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Freedom, foreknowledge, and dependence

Noûs 55 (3):603-622 (2019)

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  1. Bootstrapping Divine Foreknowledge? Comments on Fischer.Alan R. Rhoda - 2017 - Science, Religion and Culture 4 (2):72-78.
    Critiques John Martin Fischer's bootstrapping model of divine foreknowledge. Invited contribution to a special journal issue on John Martin Fischer's _Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will_ (Oxford, 2016).
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  • John Martin Fischer on the Puzzle of Theological Fatalism.David P. Hunt - 2017 - Science, Religion and Culture 4 (2):15-26.
    This is a contribution to an Author Meets Critics special issue on John Martin Fischer's _Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will_.
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  • Defending Compatibilism.Bruce Reichenbach - 2017 - Science, Religion, and Culture 2 (4):63-71.
    It is a truism that where one starts from and the direction one goes determines where one ends up. This is no less true in philosophy than elsewhere, and certainly no less true in matters dealing with the relationship between God’s foreknowledge and human free actions. In what follows I will argue that the incompatibilist view that Fischer and others stalwartly defend results from the particular starting point they choose, and that if one adopts a different starting point about divine (...)
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  • Review Essay: The Metaphysics of ControlThe Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control.David Shatz & John Martin Fischer - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):955.
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  • Fischer on Foreknowledge and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9 (4):51-61.
    I explore several issues raised in John Martin Fischer’s Our Fate: Essays on God and Free Will. First I discuss whether an approach to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge that appeals directly to the claim that God’s beliefs depend on the future is importantly different from Ockhamism. I suggest that this dependence approach has advantages over Ockhamism. I also argue that this approach gives us good reason to reject the claim that the past is fixed. Finally, I discuss Fischer’s (...)
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  • Time Travel and Changing the Past: (Or How to Kill Yourself and Live to Tell the Tale).G. C. Goddu - 2004 - Ratio 16 (1):16-32.
    According to the prevailing sentiment, changing the past is logically impossible. The prevailing sentiment is wrong. In this paper, I argue that the claim that changing the past entails a contradiction ultimately rests upon an empirical assumption, and so the conclusion that changing the past is logically impossible is to be resisted. I then present and discuss a model of time which drops the empirical assumption and coherently models changing the past. Finally, I defend the model, and changing the past, (...)
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  • On Ockham’s Way Out.Alvin Plantinga - 1986 - Faith and Philosophy 3 (3):235-269.
    In Part I, I present two traditional arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge with human freedom; the first of these is clearly fallacious; but the second, the argument from the necessity of the past, is much stronger. In the second section I explain and partly endorse Ockham’s response to the second argument: that only propositions strictly about the past are accidentally necessary, and past propositions about God’s knowledge of the future are not strictly about the past. In the third (...)
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  • Magicians, Alarm Clocks, and Backward Causation.Bob Brier - 1973 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 11 (4):359-364.
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  • The God of the Philosophers.William Hasker - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (4):621.
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  • Time, Tense and Causation.Quentin Smith & Michael Tooley - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):123.
    The main goal of Michael Tooley’s groundbreaking book is to establish a position intermediate between the tenseless theory of time and the standard tensed theory of time. Tooley argues for a novel version of the tensed theory of time, namely, that the future is unreal and the present and past real, and yet that reality consists only of tenseless facts. The question that naturally arises for the reader concerns an apparent paradox: how could the tensed theory of time be true (...)
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  • Troubles with Ockhamism.David Widerker - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87:462-480.
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  • Do God's Beliefs about the Future Depend on the Future?T. Ryan Byerly - 2015 - Journal of Analytic Theology 3:124-9.
    Trenton Merricks, among others, has recently championed in a series of papers what he takes to be a novel and simple solution to an age-old problem concerning the compatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom. The solution crucially involves the thesis that God’s beliefs about the future actions of human persons asymmetrically depend on the future actions of those persons. I show that Merricks’s defense of this thesis is inadequate and that the prospects for improving his defense of it would (...)
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  • Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.
    Many philosophers maintain that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with comprehensive divine foreknowledge but incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. But the Fixity of the Past principle underlying the rejection of compatibilism about the ability to do otherwise and determinism appears to generate an argument also for the incompatibility of the ability to do otherwise and divine foreknowledge. By developing an account of ability that appeals to the notion of explanatory dependence, we can replace the Fixity of (...)
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  • Lewis on Backward Causation.Ryan Wasserman - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):141-150.
    David Lewis famously defends a counterfactual theory of causation and a non-causal, similarity-based theory of counterfactuals. Lewis also famously defends the possibility of backward causation. I argue that this combination of views is untenable—given the possibility of backward causation, one ought to reject Lewis's theories of causation and counterfactuals.
