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  1. Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
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  • Intentionalism and Pain.David Bain - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523.
    The pain case can appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory, I argue. After categorising versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an “objectivist” and “non-mentalist” version is the most promising, provided it can withstand two objections: concerning what we say when in pain, and the distinctiveness of the pain case. I rebut these objections, in a way that’s available (...)
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  • Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience.Michael Tye - 2002 - Noûs 36 (1):137-51.
    Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same (...)
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  • Review: Two Cheers for Representationalism. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):671 - 678.
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  • Two Cheers for Representationalism. [REVIEW]Sydney Shoemaker - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):671-678.
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  • Phenomenological Approaches to Non-Conceptual Content.Corijn Van Mazijk - 2017 - HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology 6:58-78.
    Over the past years McDowell’s conceptualist theory has received mixed phenomenological reviews. Some phenomenologists have claimed that conceptualism involves an over-intellectualization of human experience. Others have drawn on Husserl’s work, arguing that Husserl’s theory of fulfillment challenges conceptualism and that his notion of “real content” is non-conceptual. Still others, by contrast, hold that Husserl’s later phenomenology is in fundamental agreement with McDowell’s theory of conceptually informed experience. So who is right? This paper purports to show that phenomenology does not have (...)
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  • Phenomenal Character Revisited.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):465 - 467.
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  • Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: A Quarterly Journal 57 (2):459-468.
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  • Representationalism, Perceptual Distortion and the Limits of Phenomenal Concepts.David Bourget - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):16-36.
    This paper replies to objections from perceptual distortion against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that some pairs of distorted and undistorted experiences share contents without sharing phenomenal characters, which is incompatible with the supervenience thesis. In reply, I suggest that such cases are not counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in some way compared to those of normal experiences. This (...)
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  • The Consequences Of Intentionalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):247-270.
    This article explores two consequences of intentionalism. My first line of argument focuses on the impact of intentionalism on the 'hard problem' of phenomenal character. If intentionalism is true, the phenomenal supervenes on the intentional. Furthermore, if physicalism about the intentional is also true, the intentional supervenes on the physical. Therefore, if intentionalism and physicalism are both true, then, by transitivity of supervenience, physicalism about the phenomenal is true. I argue that this transitivity argument is not persuasive, because on any (...)
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  • Restrictions on Representationalism.Amy Kind - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):405-427.
    According to representationalism, the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states supervenes on the intentional content of such states. Strong representationalism makes a further claim: the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states _consists in_ the intentional content of such states. Although strong representationalism has greatly increased in popularity over the last decade, I find the view deeply implausible. In what follows, I will attempt to argue against strong representationalism by a two-step argument. First, I suggest that strong representationalism must (...)
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  • The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):17-35.
    Since Twin Earth was discovered by American philosophical-space explorers in the 1970s, the domain of.
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  • Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
    Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to (...)
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  • Brentano and Husserl on Self-Awareness.Dan Zahavi - 1998 - Études Phénoménologiques 14 (27-28):127-168.
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  • Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology Of Habituality And Habitus.Dermot Moran - 2011 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 42 (1):53-77.
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  • Blurred Vision and the Transparency of Experience.Michael Pace - 2007 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):328–354.
    This paper considers an objection to intentionalism (the view that the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on intentional content) based on the phenomenology of blurred vision. Several intentionalists, including Michael Tye, Fred Dretske, and Timothy Crane, have proposed intentionalist explanations of blurred vision phenomenology. I argue that their proposals fail and propose a solution of my own that, I contend, is the only promising explanation consistent with intentionalism. The solution, however, comes at a cost for intentionalists; it involves rejecting the (...)
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  • Non-Representational Approaches to the Unconscious in the Phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.Anastasia Kozyreva - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):199-224.
    There are two main approaches in the phenomenological understanding of the unconscious. The first explores the intentional theory of the unconscious, while the second develops a non-representational way of understanding consciousness and the unconscious. This paper aims to outline a general theoretical framework for the non-representational approach to the unconscious within the phenomenological tradition. In order to do so, I focus on three relevant theories: Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, Thomas Fuchs’ phenomenology of body memory, and Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of (...)
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  • Some Reflections on Husserlian Intentionality, Intentionalism, and Non-Propositional Contents.Corijn van Mazijk - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):499-517.
    This paper discusses Husserl’s theory of intentionality and compares it to contemporary debates about intentionalism. I first show to what extent such a comparison could be meaningful. I then outline the structure of intentionality as found in Ideas I. My main claims are that – in contrast with intentionalism – intentionality for Husserl covers just a region of conscious contents; that it is essentially a relation between act-processes and presented content; and that the side of act-processes contains non-representational contents. In (...)
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  • Against Intentionalism.Bernard Nickel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):279 - 304.
    Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenological properties of a perceptual experience supervene on its intentional properties. The paper presents a counterexample to this claim, one that concerns visual grouping phenomenology. I argue that this example is superior to super?cially similar examples involving grouping phenomenology offered by Peacocke (1983), because the standard intentionalist responses to Peacocke.
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  • Affectivity And Time: Towards A Phenomenology Of Embodied Time-Consciousness.Marek Pokropski - 2015 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 41 (1):161-172.
    In the article, I develop some ideas introduced by Edmund Husserl concerning time-consciousness and embodiment. However, I do not discuss the Husserlian account of consciousness of time in its full scope. I focus on the main ideas of the phenomenology of time and the problem of bodily sensations and their role in the constitution of consciousness of time. I argue that time-consciousness is primarily constituted in the dynamic experience of bodily feelings. In the first part, I outline the main ideas (...)
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  • Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental.Tim Crane - 1998 - In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 229-251.
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which (...)
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  • The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
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  • Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind By Tye Michael MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1995, Xvi + 239 Pp. [REVIEW]James Garvey - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (282):606-.
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  • The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
    A common objection to sense-datum theories of perception is that they cannot give an adequate account of the fact that introspection indicates that our sensory experiences are directed on, or are about, the mind-independent entities in the world around us, that our sense experience is transparent to the world. In this paper I point out that the main force of this claim is to point out an explanatory challenge to sense-datum theories.
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  • The Content of Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosopical Quarterly 44 (175):190-205.
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  • Intentionalism.Tim Crane - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 474-93.
    The central and defining characteristic of thoughts is that they have objects. The object of a thought is what the thought concerns, or what it is about. Since there cannot be thoughts which are not about anything, or which do not concern anything, there cannot be thoughts without objects. Mental states or events or processes which have objects in this sense are traditionally called ‘intentional,’ and ‘intentionality’ is for this reason the general term for this defining characteristic of thought. Under (...)
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  • Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.Dan Zahavi - 2007 - Human Studies 30 (3):269-273.
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  • The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
    Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. A pain in one’s leg feels to be in the leg, not ‘in the mind’. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the (...)
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  • Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence.Tim Crane - 2006 - In Mark Textor (ed.), The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. London: Routledge. pp. 1--20.
    Franz Brentano’s attempt to distinguish mental from physical phenomena by employing the scholastic concept of intentional inexistence is often cited as reintroducing the concept of intentionality into mainstream philosophical discussion. But Brentano’s own claims about intentional inexistence are much misunderstood. In the second half of the 20th century, analytical philosophers in particular have misread Brentano’s views in misleading ways.1 It is important to correct these misunderstandings if we are to come to a proper assessment of Brentano’s worth as a philosopher (...)
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  • On Husserl's Theory of Consciousness in the Fifth Logical Investigation.Quentin Smith - 1977 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 37 (4):482-497.
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  • Phenomenal Character Revisited.Sydney Shoemaker - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):465-467.
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  • The Character of Mind.Thomas G. Arner & Colin McGinn - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (4):630.
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  • Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning.Richard Schmitt & J. N. Mohanty - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (3):394-395.
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  • The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution.Robert Sokolowsky - 1967 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (1):143-146.
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  • Bodily Affects as Prenoetic Elements in Enactive Perception.Matt Bower & Shaun Gallagher - 2013 - Phenomenology and Mind 4 (1):78-93.
    In this paper we attempt to advance the enactive discourse on perception by highlighting the role of bodily affects as prenoetic constraints on perceptual experience. Enactivists argue for an essential connection between perception and action, where action primarily means skillful bodily intervention in one’s surroundings. Analyses of sensory-motor contingencies (as in Noë 2004) are important contributions to the enactive account. Yet this is an incomplete story since sensory-motor contingencies are of no avail to the perceiving agent without motivational pull in (...)
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  • Content and Consciousness.D. C. Dennett - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (8):220-224.
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  • Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum.Eric Marcus - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.
    There has been much written in recent years about whether a pair of subjects could have visual experiences that represented the colors of objects in their environment in precisely the same way, despite differing significantly in what it was like to undergo them, differing that is, in their qualitative character. The possibility of spectrum inversion has been so much debated1 in large part because of the threat that it would pose to the more general doctrine of Intentionalism, according to which (...)
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  • Mind and World.John Mcdowell - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182):99-109.
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  • The Content of Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):190.
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  • Mental Paint.Ned Block - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 165--200.
    The greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind--maybe even all of philosophy-- divides two perspectives on consciousness. The two perspectives differ on whether there is anything in the phenomenal character of conscious experience that goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive and the functional. A convenient terminological handle on the dispute is whether there are.
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  • Social Content and Psychological Content.Brian Loar - 1988 - In Robert H. Grimm & D. D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press.
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