Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Epistemic Vigilance.Dan Sperber, Fabrice Clément, Christophe Heintz, Olivier Mascaro, Hugo Mercier, Gloria Origgi & Deirdre Wilson - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (4):359-393.
    Humans massively depend on communication with others, but this leaves them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. To ensure that, despite this risk, communication remains advantageous, humans have, we claim, a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Here we outline this claim and consider some of the ways in which epistemic vigilance works in mental and social life by surveying issues, research and theories in different domains of philosophy, linguistics, cognitive psychology and the social sciences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   257 citations  
  • Representing the past: memory traces and the causal theory of memory.Sarah Robins - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2993-3013.
    According to the Causal Theory of Memory, remembering a particular past event requires a causal connection between that event and its subsequent representation in memory, specifically, a connection sustained by a memory trace. The CTM is the default view of memory in contemporary philosophy, but debates persist over what the involved memory traces must be like. Martin and Deutscher argued that the CTM required memory traces to be structural analogues of past events. Bernecker and Michaelian, contemporary CTM proponents, reject structural (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • (Social) Metacognition and (Self-)Trust.Kourken Michaelian - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):481-514.
    What entitles you to rely on information received from others? What entitles you to rely on information retrieved from your own memory? Intuitively, you are entitled simply to trust yourself, while you should monitor others for signs of untrustworthiness. This article makes a case for inverting the intuitive view, arguing that metacognitive monitoring of oneself is fundamental to the reliability of memory, while monitoring of others does not play a significant role in ensuring the reliability of testimony.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Generative memory.Kourken Michaelian - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):323-342.
    This paper explores the implications of the psychology of constructive memory for philosophical theories of the metaphysics of memory and for a central question in the epistemology of memory. I first develop a general interpretation of the psychology of constructive memory. I then argue, on the basis of this interpretation, for an updated version of Martin and Deutscher's influential causal theory of memory. I conclude by sketching the implications of this updated theory for the question of memory 's status as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   124 citations  
  • Remembering.C. B. Martin & Max Deutscher - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (April):161-96.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   203 citations  
  • How does Paul Ricoeur apply metapsychology to collective memory?Esteban Lythgoe - 2018 - Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 8 (2):55-71.
    The concept of “abused collective memory” gathers two of Ricœur’s main lines of concern: history and psychoanalysis. The article aims to explain how this convergence was possible, especially, when the transposition of the Freudian metapsychology from the individual to the collective level was hindered by the Ricœurian emphasis on the Freudian libidinal economy. Our hypothesis is that this convergence required two intermediate steps. The first one gathered psychoanalysis and history within the larger framework of otherness as flesh. The second step (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Powerlessness and social interpretation.Miranda Fricker - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):96-108.
    Our understanding of social experiences is central to our social understanding more generally. But this sphere of epistemic practice can be structurally prejudiced by unequal relations of power, so that some groups suffer a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice—hermeneutical injustice. I aim to achieve a clear conception of this epistemicethical phenomenon, so that we have a workable definition and a proper understanding of the wrong that it inflicts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • Epistemic responsibility.J. Angelo Corlett - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):179 – 200.
    Given the hundreds of articles and books that have been written in epistemology over the span of just the past few decades, relatively little has been written specifically on epistemic responsibility. What has been written rarely considers the nature of epistemic responsibility and its possible role in epistemic justification or knowledge. Instead, such work concerns philosophical analyses and arguments about related concepts such as epistemic virtues or duties, rather than epistemic praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.2 It is epistemic responsibility in the blameworthiness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Our faithfulness to the past: Reconstructing memory value.Sue Campbell - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):361 – 380.
    The reconstructive turn in memory theory challenges us to provide an account of successful remembering that is attentive to the ways in which we use memory, both individually and socially. I investigate conceptualizations of accuracy and integrity useful to memory theorists and argue that faithful recollection is often a complex epistemological/ethical achievement.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Collective amnesia and epistemic injustice.Alessandra Tanesini - 2016 - Imperfect Cognitions.
    Alessandra Tanesini is a Professor of Philosophy at Cardiff University working on epistemology and philosophy of language. In this post she summarises some of her recent work on collective amnesia and epistemic injustice.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Collective Amnesia and Epistemic Injustice.Alessandra Tanesini - 2016 - In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford, UK: pp. 195-219.
    Communities often respond to traumatic events in their histories by destroying objects that would cue memories of a past they wish to forget and by building artefacts which memorialize a new version of their history. Hence, it would seem, communities cope with change by spreading memory ignorance so to allow new memories to take root. This chapter offers an account of some aspects of this phenomenon and of its epistemological consequences. Specifically, it is demonstrated in this chapter that collective forgetfulness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Remembering.C. B. Martin & Max Deutscher - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   122 citations  
  • The uses and abuses of memory.Tzvetan Todorov - 2001 - In Howard Marchitello (ed.), What Happens to History: The Renewal of Ethics in Contemporary Thought. Routledge. pp. 11--39.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Truth in memory: the humanities and the cognitive sciences.John Sutton - 2003 - In Iain McCalman & Ann McGrath (eds.), Proof and Truth: the humanist as expert. Australian Academy of the Humanities. pp. 145-163.
    Mistakes can be made in both personal and official accounts of past events: lies can be told. Stories about the past have many functions besides truth-telling: but we still care deeply that our sense of what happened should be accurate. The possibility of error in memory and in history implies a commonsense realism about the past. Truth in memory is a problem because, coupled with our desires to find out what really happened, we recognize that our individual and collective access (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Collective memory.James V. Wertsch - 2009 - In Pascal Boyer & James Wertsch (eds.), Memory in Mind and Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 117--137.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations