Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    In order to perfectly describe the world, it is not enough to speak truly. One must also use the right concepts - including the right logical concepts. One must use concepts that "carve at the joints", that give the world's "structure". There is an objectively correct way to "write the book of the world". Much of metaphysics, as traditionally conceived, is about the fundamental nature of reality; in the present terms, this is about the world's structure. Metametaphysics - inquiry into (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   327 citations  
  • Geometric Possibility.Gordon Belot - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Gordon Belot investigates the distinctive notion of geometric possibility that relationalists rely upon. He examines the prospects for adapting to the geometric case the standard philosophical accounts of the related notion of physical possibility, with particular emphasis on Humean, primitivist, and necessitarian accounts of physical and geometric possibility. This contribution to the debate concerning the nature of space will be of interest not only to philosophers and metaphysicians concerned with space and time, but also to those interested in laws of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • How to Russell a Frege-Church.David Kaplan - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):716-729.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   79 citations  
  • Some Aspects of General Relativity and Geometrodynamics.John C. Graves & John Earman - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (19):634.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Metaphysics of Space‐Time Substantivalism.Carl Hoefer - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):5-27.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • Humean Supervenience.Barry Loewer - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (1):101-127.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   129 citations  
  • Ideological Parsimony.Sam Cowling - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3889-3908.
    The theoretical virtue of parsimony values the minimizing of theoretical commitments, but theoretical commitments come in two kinds : ontological and ideological. While the ontological commitments of a theory are the entities it posits, a theory’s ideological commitments are the primitive concepts it employs. Here, I show how we can extend the distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony, commonly drawn regarding ontological commitments, to the domain of ideological commitments. I then argue that qualitative ideological parsimony is a theoretical virtue. My (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Two Accounts of Laws and Time.Barry Loewer - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):115-137.
    Among the most important questions in the metaphysics of science are "What are the natures of fundamental laws and chances?" and "What grounds the direction of time?" My aim in this paper is to examine some connections between these questions, discuss two approaches to answering them and argue in favor of one. Along the way I will raise and comment on a number of issues concerning the relationship between physics and metaphysics and consequences for the subject matter and methodology of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • Spacetime the One Substance.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):131 - 148.
    What is the relation between material objects and spacetime regions? Supposing that spacetime regions are one sort of substance, there remains the question of whether or not material objects are a second sort of substance. This is the question of dualistic versus monistic substantivalism. I will defend the monistic view. In particular, I will maintain that material objects should be identified with spacetime regions. There is the spacetime manifold, and the fundamental properties are pinned directly to it.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  • Two Challenges to the Requirement of Substantive General Covariance.J. Earman - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):443-468.
    It is generally acknowledged that the requirement that the laws of a spacetime theory be covariant under a general coordinate transformation is a restriction on the form but not the content of the theory. The prevalent view in the physics community holds that the substantive version of general covariance – exhibited, for example, by Einstein’s general theory of relativity – consists in the requirement that diffeomorphism invariance is a gauge symmetry of the theory. This conception of general covariance is explained (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Against Grounding Necessitarianism.Alexander Skiles - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (4):717-751.
    Can there be grounding without necessitation? Can a fact obtain wholly in virtue of metaphysically more fundamental facts, even though there are possible worlds at which the latter facts obtain but not the former? It is an orthodoxy in recent literature about the nature of grounding, and in first-order philosophical disputes about what grounds what, that the answer is no. I will argue that the correct answer is yes. I present two novel arguments against grounding necessitarianism, and show that grounding (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   89 citations  
  • Supervenience.Karen Bennett & Brian McLaughlin - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • Varieties of Necessity.Kit Fine - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford Up. pp. 253-281.
    It is argued that there are three main forms of necessity --the metaphysical, the natural and the normative--and that none of them is reducible to the others or to any other form of necessity. In arguing for a distinctive form of natural necessity, it is necessary to refute a version of the doctrine of scientific essentialism; and in arguing for a distinctive form of normative necessity, it is necessary to refute certain traditional and contemporary versions of ethical naturalism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
    It is my aim in this paper to show that the contemporary assimilation of essence to modality is fundamentally misguided and that, as a consequence, the corresponding conception of metaphysics should be given up. It is not my view that the modal account fails to capture anything which might reasonably be called a concept of essence. My point, rather, is that the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   481 citations  
  • The Metaphysics of Super‐Substantivalism.Dennis Lehmkuhl - 2018 - Noûs 52 (1):24-46.
    Recent decades have seen a revived interest in super-substantivalism, the idea that spacetime is the only fundamental substance and matter some kind of aspect, property or consequence of spacetime structure. However, the metaphysical debate so far has misidentified a particular variant of super-substantivalism with the position per se. I distinguish between a super-substantival core commitment and different ways of fleshing it out. I then investigate how general relativity and alternative spacetime theories square with the different variants of super-substantivalism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Fifty Million Elvis Fans Can’T Be Wrong.Gordon Belot - 2018 - Noûs:946-981.
    This essay revisits some classic problems in the philosophy of space and time concerning the counting of possibilities. I argue that we should think that two Newtonian worlds can differ only as to when or where things happen and that general relativistic worlds can differ in something like the same way—the first of these theses being quaintly heterodox, the second baldly heretical, according to the mores of contemporary philosophy of physics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Dualities and Emergent Gravity: Gauge/Gravity Duality.Sebastian de Haro - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 59:109-125.
    In this paper I develop a framework for relating dualities and emergence: two notions that are close to each other but also exclude one another. I adopt the conception of duality as 'isomorphism', from the physics literature, cashing it out in terms of three conditions. These three conditions prompt two conceptually different ways in which a duality can be modified to make room for emergence; and I argue that this exhausts the possibilities for combining dualities and emergence. I apply this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Conceptual Aspects of Gauge/Gravity Duality.Sebastian de Haro, Daniel Mayerson & Jeremy Butterfield - 2016 - Foundations of Physics 46 (11):1381-1425.
    We give an introductory review of gauge/gravity duality, and associated ideas of holography, emphasising the conceptual aspects. The opening sections gather the ingredients, viz. anti-de Sitter spacetime, conformal field theory and string theory, that we need for presenting, in Sect. 5, the central and original example: Maldacena’s AdS/CFT correspondence. Sections 6 and 7 develop the ideas of this example, also in applications to condensed matter systems, QCD, and hydrodynamics. Sections 8 and 9 discuss the possible extensions of holographic ideas to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Space, Time, and Spacetime.L. Sklar - 1976 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 172 (3):545-555.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • The Essence of Space-Time.Tim Maudlin - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:82 - 91.
    I argue that Norton & Earman's hole argument, despite its historical association with General Relativity, turns upon very general features of any linguistic system that can represent substances by names. After exploring various means by which mathematical objects can be interpreted as representing physical possibilities, I suggest that a form of essentialism can solve the hole dilemma without abandoning either determinism or substantivalism. Finally, I identify the basic tenets of such an essentialism in Newton's writings and consider how they can (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  • What Price Spacetime Substantivalism? The Hole Story.John Earman & John Norton - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (4):515-525.
    Spacetime substantivalism leads to a radical form of indeterminism within a very broad class of spacetime theories which include our best spacetime theory, general relativity. Extending an argument from Einstein, we show that spacetime substantivalists are committed to very many more distinct physical states than these theories' equations can determine, even with the most extensive boundary conditions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   175 citations  
  • Humean Supervenience Debugged.David K. Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
    Tn this paper I explore and to an extent defend HS. The main philosophical challenges to HS come from philosophical views that say that nomic concepts-laws, chance, and causation-denote features of the world that fail to supervene on non-nomic features. Lewis rejects these views and has labored mightily to construct HS accounts of nomic concepts. His account of laws is fundamental to his program, since his accounts of the other nomic notions rely on it. Recently, a number of philosophers have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   374 citations  
  • Qualitative Grounds.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):309-348.
    Suppose that all non-qualitative facts are grounded in qualitative facts. I argue that this view naturally comes with a picture in which trans-world identity is indeterminate. But this in turn leads to either pervasive indeterminacy in the non-qualitative, or else contingency in what facts about modality and possible worlds are determinate.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Hole Argument.John Norton - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:56 - 64.
