by philosophical arguments for architecturalism about thinking, when these arguments are put together with a thesis of first person authority. In each case, first personal knowledge about our thoughts plus the kind of knowledge that is provided by a philosophical argument seem, together, to open an unacceptably ‘non-empirical’ route to knowledge of empirical facts. Furthermore, this unwelcome (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  • Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
    Nozick analyzes fundamental issues, such as the identity of the self, knowledge and skepticism, free will, the foundations of ethics, and the meaning of life.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   793 citations  
  • How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:137-49.
    What modal relation must a fact bear to a belief in order for this belief to constitute knowledge of that fact? Externalists have proposed various answers, including some that combine externalism with contextualism. We shall find that various forms of externalism share a modal conception of “sensitivity” open to serious objections. Fortunately, the undeniable intuitive attractiveness of this conception can be explained through an easily confused but far preferable notion of “safety.” The denouement of our reflections, finally, will be to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   279 citations  
  • Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.
    A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge because they fail to fully understand the role that the problem of epistemic luck plays in that challenge. I further argue that scepticism is best thought of not as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • What is Justified Belief.Alvin Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   634 citations  
  • Conditionals.Ernest W. Adams - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (3):433.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Sceptics Simple and Subtle: G. E. Moore and John McDowell.Crispin Wright - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):330-348.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?Fred Dretske - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):591-606.
    The debate between externalists and internalists in epistemology can be viewed as a disagreement about whether there are epistemic rights without corresponding duties or obligations. Taking an epistemic right to believe P as an authorization to not only accept P as true but to use P as a positive reason for accepting other propositions, the debate is about whether there are unjustified justifiers. It is about whether there are propositions that provide for others what nothing need provide for them—viz., reasons (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  • Knowledge and Belief.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1992 - Routledge.
    In Knowledge and Belief, Frederick Schmitt explores the nature and value of knowledge and justified belief through an examination of the dispute between epistemological internalism and externalism. Knowledge and justified belief are naturally viewed as belief of a sort likely to be true--an externalist view. It is also intuitive, however, to view them as an internal matter; justification must be accessible to the subject or constituted by the subject's epistemic perspective. The author argues against the view that internalism is the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy.Martin Smith - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (1):97-121.
    Our understanding of subjunctive conditionals has been greatly enhanced through the use of possible world semantics and, more precisely, by the idea that they involve variably strict quantification over possible worlds. I propose to extend this treatment to ceteris paribus conditionals – that is, conditionals that incorporate a ceteris paribus or ‘other things being equal’ clause. Although such conditionals are commonly invoked in scientific theorising, they traditionally arouse suspicion and apprehensiveness amongst philosophers. By treating ceteris paribus conditionals as a species (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Relevant Alternatives.Mark Heller - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (1):23 - 40.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Relevant Alternatives and Closure.Mark Heller - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):196 – 208.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1018 citations  
  • Conditionals.Frank Jackson (ed.) - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
    This collection introduces the reader to some of the most interesting current work on conditionals. Particular attention is paid to possible world semantics for conditionals, the role of conditional probability in helping us to understand conditionals, implicature and the material conditional, and subjunctive versus indicative conditionals. Contributors include V.H. Dudman, Dorothy Edgington, Nelson Goodman, H.P. Grice, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
  • Some Reflections on the Acquisition of Warrant by Inference.C. Wright - 2003 - In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. pp. 57--78.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations  
  • Transfer of Warrant, Begging the Question, and Semantic Externalism.Helen Beebee - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):356-74.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.
    According to a captivating picture, epistemic justification is essentially a matter of epistemic or evidential likelihood. While certain problems for this view are well known, it is motivated by a very natural thought—if justification can fall short of epistemic certainty, then what else could it possibly be? In this paper I shall develop an alternative way of thinking about epistemic justification. On this conception, the difference between justification and likelihood turns out to be akin to the more widely recognised difference (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  • Epistemic Operators.Fred Dretske - 1970 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oup Usa.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   141 citations  
  • Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709-727.
    * Editor’s Note: This paper won the Young Epistemologist Prize for the Rutgers Epistemology conference held in 2003.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign.Michael Bergmann - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727.
    * Editor’s Note: This paper won the Young Epistemologist Prize for the Rutgers Epistemology conference held in 2003.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge.Martin Davies - 2004 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 (1):213-245.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • An Internalist Externalism.William P. Alston - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • Cogency and Question-Begging: Some Reflections on McKinsey's Paradox and Putnam's Proof.C. J. G. Wright - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):140-63.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • Replies.Ernest Sosa - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):38-42.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Asserting.Robert Brandom - 1983 - Noûs 17 (4):637-650.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   123 citations  
  • Conclusive Reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   235 citations  
  • Proof of an External World.George Edward Moore - 1939 - Proceedings of the British Academy 25 (5):273--300.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   167 citations  
  • Indicator Reliabilism.James Chase - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):115 - 137.
    In 'Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology' Goldman offers a theory of justification inspired by the exemplar account of concept representation. I discuss the connection and conclude that the analogy does not support the theory offered. I then argue that Goldman's rule consequentialist framework for analysis is vulnerable to a problem of epistemic access, and use this to present an analysis of justification as an indicator concept we use to track how well the evaluated agent is doing with respect to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses.Keith DeRose - 2004 - In J. Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics. Blackwell. pp. 22--41.
    Fortunately for those of us who work on the topic, Ernie Sosa has devoted much of his (seemingly inexhaustible) intellectual energy to the problem of philosophical skepticism. And to great effect. With the three exceptions of Peter Unger, whose 1975 Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism is a grossly under-appreciated classic of epistemology; Timothy Williamson, whose 2000 Knowledge and its Limits is, I hope, on its way to being a less underappreciated classic; and Thomas Reid, I have benefitted more from Sosa’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Behaviorism 17 (2):161-164.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   310 citations  
  • Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   503 citations  
  • Editorial Preface.Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):i-i.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 2002 - In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 264--287.
    In “Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge,” Ernest Sosa notes that in attempting to account for the conditions for knowledge, externalists have proposed that the justification condition be replaced or supplemented by the requirement that a certain modal relation be obtained between a fact and a subject's belief concerning that fact. While assessing attempts to identify such a relation, he focuses on an account labeled “Cartesian‐tracking”, which accounts for the relation in the form of two conditionals. If a person S believes a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge.Martin Davies - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):213-245.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • Facts and Certainty.Crispin Wright - 1986 - In Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 71: 1985. Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press. pp. 429-472.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations