The article presents Leibniz's preoccupation (in 1675?6) with the difference between the notion of infinite number, which he regards as impossible, and that of the infinite being, which he regards as possible. I call this issue ?Leibniz's Problem? and examine Spinoza's solution to a similar problem that arises in the context of his philosophy. ?Spinoza's solution? is expounded in his letter on the infinite (Ep.12), which Leibniz read and annotated in April 1676. The gist of Spinoza's solution is to distinguish (...) between three kinds of infinity and, in particular, between one that applies to substance, and one that applies to numbers, seen as auxiliaries of the imagination. The rest of the paper examines the extent to which Spinoza's solution solves Leibniz's problem. The main thesis I advance is that, when Spinoza and Leibniz say that the divine substance is infinite, in most contexts it is to be understood in non-numerical and non-quantitative terms. Instead, for Spinoza and Leibniz, a substance is said to be infinite in a qualitative sense stressing that it is complete, perfect and indivisible. I argue that this approach solves one strand of Leibniz's problem and leaves another unsolved. (shrink)

In this paper I shall concern myself with the ontological argument as found in Leibniz. In recent years several authors, notable among them Charles Hartshorne and Norman Malcolm, have contended that to speak of the ontological argument or the Anselmian argument is ambiguous, as in Anselm are to be found two logically independent ontological arguments. The more well-known version is from Proslogion II, and it takes existence as a perfection. This is the form of the argument rejected by Gaunilo, Aquinas, (...) and eventually Kant. Today it is in all but universal disfavor. (shrink)

In this paper I shall concern myself with the ontological argument as found in Leibniz. In recent years several authors, notable among them Charles Hartshorne and Norman Malcolm, have contended that to speak of the ontological argument or the Anselmian argument is ambiguous, as in Anselm are to be found two logically independent ontological arguments. The more well-known version is from Proslogion II, and it takes existence as a perfection. This is the form of the argument rejected by Gaunilo, Aquinas, (...) and eventually Kant. Today it is in all but universal disfavor. (shrink)

Leibniz' Theorie der möglichen Welten ist ein komplexes Ideengebäude, das er im Lauf der Jahre in verschiedenen Gelegenheitsschriften fortentwickelte. Hier wird diese Theorie systematisch dargestellt. Es werden sowohl die logischen Aspekte der Leibnizschen Möglichkeitstheorie erläutert als auch ihre Verbindungen mit Leibniz' Lehre von Raum und Zeit sowie ihre Beziehungen zu Leibniz' Theologie und insbesondere seiner Schöpfungslehre.