    I give an informal outline of the hole argument which shows that spacetime substantivalism leads to an undesirable indeterminism in a broad class of spacetime theories. This form of the argument depends on the selection of differentiable manifolds within a spacetime theory as representing spacetime. I consider the conditions under which the argument can be extended to address versions of spacetime substantivalism which select these differentiable manifolds plus some further structure to represent spacetime. Finally, I respond to the criticisms of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  • Newtonian Spacetime Structure in Light of the Equivalence Principle.Eleanor Knox - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (4):863-880.
    I argue that the best spacetime setting for Newtonian gravitation (NG) is the curved spacetime setting associated with geometrized Newtonian gravitation (GNG). Appreciation of the ‘Newtonian equivalence principle’ leads us to conclude that the gravitational field in NG itself is a gauge quantity, and that the freely falling frames are naturally identified with inertial frames. In this context, the spacetime structure of NG is represented not by the flat neo-Newtonian connection usually made explicit in formulations, but by the sum of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • Holes, Haecceitism and Two Conceptions of Determinism.J. Melia - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):639--64.
    In this paper I claim that Earman and Norton 's hole argument against substantivalist interpretations of General Relativity assumes that the substantivalist must adopt a conception of determinism which I argue is unsatisfactory. Butterfield and others have responded to the hole argument by finding a conception of determinism open to the substantivalist that is not prone to the hole argument. But, unfortunately for the substantivalist, I argue this conception also turns out to be unsatisfactory. Accordingly, I search for a conception (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Who's Afraid of Background Independence?Dean Rickles - 2008 - In Dennis Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime II. Elsevier. pp. 133--52.
    Background independence is generally considered to be ‘the mark of distinction’ of general relativity. However, there is still confusion over exactly what background independence is and how, if at all, it serves to distinguish general relativity from other theories. There is also some confusion over the philosophical implications of background independence, stemming in part from the definitional problems. In this paper I attempt to make some headway on both issues. In each case I argue that a proper account of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The Case for Background Independence.Lee Smolin - 2006 - In Dean Rickles, Steven French & Juha T. Saatsi (eds.), The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity. Oxford University Press. pp. 196--239.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • Points, Particles, and Structural Realism.Oliver Pooley - 2005 - In Dean Rickles, Steven French & Juha T. Saatsi (eds.), The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity. Oxford University Press. pp. 83--120.
    In his paper ``What is Structural Realism?'' James Ladyman drew a distinction between epistemological structural realism and metaphysical (or ontic) structural realism. He also drew a suggestive analogy between the perennial debate between substantivalist and relationalist interpretations of spacetime on the one hand, and the debate about whether quantum mechanics treats identical particles as individuals or as `non-individuals' on the other. In both cases, Ladyman's suggestion is that an ontic structural realist interpretation of the physics might be just what is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Symmetry as an Epistemic Notion.Shamik Dasgupta - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3):837-878.
    Symmetries in physics are a guide to reality. That much is well known. But what is less well known is why symmetry is a guide to reality. What justifies inferences that draw conclusions about reality from premises about symmetries? I argue that answering this question reveals that symmetry is an epistemic notion twice over. First, these inferences must proceed via epistemic lemmas: premises about symmetries in the first instance justify epistemic lemmas about our powers of detection, and only from those (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Non-Symmetric Relations.Cian Dorr - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1:155-92.
    Presupposing that most predicates do not correspond directly to genuine relations, I argue that all genuine relations are symmetric. My main argument depends on the premise that there are no brute necessities, interpreted so as to require logical and metaphysical necessity to coincide for sentences composed entirely of logical vocabulary and primitive predicates. Given this premise, any set of purportedly primitive predicates by which one might hope to express the facts about non-symmetric relations order their relata will generate an objectionable (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Quantum Spacetime: What Do We Know?Carlo Rovelli - 2001 - In Craig Callender & Nick Huggett (eds.), Physics Meets Philosophy at the Planck Scale. Cambridge University Press. pp. 101--22.
    This is a contribution to a book on quantum gravity and philosophy. I discuss nature and origin of the problem of quantum gravity. I examine the knowledge that may guide us in addressing this problem, and the reliability of such knowledge. In particular, I discuss the subtle modification of the notions of space and time engendered by general relativity, and how these might merge into quantum theory. I also present some reflections on methodological questions, and on some general issues in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Background Independence, Diffeomorphism Invariance, and the Meaning of Coordinates.Oliver Pooley - 2015 - In Dennis Lehmkuhl (ed.), Towards a Theory of Spacetime Theories. Birkhäuser.
