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  1. Truth and Probability.Frank Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.
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  • Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):110–132.
    This paper addresses the two extensional objections to the Humean Theory of Reasons—that it allows for too many reasons, and that it allows for too few. Although I won’t argue so here, manyof the other objections to the Humean Theoryof Reasons turn on assuming that it cannot successfully deal with these two objections.1 What I will argue, is that the force of the too many and the too few objections to the Humean Theorydepend on whether we assume that Humeans are (...)
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  • Morality, Fiction, and Possibility.Brian Weatherson - 2004 - Philosophers' Imprint 4:1-27.
    Authors have a lot of leeway with regard to what they can make true in their story. In general, if the author says that p is true in the fiction we’re reading, we believe that p is true in that fiction. And if we’re playing along with the fictional game, we imagine that, along with everything else in the story, p is true. But there are exceptions to these general principles. Many authors, most notably Kendall Walton and Tamar Szabó Gendler, (...)
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  • Particular Reasons.Selim Berker - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):109-139.
    Moral particularists argue that because reasons for action are irreducibly context-dependent, the traditional quest in ethics for true and exceptionless moral principles is hopelessly misguided. In making this claim, particularists assume a general framework according to which reasons are the ground floor normative units undergirding all other normative properties and relations. They then argue that there is no cashing out in finite terms either (i) when a given non-normative feature gives rise to a reason for or against action, or (ii) (...)
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  • Ethics: Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality.David Wiggins - 2006 - Harvard University Press.
    As the need arises at various points in the book, he pursues a variety of related issues and engages additional thinkers--Plato, C. S. Peirce, Darwin, ...
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  • Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):533-562.
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  • Replies.T. Scanlon - 2002 - Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):337-358.
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  • Replies.T. M. Scanlon - 2003 - Ratio 16 (4):424–439.
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  • Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity.David Copp - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):21-37.
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  • Normative Properties.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (s):141-157.
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  • Climb Every Mountain?Michael Ridge - 2009 - Ratio 22 (1):59-77.
    The central thesis of Derek Parfit's On What Matters is that three of the most important secular moral traditions – Kantianism, contractualism, and consequentialism – all actually converge in a way onto the same view. It is in this sense that he suggests that we may all be 'climbing the same mountain, but from different sides'. In this paper, I argue that Parfit's argument that we are all metaphorically climbing the same mountain is unsound. One reason his argument does not (...)
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  • Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):69-78.
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  • Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation.David Copp - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplement 21 (sup1):187–219.
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  • What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?Sharon Street - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (5):363-384.
    Most agree that when it comes to so-called 'first-order' normative ethics and political philosophy, constructivist views are a powerful family of positions. When it comes to metaethics, however, there is serious disagreement about what, if anything, constructivism has to contribute. In this paper I argue that constructivist views in ethics include not just a family of substantive normative positions, but also a distinct and highly attractive metaethical view. I argue that the widely accepted 'proceduralist characterization' of constructivism in ethics is (...)
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  • Deontology.David McNaughton, Florida State University & Piers Rawling - 2007 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oup Usa.
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  • The Reasons That Matter.Stephen Finlay - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):1 – 20.
    Bernard Williams's motivational reasons-internalism fails to capture our first-order reasons judgements, while Derek Parfit's nonnaturalistic reasons-externalism cannot explain the nature or normative authority of reasons. This paper offers an intermediary view, reformulating scepticism about external reasons as the claim not that they don't exist but rather that they don't matter. The end-relational theory of normative reasons is proposed, according to which a reason for an action is a fact that explains why the action would be good relative to some end, (...)
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  • What Are Mathematical Coincidences ?M. Lange - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):307-340.
    Although all mathematical truths are necessary, mathematicians take certain combinations of mathematical truths to be ‘coincidental’, ‘accidental’, or ‘fortuitous’. The notion of a ‘ mathematical coincidence’ has so far failed to receive sufficient attention from philosophers. I argue that a mathematical coincidence is not merely an unforeseen or surprising mathematical result, and that being a misleading combination of mathematical facts is neither necessary nor sufficient for qualifying as a mathematical coincidence. I argue that although the components of a mathematical coincidence (...)
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  • Duty, Rationality, and Practical Reasons.David McNaughton & Piers Rawling - 2004 - In Piers Rawling & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 110--131.
    McNaughton and Rawling present a view on which practical reasons are facts, such as the fact that the rubbish bin is full. This is a non-normative fact, but it is a reason for you to do something, namely take the rubbish out. They see rationality as a matter of consistency. And they see duty as neither purely a matter of rationality nor of practical reason: on the one hand, the rational sociopath is immoral; but, on the other, morality does not (...)
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  • Ethical Naturalism.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.
    Ethical naturalism holds that ethical facts about such matters as good and bad, right and wrong, are part of a purely natural world — the world studied by the sciences. It is supported by the apparent reasonableness of many moral explanations. It has been thought to face an epistemological challenge because of the existence of an “is-ought gap”; it also faces metaphysical objections from philosophers who hold that ethical facts would have to be supernatural or “nonnatural,” sometimes on the grounds (...)
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  • Morality and Practical Reason: A Kantian Approach.Stephen Darwall - 2006 - In David Copp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 282--320.
    A central theme of Kant’s approach to moral philosophy is that moral obligations are categorical, by which he means that they provide supremely authoritative reasons for acting independently of an agent’s ends or interests. Kant argues that this is a reflection of our distinctive freedom or autonomy, as he calls it, as moral agents. A less, well- appreciated aspect of the Kantian picture of morality and respect for the dignity of each individual person is the idea of reciprocal accountability, that (...)
