Machine generated contents note: Essay 1.

In this book, which remained unfinished at his death, Husserl attempts to forge a union between phenomenology and existentialism.

Breaking new ground in the debate about the relation of mind and body, David Armstrong's classic text - first published in 1968 - remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In the preface to this new edition, the author reflects on the book's impact and considers it in the light of subsequent developments. He also provides a bibliography of all the key writings to have appeared in the materialist debate.

Intuitions based on the first-person perspective can easily mislead us about what is and is not conceivable.1 This point is usually made in support of familiar reductionist positions on the mind-body problem, but I believe it can be detached from that approach. It seems to me that the powerful appearance of contingency in the relation between the functioning of the physical organism and the conscious mind -- an appearance that depends directly or indirectly on the first- person perspective -- must (...) be an illusion. But the denial of this contingency should not take the form of a reductionist account of consciousness of the usual type, whereby the logical gap between the mental and the physical is closed by conceptual analysis -- in effect, by analyzing the mental in terms of the physical. (shrink)

Husserl has finally begun to be recognized as the precursor of current interest in intentionality — the first to have a general theory of the role of mental representations in the philosophy of language and mind. As the first thinker to put directedness of mental representations at the center of his philosophy, he is also beginning to emerge as the father of current research in cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence.

Hilary Putnam deals in this book with some of the most fundamental persistent problems in philosophy: the nature of truth, knowledge and rationality. His aim is to break down the fixed categories of thought which have always appeared to define and constrain the permissible solutions to these problems.

The assumption of materialism Howard Robinson believes is false.

the Logische Untersuchungen,l phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "imma nental" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere compris ing descriptions that - so the immanence in question is understood - are strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience. It 2 would seem that my protest against this conception has been oflittle avail; and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have not been understood (...) or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism of psychological method are also quite negative because they miss the straightforward sense of my presentation. My criticism of psychological method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification ofits field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed "attacks. (shrink)

EDMUND Husserl's Crisis was not only one of his most important formulations of an introduction to phenomenology, but also the inspiration for a plethora of studies that have helped shape the direction of thought in the twentieth century, from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phénoménologie de la perception to Jürgen Habermas's Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. It is well known that the problematic surrounding the Crisis occupied Husserl during his last years, from 1934 to 1937. The first critical edition of these reflections was prepared (...) by Walter Biemel and published in 1954 as volume 6 of the Husserliana series bearing the title, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. (shrink)

Las intuiciones basadas en la perspectivade la primera persona fácilmente nospueden inducir a error sobre lo que es yno es concebible. Este punto usualmentese presenta como apoyo de posicionesreduccionistas comunes sobre el problemamente-cuerpo, pero considero que se puedeseparar de tal perspectiva. Me pareceque la fuerte apariencia de contingenciaen la relación entre el funcionamiento delorganismo físico y la mente consciente–una apariencia que depende directa oindirectamente de la perspectiva de laprimera persona– tiene que ser una ilusión.Enotraspalabras,creoquehayunaconexiónnecesariaenambasdireccionesentre lo físico y lo mental, pero (...) que nopuede descubrirse a priori. La opinión sedivide fuertemente entre la credibilidad dealgún tipo de reduccionismo funcionalista,y no examinaré mis razones para ubicarmeen el lado antireduccionista de este debate.Mi lectura del asunto es que nuestra faltade habilidad para obtener una concepcióninteligible de la relación mente-cuerpo esun signo de la inadecuación de nuestrosconceptos actuales, y que se requiere algúngrado de desarrollo.The Intuitions based on the first-personperspective can easily mislead us aboutwhat is and is not conceivable. This pointis usually made in support of familiarreductionist positions on the mind-bodyproblem, but I believe it can be detachedfrom that approach. It seems to me thatthe powerful appearance of contingency inthe relation between the functioning of thephysical organism and the conscious mind–an appearance that depends directly orindirectly on the first person– perspectivemust be an illusion. In other words, I believethatthereisanecessaryconnectioninbothdirectionsbetweenthephysicalandthemental,butthatitcannot bediscovereda priori. Opinion is strongly divided on thecredibility of some kind of functionalistreductionism, and I won’t go through myreasons for being on the antireductionistside of that debate.My reading of the situation is that ourinability to come up with an intelligibleconception of the relation between mindand body is a sign of the inadequacy of ourpresent concepts, and that some developmentis needed. (shrink)