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  1. Cudworth and Normative Explanations.Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (3):1-28.
    Moral theories usually aspire to be explanatory – to tell us why something is wrong, why it is good, or why you ought to do it. So it is worth knowing how moral explanations differ, if they do, from explanations of other things. This paper uncovers a common unarticulated theory about how normative explanations must work – that they must follow what I call the Standard Model. Though the Standard Model Theory has many implications, in this paper I focus primarily (...)
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  • What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas M. Scanlon - 2000 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
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  • The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1996 - Ethics 106 (4):694-726.
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  • The Property of Rationality: A Guide to What Rationality Requires?Julian Fink - 2017 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.
    Can we employ the property of rationality in establishing what rationality requires? According to a central and formal thesis of John Broome’s work on rational requirements, the answer is ‘no’ – at least if we expect a precise answer. In particular, Broome argues that (i) the property of full rationality (i.e. whether or not you are fully rational) is independent of whether we formulate conditional requirements of rationality as having a wide or a narrow logical scope. That is, (ii) by (...)
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  • Desires as Additional Reasons? The Case of Tie-Breaking.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.
    According to the Desire-Based Reasons Model reasons for action are provided by desires. Many, however, are critical about the Model holding an alternative view of practical reason, which is often called valued-based. In this paper I consider one particular attempt to refute the Model, which advocates of the valued-based view often appeal to: the idea of reason-based desires. The argument is built up from two premises. The first claims that desires are states that we have reason to have. The second (...)
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  • On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    This is a major work in moral philosophy, the long-awaited follow-up to Parfit's 1984 classic Reasons and Persons, a landmark of twentieth-century philosophy. Parfit now presents a powerful new treatment of reasons and a critical examination of the most prominent systematic moral theories, leading to his own ground-breaking conclusion.
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  • Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, and the Possibility of Vindication: Lessons From Moore and Parfit.Attila Tanyi - 2009 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):87-107.
    The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires. I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument, the other is Derek Parfit’s Triviality Objection. I (...)
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  • Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Philosophy 78 (305):414-425.
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  • Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436-443.
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  • The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1996 - Mind 106 (424):791-794.
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  • The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.
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  • Morality, Normativity, and Society.David Copp - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):411-413.
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  • Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reason.Simon Blackburn - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (202):110-114.
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  • Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - Mind 111 (442):373-380.
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  • A Theory of Justice.John Rawls - unknown
    Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition.
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  • Review Essay: Ethics and the Limits of PhilosophyEthics and the Limits of Philosophy.David B. Wong & Bernard Williams - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (4):721.
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  • Reasons and Motivation: John Broome.John Broome - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):131–146.
    Derek Parfit takes an externalist and cognitivist view about normative reasons. I shall explore this view and add some arguments that support it. But I shall also raise a doubt about it at the end.
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  • How to Engage Reason: The Problem of Regress.Peter Railton - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Clarendon Press.
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  • Agency and the Open Question Argument.Connie Rosati - 2003 - Ethics 113 (3):490-527.
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  • Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self: A Reply to Ginsborg, Guyer, and Schneewind.Christine Korsgaard - 1998 - Ethics 109 (1):49-66.
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  • The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    This paper criticizes two accounts of the normativity of practical principles: the empiricist account and the rationalist or realist account. It argues against the empiricist view, focusing on the Humean texts that are usually taken to be its locus classicus. It then argues both against the dogmatic rationalist view, and for the Kantian view, through a discussion of Kant's own remarks about instrumental rationality in the second section of the Groundwork. It further argues that the instrumental principle cannot stand alone. (...)
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  • Humean Nature.Neil Sinhababu - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book defends the Humean Theory of Motivation, according to which desire drives all action and practical reasoning. -/- Desire motivates us to pursue its object. It makes thoughts of its object pleasant. It focuses attention on its object. Its effects are amplified by vivid representations of its object. These aspects of desire explain why motivation usually accompanies moral belief, how intentions shape our plans, how we exercise willpower, what human selves are, how action can express emotion, why we procrastinate, (...)
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  • Reasons and Motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
    When we have a normative reason, and we act for that reason, it becomes our motivating reason. But we can have either kind of reason without having the other. Thus, if I jump into the canal, my motivating reason was provided by my belief; but I had no normative reason to jump. I merely thought I did. And, if I failed to notice that the canal was frozen, I had a reason not to jump that, because it was unknown to (...)
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  • The Practical Turn in Ethical Theory: Korsgaard’s Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity.William J. FitzPatrick - 2005 - Ethics 115 (4):651-691.
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  • Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (Supplement):99-122.
    In this paper I trace the development of one of the central debates of late twentieth-century moral philosophy—the debate between realism and what Rawls called “constructivism.” Realism, I argue, is a reactive position that arises in response to almost every attempt to give a substantive explanation of morality. It results from the realist’s belief that such explanations inevitably reduce moral phenomena to natural phenomena. I trace this belief, and the essence of realism, to a view about the nature of concepts—that (...)
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  • Railton on Normativity. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):463-479.
