Standard sorites paradoxes can always be put into a simple canonical form, employing the sole inference modus ponens. For example, consider the following paradox. Take a continuum of colours going from red to blue, and let a1,..., am be a sequence of segments of this continuum such that each segment is phenomenologically indistinguishable in colour from its immediate neighbours. Let Fx be the predicate ‘x is red’. Then the untrue conclusion Fam can be inferred from the premises Fa0 and Fan (...) → Fan + 1. (shrink)

Sorensen here offers a unified solution to a large family of philosophical puzzles and paradoxes through a study of "blindspots": consistent propositions that cannot be rationally accepted by certain individuals even though they might by true.

I propose that the meanings of vague expressions render the truth conditions of utterances of sentences containing them sensitive to our interests. For example, 'expensive' is analyzed as meaning 'costs a lot', which in turn is analyzed as meaning 'costs significantly greater than the norm'. Whether a difference is a significant difference depends on what our interests are. Appeal to the proposal is shown to provide an attractive resolution of the sorites paradox that is compatible with classical logic and semantics.