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Fully Understanding Concept Possession.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2018 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 50 (148):3-27.details
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You and me.Guy Longworth - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):289-303.details
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Second person thought.Jane Heal - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):317-331.details
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Am I You?Matthias Haase - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):358-371.details
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The You Turn.Naomi Eilan - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):265-278.details
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Do demonstratives have senses?Richard Heck - 2002 - Philosophers' Imprint 2:1-33.details
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