    This is a critical discussion of Part III of Peter Railton's recent book Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Toward a Morality of Consequence (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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  • Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Long claimed to be the dominant conception of practical reason, the Humean theory that reasons for action are instrumental, or explained by desires, is the basis for a range of worries about the objective prescriptivity of morality. As a result, it has come under intense attack in recent decades. A wide variety of arguments have been advanced which purport to show that it is false, or surprisingly, even that it is incoherent. Slaves of the Passions aims to set the record (...)
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  • Practical Reasoning as Figuring Out What is Best: Against Constructivism.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):139-152.
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  • Why Naturalism?David Copp - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):179-200.
    My goal in this paper is to explain what ethical naturalism is, to locate the pivotal issue between naturalists and non-naturalists, and to motivate taking naturalism seriously. I do not aim to establish the truth of naturalism nor to answer the various familiar objections to it. But I do aim to motivate naturalism sufficiently that the attempt to deal with the objections will seem worthwhile. I propose that naturalism is best understood as the view that the moral properties are natural (...)
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  • Practical Tortoise Raising.Simon Blackburn - 1995 - Mind 104 (416):695-711.
    In this paper I am not so much concerned with movements of the mind, as movements of the will. But my question bears a similarity to that of the tortoise. I want to ask whether the will is under the control of fact and reason, combined. I shall try to show that there is always something else, something that is not under the control of fact and reason, which has to be given as a brute extra, if deliberation is ever (...)
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  • The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):812-816.
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  • Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):574-576.
    Like much in this book, the title and dust jacket illustration are clever. The first evokes Hume's remark in the Treatise that ‘Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.’ The second, which represents a cross between a dance-step and a clinch, links up with the title and anticipates an example used throughout the book to support its central claims: that Ronnie, unlike Bradley, has a reason to go to a party – namely, that there will (...)
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  • Humean Doubts About Categorical Imperatives.James Dreier - 2001 - In Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning. MIT Press. pp. 27--48.
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  • Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Agency and identity -- Necessitation -- Acts and actions -- Aristotle and Kant -- Agency and practical identity -- The metaphysics of normativity -- Constitutive standards -- The constitution of life -- In defense of teleology -- The paradox of self-constitution -- Formal and substantive principles of reason -- Formal versus substantive -- Testing versus weighing -- Maximizing and prudence -- Practical reason and the unity of the will -- The empiricist account of normativity -- The rationalist account of normativity (...)
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  • The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality.Donald C. Hubin - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (9):445-468.
    Neo-Humean instrumentalist theories of reasons for acting have been presented with a dilemma: either they are normatively trivial and, hence, inadequate as a normative theory or they covertly commit themselves to a noninstrumentalist normative principle. The claimed result is that no purely instrumentalist theory of reasons for acting can be normatively adequate. This dilemma dissolves when we understand what question neo-Humean instrumentalists are addressing. The dilemma presupposes that neo-Humeans are attempting to address the question of how to act, 'simpliciter'. Instead, (...)
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  • Reasons and Motivation.Derek Parfit - 1997 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1):99-130.
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  • Can Reasons Fundamentalism Answer the Normative Question?James Dreier - 2015 - In Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson & Fredrik Björklund (eds.), Motivational Internalism. Oxford University Press.
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  • Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1987 - Behaviorism 15 (2):179-181.
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  • The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality.Donald C. Hubin - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (9):445.
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  • Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    It is often claimed that irreducibly normative truths would have unacceptable metaphysical implications, and are incompatible with a scientific view of the world. The book argues, on the basis of a general account of the relevance of ontological questions, that this claim is mistaken. It is also a mistake to think that interpreting normative judgments as beliefs would make it impossible to explain their connection with action. An agent’s acceptance of a normative judgment can explain that agent’s subsequent action because (...)
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  • Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, and the Possibility of Vindication.Attila Tanyi - 2009 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):87-107.
    The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA), the other is Derek (...)
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  • A Normative Regress Problem.Linda Radzik - 1999 - American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1):35-47.
    The article argues that theorists who try to justify 'ought'-claims, i.e., who try to show that a standard of behavior has normative authority, will run into a regress problem. The problem is similar in structure to the familiar regress in the justification of belief. The point of the paper is not skeptical. Rather, the aim is to help theorists better understand the challenges associated with formulating a theory of normative authority.
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  • Moral Non-Naturalism.Michael Ridge - manuscript
    There may be as much philosophical controversy about how to distinguish naturalism from non-naturalism as there is about which view is correct. In spite of this widespread disagreement about the content of naturalism and non-naturalism there is considerable agreement about the status of certain historically influential philosophical accounts as non-naturalist. In particular, there is widespread agreement that G.E. Moore's account of goodness in.
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  • Moral Naturalism.Jimmy Lenman - manuscript
    While "moral naturalism" is sometimes used to refer to any approach to metaethics intended to cohere with naturalism in metaphysics more generally, the label is more usually reserved for naturalistic forms of moral realism according to which there are objective moral facts and properties and these moral facts and properties are natural facts and properties. Views of this kind appeal to many as combining the advantages of naturalism and realism but have seemed to many others to do inadequate justice to (...)
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