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  1. Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):455-459.
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  • Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science.Jarrett Leplin - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 52 (2):314-315.
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  • The Book of Evidence.[author unknown] - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):740-743.
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  • Robustness and Integrative Survival in Significance Testing: The World's Contribution to Rationality.J. D. Trout - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):1-15.
    Significance testing is the primary method for establishing causal relationships in psychology. Meehl [1978, 1990a, 1990b] and Faust [1984] argue that significance tests and their interpretation are subject to actuarial and psychological biases, making continued adherence to these practices irrational, and even partially responsible for the slow progress of the ‘soft’ areas of psychology. I contend that familiar standards of testing and literature review, along with recently developed meta-analytic techniques, are able to correct the proposed actuarial and psychological biases. In (...)
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  • Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
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  • Why Do Scientists Prefer to Vary Their Experiments?Allan Franklin - 1984 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 15 (1):51.
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  • Theory of Scientific Method.William Whewell & Robert E. Butts - 1989
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  • What Experiment Did We Just Do? Counterfactual Error Statistics and Uncertainties About the Reference Class.Kent W. Staley - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):279-299.
    Experimenters sometimes insist that it is unwise to examine data before determining how to analyze them, as it creates the potential for biased results. I explore the rationale behind this methodological guideline from the standpoint of an error statistical theory of evidence, and I discuss a method of evaluating evidence in some contexts when this predesignation rule has been violated. I illustrate the problem of potential bias, and the method by which it may be addressed, with an example from the (...)
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  • Mesosomes: A Study in the Nature of Experimental Reasoning.Robert G. Hudson - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (2):289-309.
    Culp (1994) provides a defense for a form of experimental reasoning entitled 'robustness'. Her strategy is to examine a recent episode in experimental microbiology--the case of the mistaken discovery of a bacterial organelle called a 'mesosome'--with an eye to showing how experimenters effectively used robust experimental reasoning (or could have used robust reasoning) to refute the existence of the mesosome. My plan is to criticize Culp's assessment of the mesosome episode and to cast doubt on the epistemic significance of robustness. (...)
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  • Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (4):381-390.
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  • Are Empirical Evidence Claims a Priori?Peter Achinstein - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):447-473.
    An a priori thesis about evidence, defended by many, states that the only empirical fact that can affect the truth of an objective evidence claim of the form ‘e is evidence for h’ (or ‘e confirms h to degree r’) is the truth of e; all other considerations are a priori. By examining cases involving evidential flaws, I challange this claim and defend an empirical concept of evidence. In accordance with such a concept, whether, and the extent to which, e, (...)
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  • Defending Robustness: The Bacterial Mesosome as a Test Case.Sylvia Culp - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:46 - 57.
    Rasmussen (1993) argues that, because electron microscopists did not use robustness and would not have been warranted in using it as a criterion for the reality or the artifactuality of mesosomes, the bacterial mesosome serves as a test case for robustness that it fails. I respond by arguing that a more complete reading of the research literature on the mesosome shows that ultimately the more robust body of data did not support the mesosome and that electron microscopists used and were (...)
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  • Distrust and Discovery: The Case of the Heavy Bosons at CERN.John Krige - 2001 - Isis 92:517-540.
    This essay describes the microhistorical process whereby different groups of scientific actors came to claim that a new fundamental particle had been discovered at CERN. Particular attention is paid to the role of trust, and of distrust, in the directorate's planning of the experimental program and in their interpretation and promotion of its first results. Distrust demanded independent replication; it also influenced the way in which the CERN director general managed the credibility of the results for the world's press, turning (...)
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