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  • Naming and Asserting.Scott Soames - 2005 - In Zoltan Gendler Szabo (ed.), Semantics Versus Pragmatics. Oxford University Press. pp. 356--382.
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  • Consequentializing.Douglas W. Portmore - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.
    A growing trend of thought has it that any plausible nonconsequentialist theory can be consequentialized, which is to say that it can be given a consequentialist representation. In this essay, I explore both whether this claim is true and what its implications are. I also explain the procedure for consequentializing a nonconsequentialist theory and give an account of the motivation for doing so.
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  • Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value Gaps.Richmond H. Thomason - 1970 - Theoria 36 (3):264-281.
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  • Constructivism About Practical Reasons.Aaron James - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):302-325.
    Philosophers commonly wonder what a constructivist theory as applied to practical reasons might look like. For the methods or procedures of reasoning familiar from moral constructivism do not clearly apply generally, to all practical reasons. The paper argues that procedural specification is not necessary, so long as our aims are not first-order but explanatory. We can seek to explain how there could be facts of the matter about reasons for action without saying what reasons we have. Explanatory constructivism must assurne (...)
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  • What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
    In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.
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  • On What Matters: Volume Three.Derek Parfit - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Derek Parfit presents the third volume of On What Matters, his landmark work of moral philosophy. Parfit develops further his influential treatment of reasons, normativity, the meaning of moral discourse, and the status of morality. He engages with his critics, and shows the way to resolution of their differences.
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  • The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.Tamar Szabo Gendler - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):55-81.
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  • The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.Tamar Szabo Gendler - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):55.
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  • Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason.Amartya Sen - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):477-502.
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  • Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason.Amartya Sen - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):477.
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  • Presupposition, Implication, and Self-Reference.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):136-152.
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  • Singular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logic.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (17):481-495.
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  • Facts and Values.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.
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  • Facts and Values.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.
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  • Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 1978 - Syntax and Semantics (New York Academic Press) 9:315-332.
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  • Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
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  • A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1911 - Dent.
    'These new Oxford University Press editions have been meticulously collated from various exatant versions. Each text has an excellent introduction including an overview of Hume's thought and an account of his life and times. Even the difficult, and rarely commented-on, chapters on space and time are elucidated. There are also useful notes on the text and glossary. These scholarly new editions are ideally adapted for a whole range of readers, from beginners to experts.' -Jane O'Grady, Catholic Herald, 4/8/00. One of (...)
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  • Why Be an Internalist About Reasons?Julia Markovits - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:255.
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  • Reasons as Evidence.Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
    In this paper, we argue for a particular informative and unified analysis of normative reasons. According to this analysis, a fact F is a reason to act in a certain way just in case it is evidence that one ought to act in that way. Similarly, F is a reason to believe a certain proposition just in case it is evidence for the truth of this proposition. Putting the relatively uncontroversial claim about reasons for belief to one side, we present (...)
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  • Realist-Expressivism and Conventional Implicature.David Copp - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:167-202.
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  • Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1.Donald Davidson - 1970 - Clarendon Press.
    Machine generated contents note: Essay 1.
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  • The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the (...)
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  • The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability.Stephen Darwall - 1996 - Harvard University Press.
    The result is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of moral theory that enables it at last to account for morality's supreme authority--an account that ...
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  • Practical Reason and Norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - Hutchinson.
    Practical Reason and Norms focuses on three problems: In what way are rules normative, and how do they differ from ordinary reasons? What makes normative systems systematic? What distinguishes legal systems, and in what consists their normativity? All three questions are answered by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus paving the way to a unified account of normativity. Rules are a structure of reasons to perform the required act (...)
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  • The Possibility of Altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford Clarendon Press.
    Just as there are rational requirements on thought, there are rational requirements on action. This book defends a conception of ethics, and a related conception of human nature, according to which altruism is included among the basic rational requirements on desire and action. Altruism itself depends on the recognition of the reality of other persons, and on the equivalent capacity to regard oneself as merely one individual among many.
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  • Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
    It is my aim in this paper to show that the contemporary assimilation of essence to modality is fundamentally misguided and that, as a consequence, the corresponding conception of metaphysics should be given up. It is not my view that the modal account fails to capture anything which might reasonably be called a concept of essence. My point, rather, is that the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in (...)
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  • On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a major work in moral philosophy, the long-awaited follow-up to Parfit's 1984 classic Reasons and Persons, a landmark of twentieth-century philosophy. Parfit now presents a powerful new treatment of reasons and a critical examination of the most prominent systematic moral theories, leading to his own ground-breaking conclusion.
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  • What is a Philosophical Analysis?Jeffrey C. King - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (2):155-179.
    It is common for philosophers to offer philosophical accounts or analyses, as they are sometimes called, of knowledge, autonomy, representation, (moral) goodness, reference, and even modesty. These philosophical analyses raise deep questions.What is it that is being analyzed (i.e. what sorts of things are the objects of analysis)? What sort of thing is the analysis itself (a proposition? sentence?)? Under what conditions is an analysis correct? How can a correct analysis be informative? How, if at all, does the production of (...)
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  • Naturalism and Prescriptivity.Peter Railton - 1989 - Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (1):151.
    Statements about a person's good slip into and out of our ordinary discourse about the world with nary a ripple. Such statements are objects of belief and assertion, they obey the rules of logic, and they are often defended by evidence and argument. They even participate in common-sense explanations, as when we say of some person that he has been less subject to wild swings of enthusiasm and disappointment now that, with experience, he has gained a clearer idea of what (...)
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  • Internal Reasons.Michael Smith - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):109-131.
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