    Diffeomorphism invariance is sometimes taken to be a criterion of background independence. This claim is commonly accompanied by a second, that the genuine physical magnitudes (the ``observables'') of background-independent theories and those of background-dependent (non-diffeomorphism-invariant) theories are essentially different in nature. I argue against both claims. Background-dependent theories can be formulated in a diffeomorphism-invariant manner. This suggests that the nature of the physical magnitudes of relevantly analogous theories (one background free, the other background dependent) is essentially the same. The temptation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Background-Independence.Gordon Belot - 2011 - General Relativity and Gravitation 43:2865-2884.
    Intuitively, a classical field theory is background-in- dependent if the structure required to make sense of its equations is itself subject to dynamical evolution, rather than being imposed ab initio. The aim of this paper is to provide an explication of this intuitive notion. Background-independence is not a not formal property of theories: the question whether a theory is background-independent depends upon how the theory is interpreted. Under the approach proposed here, a theory is fully background-independent relative to an interpretation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Regularity Relationalism and the Constructivist Project.Syman Stevens - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axx037.
    ABSTRACT It has recently been argued that Harvey Brown and Oliver Pooley’s ‘dynamical approach’ to special relativity should be understood as what might be called an ontologically and ideologically relationalist approach to Minkowski geometry, according to which Minkowski geometrical structure supervenes upon the symmetries of the best-systems dynamical laws for a material world with primitive topological or differentiable structure. Fleshing out the details of some such primitive structure, and a conception of laws according to which Minkowski geometry could so supervene, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Against Parthood.Theodore Sider - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:237–293.
    Mereological nihilism says that there do not exist (in the fundamental sense) any objects with proper parts. A reason to accept it is that we can thereby eliminate 'part' from fundamental ideology. Many purported reasons to reject it - based on common sense, perception, and the possibility of gunk, for example - are weak. A more powerful reason is that composite objects seem needed for spacetime physics; but sets suffice instead.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  • Substances and Space-Time: What Aristotle Would Have Said to Einstein.Tim Maudlin - 1990 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (4):531-561.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Substantive General Covariance: Another Decade of Dispute.Oliver Pooley - 2009 - In Mauricio Suárez, Mauro Dorato & Miklós Rédei (eds.), EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer. pp. 197--209.
    John Earman's recent proposal that a substantive version of general covariance consists in the requirement that diffeomorphism invariance be a gauge symmetry is critically assessed. I argue that such a principle does not serve to differentiate general relativity from pre-relativistic theories. A model-theoretic characterization of two formulations of specially-relativistic theories is suggested. Diffeomorphisms are symmetries of only one such style of formulation and, I argue, Earman's proposal does not provide a reason to deny diffeomorphisms the status of gauge transformations relative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Foundations of Space-Time Theories.Michael Friedman - 1983 - Noûs 21 (4):595-601.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   155 citations  
  • The Regularity Account of Relational Spacetime.Nick Huggett - 2006 - Mind 115 (457):41--73.
    A version of relationism that takes spatiotemporal structures—spatial geometry and a standard of inertia—to supervene on the history of relations between bodies is described and defended. The account is used to explain how the relationist should construe models of Newtonian mechanics in which absolute acceleration manifestly does not supervene on the relations; Ptolemaic and Copernican models for example. The account introduces a new way in which a Lewis-style ‘best system’ might capture regularities in a broadly Humean world; a defence is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • An Elementary Notion of Gauge Equivalence.Gordon Belot - 2008 - General Relativity and Gravitation 40.
    An elementary notion of gauge equivalence is introduced that does not require any Lagrangian or Hamiltonian apparatus. It is shown that in the special case of theories, such as general relativity, whose symmetries can be identified with spacetime diffeomorphisms this elementary notion has many of the same features as the usual notion. In particular, it performs well in the presence of asymptotic boundary conditions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • An Example Relevant to the Kretschmann-Einstein Debate.Rafael Sorkin - 2001 - Modern Physics Letters A 17:695--700.
    We cast the flat space theory of a scalar field in generally covariant form by introducing an auxiliary field $\lambda$. The resulting theory is couched in terms of an action integral $S$, and all the fields (the scalar, the spacetime metric, and $\lambda$) are dynamical in the sense of being varied freely in $S$. Conservation of energy-momentum emerges as a formal consequence of diffeomorphism invariance, in close analogy with the situation in ordinary general relativity.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Absolute Objects and Counterexamples: Jones--Geroch Dust, Torretti Constant Curvature, Tetrad-Spinor, and Scalar Density.J. Brian Pitts - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 37:347-71.
    James L. Anderson analyzed the novelty of Einstein's theory of gravity as its lack of "absolute objects." Michael Friedman's related work has been criticized by Roger Jones and Robert Geroch for implausibly admitting as absolute the timelike 4-velocity field of dust in cosmological models in Einstein's theory. Using the Rosen-Sorkin Lagrange multiplier trick, I complete Anna Maidens's argument that the problem is not solved by prohibiting variation of absolute objects in an action principle. Recalling Anderson's proscription of "irrelevant" variables, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • The Implications of General Covariance for the Ontology and Ideology of Spacetime.John Earman - 2006 - In Dennis Dieks (ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime. Elsevier. pp. 3--24.
    It generally agreed that the requirement of formal general covariance is a condition of the well-formedness of a spacetime theory and not a restriction on its content. Physicists commonly take the substantive requirement of general covariance to mean that the laws exhibit diffeomorphism invariance and that this invariance is a gauge symmetry. This latter requirement does place restrictions on the content of a spacetime theory. The present paper explores the implications of these restrictions for interpreting the ideology and ontology of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Haecceitism, Anti-Haecceitism, and Possible Worlds: A Case Study.Brad Skow - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):97-107.
    Possible-worlds talk obscures, rather than clarifies, the debate about haecceitism. In this paper I distinguish haecceitism and anti-haecceitism from other doctrines that sometimes go under those names. Then I defend the claim that there are no non-tendentious definitions of ‘haecceitism’ and ‘anti-haecceitism’ using possible-worlds talk. That is, any definition of ‘haecceitism’ using possible-worlds talk depends, for its correctness, on a substantive theory of the nature of possible worlds. This explains why using possible-worlds talk when discussing haecceitism causes confusion: if the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • General Covariance and the Foundations of General Relativity: Eight Decades of Dispute.John D. Norton - 1993 - Reports of Progress in Physics 56:791--861.
    iinstein oered the prin™iple of gener—l ™ov—ri—n™e —s the fund—ment—l physi™—l prin™iple of his gener—l theory of rel—tivityD —nd —s responsi˜le for extending the prin™iple of rel—tivity to —™™eler—ted motionF „his view w—s disputed —lmost immedi—tely with the ™ounterE™l—im th—t the prin™iple w—s no rel—tivity prin™iple —nd w—s physi™—lly v—™uousF „he dis—greeE ment persists tod—yF „his —rti™le reviews the development of iinstein9s thought on gener—l ™ov—ri—n™eD its rel—tion to the found—tions of gener—l rel—tivity —nd the evolution of the ™ontinuing de˜—te (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • A Primer on Determinism.John Earman - 1986 - D. Reidel.
    Determinism is a perennial topic of philosophical discussion. Very little acquaintance with the philosophical literature is needed to reveal the Tower of ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   173 citations  
  • The Rise and Fall of Geometrodynamics.John Stachel - 1972 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1972:31 - 54.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Can We Dispense with Space-Time?Hartry Field - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:33-90.
    This paper is concerned with the debate between substantival and relational theories of space-time, and discusses two difficulties that beset the relationalist: a difficulty posed by field theories, and another difficulty called the problem of quantities. A main purpose of the paper is to argue that possibility can not always be used as a surrogate of ontology, and that in particular that there is no hope of using possibility to solve the problem of quantities.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Spacetime and Holes.Carolyn Brighouse - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:117 - 125.
    John Earman and John Norton have argued that substantivalism leads to a radical form of indeterminism within local spacetime theories. I compare their argument to more traditional arguments typical in the Relationist/Substantivalist dispute and show that they all fail for the same reason. All these arguments ascribe to the substantivalist a particular way of talking about possibility. I argue that the substantivalist is not committed to the modal claims required for the arguments to have any force, and show that this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations