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An argument against spectrum inversion

In Sten Lindstrom & Par Sundstrom (eds.), Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind. pp. 65--94 (2002)

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  1. On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • The Message Is: There is No Medium. [REVIEW]Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):919-931.
    Sydney Shoemaker notes that my "avoidance of the standard philosophical terminology for discussing such matters" often creates problems for me; philosophers have a hard time figuring out what I am saying and what I am denying. My refusal to play ball with my colleagues is deliberate, of course, since I view the standard philosophical terminology as worse than useless--a major obstacle to progress since it consists of so many errors trapped in the seductively lucid amber of tradition: "obvious truths" that (...)
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  • The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
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  • Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.
    Tye's book develops a persuasive and, in many respects, original argument for the view that the qualitative side of our mental life is representational in..
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  • Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.
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  • Qualia and Consciousness.Sydney Shoemaker - 1991 - Mind 100 (4):507-524.
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  • Self-Knowledge and "Inner Sense" Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.
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  • Sexism, Racism, Ageism, and the Nature of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1/2):39-70.
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  • The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
    The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible , and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to defend (...)
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  • The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.
    Experiences and beliefs are different sorts of mental states, and are often taken to belong to very different domains. Experiences are paradigmatically phenomenal, characterized by what it is like to have them. Beliefs are paradigmatically intentional, characterized by their propositional content. But there are a number of crucial points where these domains intersect. One central locus of intersection arises from the existence of phenomenal beliefs: beliefs that are about experiences.
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  • Cool Red.Joseph Levine - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):27-40.
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  • Color, Consciousness, and the Isomorphism Constraint.Stephen E. Palmer - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):923-943.
    The relations among consciousness, brain, behavior, and scientific explanation are explored in the domain of color perception. Current scientific knowledge about color similarity, color composition, dimensional structure, unique colors, and color categories is used to assess Locke.
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  • Phenomenal Character.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):21-38.
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  • Functionalism and Qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.
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  • Mental Paint and Mental Latex.Ned Block - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:19-49.
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  • Conceptual Role Semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28 (April):242-56.
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  • Inverted Earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
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  • Form and Content.Martha Brandt Bolton & Bernard Harrison - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (3):444.
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  • On Describing Colors.Bernard Harrison - 1967 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 10 (1-4):38-52.
    This paper attempts to refute the familiar sceptical argument based upon the theoretical possibility of systematic transpositions of colours in different observers? colour?vision. The force of this argument lies in its apparent demonstration that cases of transposed colour?vision would be on a quite different cognitive footing from ordinary cases of colour?blindness; since colour transposition, unlike colour?blindness, could not possibly have any effect on the use of language by a person who suffered from it. It is argued (1) that this demonstration (...)
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  • Inverted Spectrum.William G. Lycan - 1973 - Ratio (Misc.) 15 (July):315-9.
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  • Colors, Subjective Reactions, and Qualia.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:55-66.
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  • Qualities and Qualia: What's in the Mind?Sydney Shoemaker - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (Supplement):109-131.
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  • Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum.Michael Tye - 1994 - Noûs 28 (2):159-183.
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  • Consciousness and Cognition.Michael Thau - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):484-491.
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  • Color for Philosophers.C. L. Hardin & David R. Hilbert - 1991 - Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):83-85.
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  • Perception.Ian Tipton & Frank Jackson - 1978 - Philosophical Quarterly 28 (112):275.
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  • Readings on Color I: The Philosophy of Color.Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (eds.) - 1997 - MIT Press.
    Edward Wilson Averill By the phrase 'anthropocentric account of color' I mean an account of color that makes an assumption of the following form: two ...
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  • Colors and Reflectances.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press.
    When we open our eyes, the world seems full of colored opaque objects, light sources, and transparent volumes. One historically popular view, _eliminativism_, is that the world is not in this respect as it appears to be: nothing has any color. Color _realism_, the denial of eliminativism, comes in three mutually exclusive varieties, which may be taken to exhaust the space of plausible realist theories. Acccording to _dispositionalism_, colors are _psychological_ dispositions: dispositions to produce certain kinds of visual experiences. According (...)
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  • Reinverting the Spectrum.C. L. Hardin - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press. pp. 5--99.
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  • Color and the Inverted Spectrum.David R. Hilbert & Mark Eli Kalderon - 2000 - In Steven Davis (ed.), Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-214.
    If you trained someone to emit a particular sound at the sight of something red, another at the sight of something yellow, and so on for other colors, still he would not yet be describing objects by their colors. Though he might be a help to us in giving a description. A description is a representation of a distribution in a space (in that of time, for instance).
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  • The Inverted Spectrum.Sydney Shoemaker - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (July):357-381.
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  • Editorial Preface.James E. Tomberlin - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:3-3.
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  • Between Instrumentalism and Brain-Writing.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - In Sense and Content. Oxford University Press.
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  • Visual Qualia and Visual Content.Michael Tye - 1992 - In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press. pp. 158--176.
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  • Reply to Levine's 'Cool Red'.C. L. Hardin - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4:41-50.
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  • Intersubjective/Intrasubjective.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - In The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
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