- Blame.D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2014 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Moral saints.Susan Wolf - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (8):419-439.details
|
|
Morality and Practical Reasons.Douglas W. Portmore - 2021 - Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
God's Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument From Evil.Mark C. Murphy - 2017 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Moral Saints.Susan Wolf - 1982 - In Roger Crisp & Michael Slote (eds.), Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The dual scale model of weighing reasons.Chris Tucker - 2021 - Noûs 56 (2):366-392.details
|
|
Neo-Aristotelian Supererogation.Rebecca Stangl - 2016 - Ethics 126 (2):339-365.details
|
|
Subjectivism and Blame.David Sobel - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (sup1):149-170.details
|
|
Subjectivism and blame.David Sobel - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 149-170.details
|
|
Practical Identity and Duties to the Self.Paul Schofield - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (3):219-232.details
|
|
Replies to Gert, Hurley, and Tenenbaum.Douglas W. Portmore - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):241-255.details
|
|
Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?Douglas W. Portmore - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (4):369-388.details
|
|
Three Paradoxes of Supererogation.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):699-716.details
|
|
Moral Worth and Supererogation.Amy Massoud - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):690-710.details
|
|
Morally Permissible Moral Mistakes.Elizabeth Harman - 2016 - Ethics 126 (2):366-393.details
|
|
Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):533-562.details
|
|
Normative strength and the balance of reasons.Joshua Gert - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):533-562.details
|
|
Moral Rationalism and Commonsense Consequentialism.Joshua Gert - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):217-224.details
|
|
The supererogatory, the foolish and the morally required.Barry Curtis - 1981 - Journal of Value Inquiry 15 (4):311-318.details
|
|
The Meritorious And The Mandatory.Michael Clark - 1979 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79:23-33.details
|
|
Moral Obligation, Self-Interest and The Transitivity Problem.Alfred Archer - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (4):441-464.details
|
|
The Limits of Moral Authority.Dale Dorsey - 2016 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.details
|
|
The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability.Stephen L. Darwall - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
Weighing Reasons Against.Chris Tucker - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.details
|
|
Ethical explorations.John Skorupski - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality.Douglas W. Portmore - 2011 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action.Joshua Gert - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Ethics 102 (2):342-356.details
|
|
The impotence of the demandingness objection.David Sobel - 2007 - Philosophers' Imprint 7:1-17.details
|
|
Ethical Explorations.John Skorupski - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):470-473.details
|
|