The primary purpose of the material presented in this book is to familiarize the reader with sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English language sources pertinent to the doctrine of divine impassibility, particularly for those who confess with the Reformed confessions that God is "without body, parts, or passions." If this material is studied carefully, the reader will encounter an excellent and diverse array of writings that touch on this subject.

The author of this book challenges the contemporary view of God and suffering. Calling upon scripture, and the philosophical and theological tradition of the Fathers and Aquinas, he advocates the incarnational truth that the Son of God actually does experience human living, including suffering.

James Moore states that "some of the most distinctive and central arguments of Hutcheson's philosophy - the importance of ideas brought to mind by the internal senses, the presence in human nature of calm desires, of generous and benevolent instincts - will be found to emerge in the course of these writings.""--Jacket.

This article first presents an overview of the arguments on behalf of a passible and so suffering God. These arguments are: 1. The experience of immense suffering over the past century, especially the Holocaust. In the midst of such suffering, God must himself suffer in solidarity with those who suffer. 2. The Bible, especially the Old Testament, bears witness to a suffering God. Also the cross is the revelational icon of the truth that God always suffers. 3. The impassibility of (...) God is a remnant of Greek philosophy within the Christian notion of God. In the light of contemporary philosophy, especially with regards to Process Philosophy, a more Christian understanding of God is now offered, a notion that entails a passible and so suffering God. The author argues against a passible and suffering God by examining the Bible and the Christian tradition. He argues that the Christian notion of God, both by way of revelation and by way of philosophy, demands that God be impassible and so does not suffer. He believes that only an impassible God is truly loving. Moreover, he argues that it is precisely the human suffering of the Son of God that is truly redemptive. (shrink)

Francis Hutcheson's objections to psychological egoism usually appeal to experience or introspection. However, at least one of them is theological: It includes premises of a religious kind, such as that God rewards the virtuous. This objection invites interpretive and philosophical questions, some of which may seem to highlight errors or shortcomings on Hutcheson's part. Also, to answer the questions is to point out important features of Hutcheson's objection and its intellectual context. And nowhere in the scholarship on Hutcheson do we (...) find these questions addressed. This paper addresses them. A fact that emerges is that the apparent errors or shortcomings the questions may highlight are just that – apparent errors or shortcomings; in reality they are nothing of the kind. (shrink)

While the impassibility debate has traditionally been construed in terms of whether God suffers, recent philosophy of religion has interpreted it in terms of whether God has emotions more generally. This article surveys the philosophical literature on divine im/passibility over the last 25 years, outlining major arguments for and against the idea that God has emotions. It argues that questions about the nature and value of emotions are at the heart of the im/passibility debate. More specifically, it suggests that presuppositions (...) about the dichotomy between emotions and reason (or the ‘heart and the head’) have negatively impacted the debate. It contends that the debate can only move forward in response to serious reflection on our affects as we experience them, aided by historical and anthropological as well as contemporary philosophical perspectives. (shrink)

Originally published in 1926, this book attempts to state 'what has been believed with regard to God's incapacity for suffering'. Mozley charts the development of the doctrine from the Apostolic Fathers through the Reformation to the modern influence of metaphysical philosophy and concludes with six questions intended to prompt further theological discussion on this point. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the history of Christian theology.

The chapter analyses the debates on the relation between self-interest and sociability in eighteenth-century British moral philosophy. It focuses on the selfish hypothesis, i.e. on the egoistic theory that we are only motivated by self-interest or self-love, and that our sociability is not based on disinterested affections, such as benevolence. The selfish hypothesis is much debated especially in the early eighteenth century (Mandeville, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, Clarke, Campbell, Gay), and then rather tacitly accepted (Hartley, Tucker, Paley) or rejected (Hume, Smith, (...) Reid). It is asserted for example by philosophers with an Augustinian and Epicurean background and by the associationists, yet rejected especially by thinkers inspired by Stoic ideas. In particular for these latter authors, who emphasise the disinterested aspects of moral motivation, the debates on the selfish hypothesis have an important moral dimension. Others again argue that specific kinds of self-interest motivate virtuous actions. (shrink)

Francis Hutcheson was the first major philosopher of the Scottish Enlightenment, and one of the great thinkers in the history of British moral philosophy. He firmly rejected the reductionist view, common then as now, that morality is nothing more than the prudent pursuit of self-interest, arguing in favour of a theory of a moral sense. The two texts presented here are the most eloquent expressions of this theory. The Reflections on our Common Systems of Morality insists on the connection between (...) moral philosophy and moral improvement, and was a preview of his first major work, the Inquiry of 1725. The lecture On the Social Nature of Man, arguing against the psychological egoism of Hobbes, appears here in an English translation for the first time. Thomas Mautner's introduction and editorial apparatus provide a mass of new information, helping to give the reader a sense of the intellectual climate in which Hutcheson lived. (shrink)

The project of this chapter is to examine how two key figures of the Scottish Enlightenment—Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Reid—think of the role of reason and passion in moral judgment. According to a standard way of categorizing these figures, Hutcheson is a sentimentalist, while Reid is a rationalist. Although this categorization can be illuminating in certain respects, it also distorts both Hutcheson’s and Reid’s views. For a close reading of both these men reveals that their views are more eclectic than (...) many have supposed. Hutcheson’s views have much more in common with the rationalists while Reid’s views have much more in common with the sentimentalists. (shrink)

Concerning beauty, order, harmony, design.--Concerning moral good and evil.

Uncovering the historical roots of naturalistic, secular contemporary ethics, in this volume Michael Gill shows how the British moralists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries completed a Copernican revolution in moral philosophy. They effected a shift from thinking of morality as independent of human nature to thinking of it as part of human nature itself. He also shows how the British Moralists - sometimes inadvertently, sometimes by design - disengaged ethical thinking, first from distinctly Christian ideas and then from theistic (...) commitments altogether. Examining in detail the arguments of Whichcote, Cudworth, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson against Calvinist conceptions of original sin and egoistic conceptions of human motivation, Gill also demonstrates how Hume combined the ideas of earlier British moralists with his own insights to produce an account of morality and human nature that undermined some of his predecessors' most deeply held philosophical goals. (shrink)

Provides an overview of the theory of psychological egoism—the thesis that we are all ultimately motivated by self-interest. Philosophical arguments for and against the view are considered as well as some empirical evidence.