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  1. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.Willard van Orman Quine - unknown
    Ontological. Relativity. and. Other. Essays. W. V. QUINE This volume consists of the first of the John Dewey Lectures delivered under the auspices of Columbia University's Philosophy Department as well as other essays by the author.
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  • Word and Object.Willard van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    In the course of the discussion, Professor Quine pinpoints the difficulties involved in translation, brings to light the anomalies and conflicts implicit in our ...
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  • A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.George Berkeley & Colin M. Turbayne - 1710 - Auckland, New Zealand: Bobbs-Merrill.
    Thorough introduction to the central ideas of one of the world's greatest philosophers.
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  • Ontological Commitment.Agustín Rayo - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):428–444.
    I propose a way of thinking aboout content, and a related way of thinking about ontological commitment. (This is part of a series of four closely related papers. The other three are ‘On Specifying Truth-Conditions’, ‘An Actualist’s Guide to Quantifying In’ and ‘An Account of Possibility’.).
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  • Meta-Ontology.Peter Van Inwagen - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (2-3):233--50.
    Quine has called the question, ‘What is there?’ the “ontological question.” But if we call this question by that name, what name shall we use for the question, ‘What are we asking when we ask “What is there?”’? I shall call it ‘the meta-ontological question’. I shall call the attempt to answer the meta-ontological question ‘meta-ontology’ and any proposed answer to it ‘a meta-ontology’. In this essay, I shall briefly sketch a meta-ontology. The meta-ontology I shall present is broadly Quinean. (...)
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  • Generics: Cognition and Acquisition.Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (1):1-47.
    Ducks lay eggs' is a true sentence, and `ducks are female' is a false one. Similarly, `mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus' is obviously true, whereas `mosquitoes don't carry the West Nile virus' is patently false. This is so despite the egg-laying ducks' being a subset of the female ones and despite the number of mosquitoes that don't carry the virus being ninety-nine times the number that do. Puzzling facts such as these have made generic sentences defy adequate semantic treatment. (...)
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  • Noneism, Ontology, and Fundamentality.Tatjana Von Solodkoff & Richard Woodward - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):558-583.
    In the recent literature on all things metaontological, discussion of a notorious Meinongian doctrine—the thesis that some objects have no kind of being at all—has been conspicuous by its absence. And this is despite the fact that this thesis is the central element of the noneist metaphysics of Richard Routley (1980) and Graham Priest (2005). In this paper, we therefore examine the metaontological foundations of noneism, with a view to seeing exactly how the noneist's approach to ontological inquiry differs from (...)
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  • Realism, Mathematics & Modality.Hartry H. Field - 1989 - Blackwell.
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  • Ontological Commitments.William P. Alston - 1958 - Philosophical Studies 9 (1-2):8 - 17.
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  • Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Objects and Persons presents an original theory about what kinds of things exist. Trenton Merricks argues that there are no non-living inanimate macrophysical objects -- no statues or rocks or chairs or stars -- because they would have no causal role over and above the causal role of their microphysical parts. Humans do exist: we have non-redundant causal powers. Along the way, Merricks has interesting things to say about mental causation, free will, and various philosophical puzzles. Anyone working in metaphysics (...)
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  • The Nature of the Physical World.Arthur Stanley Eddington - 1928 - London: Dent.
    1929. The course of Gifford Lectures that Eddington delivered in the University of Edinburgh in January to March 1927.
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  • How to Have a Radically Minimal Ontology.Ross P. Cameron - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):249 - 264.
    In this paper I further elucidate and defend a metaontological position that allows you to have a minimal ontology without embracing an error-theory of ordinary talk. On this view 'there are Fs' can be strictly and literally true without bringing an ontological commitment to Fs. Instead of a sentence S committing you to the things that must be amongst the values of the variables if it is true, I argue that S commits you to the things that must exist as (...)
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  • Straightening Priority Out.Tatjana von Solodkoff - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):391-401.
    In recent work, Louis deRosset (Philosophical Studies 149:73–97, 2010) has argued that priority theorists, who hold that truths about macroscopic objects can be metaphysically explained without reference to such things, cannot meet an independently motivated constraint upon good explanation. By clarifying the nature of the priority theorist’s project, I argue that deRosset’s argument fails to establish its conclusion.
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  • On What There Is.W. V. Quine - 1953 - In From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp. 1-19.
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  • Unrestricted Composition and Restricted Quantification.Daniel Z. Korman - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):319-334.
    Many of those who accept the universalist thesis that mereological composition is unrestricted also maintain that the folk typically restrict their quantifiers in such a way as to exclude strange fusions when they say things that appear to conflict with universalism. Despite its prima facie implausibility, there are powerful arguments for universalism. By contrast, there is remarkably little evidence for the thesis that strange fusions are excluded from the ordinary domain of quantification. Furthermore, this reconciliatory strategy seems hopeless when applied (...)
