One-third of all human lives end in early death from poverty-related causes. Most of these premature deaths are avoidable through global institutional reforms that would eradicate extreme poverty. Many are also avoidable through global health-system reform that would make medical knowledge freely available as a global public good. The rules should be redesigned so that the development of any new drug is rewarded in proportion to its impact on the global disease burden (not through monopoly rents). This reform would bring (...) drug prices down worldwide close to their marginal cost of production and would powerfully stimulate pharmaceutical research into currently neglected diseases concentrated among the poor. Its feasibility shows that the existing medical-patent regime (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights—TRIPS—as supplemented by bilateral agreements) is severely unjust—and its imposition a human-rights violation on account of the avoidable mortality and morbidity it foreseeably produces. (shrink)

Winner of the 1975 National Book Award, this brilliant and widely acclaimed book is a powerful philosophical challenge to the most widely held political and social positions of our age--liberal, socialist, and conservative.

Is it really necessary to add something like the Health Impact Fund to the existing global patent system? We can divide this question into two parts. First, is there something seriously wrong with the status quo and, if so, what exactly is it? Second, how do we best go about solving the problem; that is, how does the design of the reform proposal address the flaws in the status quo? Jorn Sonderholm, in his critique of the Health Impact Fund, or (...) HIF, raises both of these issues. These criticisms afford us the opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to ameliorating glaring problems with the current system for incentivizing R&D for essential medicines, and to clarify why we believe the HIF is exactly what the world needs. (shrink)

This is a new revised version of Dr. Laslett's standard edition of Two Treatises. First published in 1960, and based on an analysis of the whole body of Locke's publications, writings, and papers. The Introduction and text have been revised to incorporate references to recent scholarship since the second edition and the bibliography has been updated.

Despite the enormous progress made in the advancement of health technologies over the last century, infectious diseases continue to cause significant morbidity and mortality in developing countries. Neglected diseases are a subset of infectious diseases that lack treatments that are effective, simple to use, or affordable. Neglected diseases primarily affect populations in poor countries that do not constitute a lucrative market sector, thus failing to provide incentives for the pharmaceutical industry to conduct R&D for these diseases. Of the treatments that (...) do exist for neglected diseases, most are completely out-dated, with poor side-effect profiles, cumbersome logistics of administration, and inadequate efficacy. Historically, the impetus for a majority of neglected disease research was driven by early 20th-century colonialism, and in the post-colonial era, these diseases have been virtually ignored. Of the 1556 New Chemical Entities brought to market during the 30-year period from 1975 to 2004, only 20 — less than 0.02% — were for neglected diseases. (shrink)

The authors suggest creating a scheme that offers new incentives for research on diseases disproportionately affecting the poor, with the goal of making development of neglected disease vaccines a lucrative endeavor for pharmaceutical companies.

In two recent essays, Thomas Pogge addresses the question of how research and development of essential drugs should be incentivized. Essential drugs are drugs for diseases that ruin human lives. The current incentivizing scheme for such drugs is, according to Pogge, a significant causal factor in bringing about a state of affairs in which millions of people die or suffer from lack of access to essential drugs. Pogge, therefore, suggests a reform plan for how to incentivize research and development of (...) these drugs, and he is of the opinion that implementation of this plan will have a significant positive impact on the global disease burden. This paper is a critical examination of Pogge's reform plan. In the first part of the paper, Pogge's reasons for being dissatisfied with the current incentivizing scheme are spelled out. The reform plan is then presented, and in the final part of the paper, it is argued that the reform plan is flawed at a number of levels. (shrink)

Tens of millions of adults and children die each year from illnesses that are treatable or preventable with existing medicines. Each year over 500 million people are infected with malaria, and the disease kills two million people annually. Hundreds of thousands more die annually from a myriad of lesser known diseases including diphtheria, measles, tetanus, and syphilis. Approximately 30 percent of the world’s population, over 1.7 billion people, has inadequate access or no access at all to essential medicines.Not surprisingly, the (...) vast majority of these illnesses are contracted in poor countries. Four million lives could be saved annually through prompt diagnosis and treatment of illnesses in Africa and Southeast Asia alone, and access to pharmaceutical drugs could likely save millions more. Many of the health problems facing the developing world do not arise from lack of understanding of complex diseases. Rather, the problem arises from a striking lack of availability of life-saving medicines for the consumers that need these medicines the most. (shrink)

This article argues that there is no sound basis for thinking that we have a general and strong duty to rectify disparities of wealth around the world, apart from the special case where some become wealthy by theft or fraud. The nearest thing we have to a rational morality for all has to be built on the interests of all, and they include substantial freedoms, but not substantial entitlements to others' assistance. It is also pointed out that the situation of (...) the world's poor is not that of victims of disasters, but simply of less-developed technology, which can be repaired by full and free trade relations with others. The true savior of the world's poor is the businessman, not the missionary. What we do need to do is strike down barriers to commerce, rather than requisition "aid.". (shrink)

Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (CAPPE), Menzies Centre for Health Policy, The Australian National University, LPO Box 8260, ANU Canberra ACT 2601, Australia. Tel.: +61 (0)2 6125 4355; Mobile: +61 (0)431 124 286; Fax: +61 (0)2 6125 6579; Email: michael.selgelid{at}anu.edu.au ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Abstract Thomas Pogge has proposed a supplement to the standard patent regime whereby innovating companies would be rewarded in proportion to the extent to which their innovations lead to (...) reduction of the global burden of disease (GBD). This paper argues that an expansion of this proposal—whereby provision of already existing medicines are incentivised in a similar way—would provide a more comprehensive solution to the healthcare situation in developing countries. It then considers the practical challenges that the implementation of such a proposal (expanded or otherwise) would entail. Though these include difficulties associated with disease burden metric, I argue that the most serious difficulties are associated with the problem of causal attribution. A basic idea underlying Pogge's proposal is that the disease burden reduction attributable to particular interventions can be determined. Theoretically speaking, in cases involving multiple interacting causal factors, there may be no fact of the matter regarding the extent to which disease burden reduction should be attributed to one intervention as opposed to another; and (even if workable practical solutions to this theoretical challenge can be met) the data requirements for implementation would be daunting. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This paper deals with the question of how to price drugs for tropical diseases. The thesis defended in the paper is: (i) there should be no legal constraints on the profits pharmaceutical companies can make on their products for tropical diseases. In essence, (i) expresses the idea that drugs for tropical diseases should be treated as any other product on the free market and that the producers of these drugs should be allowed to sell their products at whatever price the (...) market can bear. The main argument in favour of (i) is first outlined. Five common arguments against (i) are thereafter discussed, and it is argued that all of these fail in their intended purpose. (shrink)

This article argues that considerations about the role and predictability of intellectual innovation make the protection of intellectual property morally obligatory even when it greatly reduces short-term welfare. Since the provision of good new ideas is the only productive input not subject to decreasing marginal productivity, welfarist considerations require that no impediment to its maximal provision be erected and the potentially substantial welfare losses imposed by a patent system be mitigated by taxation of other sources of wealth and income. Key (...) Words: patent system • welfarism • decreasing marginal productivity. (shrink)

Michael Ravvin, Department of Political Science, Columbia University, 420 W. 118th Street, New York, NY 10027 Email: mer2133{at}columbia.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> Abstract The existing intellectual property regime discourages the innovation of, and access to, essential medicines for the poor in developing countries. A successful proposal to reform the existing system must address these challenges of access and innovation. This essay will survey the problems in the existing pharmaceutical patent system and offer critical analysis (...) of some reform proposals. I will argue that existing mechanisms that are intended to mitigate the harms of the current pharmaceutical patent system, such as bulk buying, differential pricing and compulsory licenses, are inadequate and perhaps even counter-productive over the long-term. Other incentive mechanisms based on push funding, such as government research grants, are inefficient and limited in scope. Pull mechanisms, which offer some reward for successful pharmaceutical innovations, offer a more promising incentive mechanism. I will evaluate three pull mechanisms -- Priority Review Vouchers, Advance Market Commitment (AMC) and the Health Impact Fund -- on the basis of their capacity to incentivize access and innovation, as well as their efficiency and political feasibility. Though the Health Impact Fund appears to be the most promising proposal, more work must be done to overcome challenges of its implementation. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)