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  • Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts.Kendall L. Walton - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
    Mimesis as Make-Believe is important reading for everyone interested in the workings of representational art.
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  • Quine.Peter Hylton - 2007 - Routledge.
    Quine was one of the foremost philosophers of the Twentieth century. In this outstanding overview of Quine's philosophy, Peter Hylton shows why Quine is so important and how his philosophical naturalism has been so influential within analytic philosophy. Beginning with an overview of Quine's philosophical background in logic and mathematics and the role of Rudolf Carnap's influence on Quine's thought, he goes on to discuss Quine's famous analytic-synthetic distinction and his arguments concerning the nature of the a priori. He also (...)
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  • Creatures of Fiction.Peter van Inwagen - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (4):299 - 308.
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  • Ontological Commitment 1.Agustín Rayo - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):428-444.
    I propose a way of thinking about content, and a related way of thinking about ontological commitment.
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  • What We Disagree About When We Disagree About Ontology.Cian Dorr - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 234--86.
    In this paper I attempt two things. First, I argue that one can coherently imagine different communities using languages structurally similar to English, but in which the meanings of the quantifiers vary, so that the answers to ontological questions, such as ‘Under what circumstances do some things compose something?’, are different. Second, I argue that nevertheless, one can make sense of the idea that of the various possible assignments of meanings to the quantifiers, one is especially fundamental, so that there (...)
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  • Two Dogmas of Empiricism Symposium.W. V. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60:20.
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  • Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
    Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas. One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic, or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience. Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded. One effect of abandoning them is, as (...)
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  • Holes.David K. Lewis & Stephanie Lewis - 1970 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):206 – 212.
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  • Material Beings.Harold W. Noonan - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (167):239.
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  • Designation and Existence.Willard V. Quine - 1939 - Journal of Philosophy 36 (26):701-709.
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  • Objects and Persons.T. Sider - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):195-198.
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  • Metaphysical Language, Ordinary Language and Peter van Inwagen's Material Beings.Daniel Nolan - 2010 - Humana Mente 4 (13):237-246.
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  • No Requirement of Relevance.John P. Burgess - 2005 - In Stewart Shapiro (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 727--750.
    There are schools of logicians who claim that an argument is not valid unless the conclusion is relevant to the premises. In particular, relevance logicians reject the classical theses that anything follows from a contradiction and that a logical truth follows from everything. This chapter critically evaluates several different motivations for relevance logic, and several systems of relevance logic, finding them all wanting.
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  • Plurals and Simples.Gabriel Uzquiano - 2004 - The Monist 87 (3):429-451.
    I would like to discuss the claim that the resources of plural reference and plural quantification are sufficient for the purpose of paraphrasing all ordinary statements apparently concerned with composite material objects into plural statements concerned exclusively with simples.
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  • Quine.Elliott Sober & Peter Hylton - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 74:237-299.
    [Elliott Sober] In 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', Quine attacks the analytic/synthetic distinction and defends a doctrine that I call epistemological holism. Now, almost fifty years after the article's appearance, what are we to make of these ideas? I suggest that the philosophical naturalism that Quine did so much to promote should lead us to reject Quine's brief against the analytic/synthetic distinction; I also argue that Quine misunderstood Carnap's views on analyticity. As for epistemological holism, I claim that this thesis does (...)
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  • A Yablovian Dilemma.Richard Woodward - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):200-209.
    Stephen Yablo (2001) argues that traditional fictionalist strategies run into trouble due to a mismatch between the modal status of a claim like ‘2 + 3 = 5’ and the modal status of its fictionalist paraphrase. I argue here that Yablo is best seen as confronting the fictionalist with a dilemma, and then go on to show how this dilemma can be resolved.
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  • On What There's Not.Joseph Melia - 1995 - Analysis 55 (4):223 - 229.
    (1) The average Mum has 2.4 children. (2) The number of Argle’s fingers equals the number of Bargle’s toes. (3) There are two possible ways in which Joe could win this chess game. In the right contexts, and outside the philosophy room, all the above sentences may be completely uncontroversial. For instance, if we know that Joe could win either by exchanging queens and entering an endgame, or by initiating a kingside attack then, if ignorant of Quine’s work on ontology, (...)
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  • Ontological Commitment and Paraphrase.Frank Jackson - 1980 - Philosophy 55 (213):303-315.
    It is persons who are ontologically committed. But a person is not ontologically committed by virtue of his character, his height, his social standing or whatever, but by virtue of the sentences he assents to. Hence we should look to sentences for a criterion of ontological commitment. This is precisely what is done by advocates of what I will call the Referential theory. In this paper I argue that the Referential theory faces serious objections related to the role paraphrase must (...)
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