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  • Does God have Beliefs?: WILLIAM P. ALSTON.William P. Alston - 1986 - Religious Studies 22 (3-4):287-306.
    Beliefs are freely attributed to God nowadays in Anglo–American philosophical theology. This practice undoubtedly reflects the twentieth–century popularity of the view that knowledge consists of true justified belief . The connection is frequently made explicit. If knowledge is true justified belief then whatever God knows He believes. It would seem that much recent talk of divine beliefs stems from Nelson Pike's widely discussed article, ‘Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action’. In this essay Pike develops a version of the classic argument for (...)
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  • Metaphysical grounding.Ricki Bliss & Kelly Trogdon - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    General discussion of grounding, including its formal features, relations to other notions, and applications. (Originally published 2014; revised 2021).
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  • Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow’, Reprinted with Postscripts In.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Philosophical Papers 2.
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  • Introduction” to his.D. Lewis - 1986 - Philosophical Papers 2.
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  • Recent Work on Molinism.Ken Perszyk - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):755-770.
    Molinism is named after Luis de Molina (1535–1600). Molina and his fellow Jesuits became entangled in a fierce debate over issues involving the doctrine of divine providence, which is a picture of how God runs the world. Molinism reemerged in the 1970s after Alvin Plantinga unwittingly assumed it in his Free Will Defense against the ‘Logical’ Argument from Evil. Molinism has been the subject of vigorous debate in analytic philosophy of religion ever since. The main aim of this essay is (...)
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  • Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: metaphysics, logic, and epistemology. qnew York: Oxford University Press. pp. 109-135.
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  • The Mystery of Foreknowledge.David J. Anderson & Joshua L. Watson - 2010 - Philo 13 (2):136-150.
    Many have attempted to respond to arguments for the incompatibility of freedom with divine foreknowledge by claiming that God’s beliefs about the future are explained by what the world is like at that future time. We argue that this response adequately advances the discussion only if the theist is able to articulate a model of foreknowledge that is both clearly possible and compatible with freedom. We investigate various models the theist might articulate and argue that all of these models fail.
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  • Facts, Freedom and Foreknowledge.E. M. Zemach & D. Winderker - 1987 - Religious Studies 23 (1):19 - 28.
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  • The Paradoxes of Time Travel.David K. Lewis - 1976 - American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (2):145-152.
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  • ``Freedom and Foreknowledge".John Martin Fischer - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):67-79.
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  • Some Puzzles of Ground.Kit Fine - 2010 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):97-118.
    I describe some paradoxes of ground and relate them to the semantic paradoxes.
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  • Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
    It is my aim in this paper to show that the contemporary assimilation of essence to modality is fundamentally misguided and that, as a consequence, the corresponding conception of metaphysics should be given up. It is not my view that the modal account fails to capture anything which might reasonably be called a concept of essence. My point, rather, is that the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in (...)
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  • Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
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  • No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.
    It has recently been suggested that a distinctive metaphysical relation— ‘Grounding’—is ultimately at issue in contexts in which some goings-on are said to hold ‘in virtue of’’, be ‘metaphysically dependent on’, or be ‘nothing over and above’ some others. Grounding is supposed to do good work in illuminating metaphysical dependence. I argue that Grounding is also unsuited to do this work. To start, Grounding alone cannot do this work, for bare claims of Grounding leave open such basic questions as whether (...)
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  • On Divine Foreknowledge.John Martin Fischer, Luis De Molina & Alfred J. Freddoso - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):387.
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  • Presentism and Ockham's Way Out.Alicia Finch & Michael C. Rea - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 1:1-17.
    We lay out the fatalist’s argument, making sure to clarify which dialectical moves are available to the libertarian. We then offer a more robust presentation of Ockhamism, responding to obvious objections and teasing out the implications of the view. At this point, we discuss presentism and eternalism in more detail. We then present our argument for the claim that the libertarian cannot take Ockham’s way out of the fatalism argument unless she rejects presentism. Finally, we consider and dispense with objections (...)
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  • Soft facts and ontological dependence.Patrick Todd - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):829-844.
    In the literature on free will, fatalism, and determinism, a distinction is commonly made between temporally intrinsic (‘hard’) and temporally relational (‘soft’) facts at times; determinism, for instance, is the thesis that the temporally intrinsic state of the world at some given past time, together with the laws, entails a unique future (relative to that time). Further, it is commonly supposed by incompatibilists that only the ‘hard facts’ about the past are fixed and beyond our control, whereas the ‘soft facts’ (...)
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  • Is the Past Unpreventable?George I. Mavrodes - 1984 - Faith and Philosophy 1 (2):131-146.
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  • ``Is the Past Preventable?".George I. Mavrodes - 1984 - Faith and Philosophy 1 (2):131-146.
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  • Of God and freedom.John Turk Saunders - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (2):219-225.
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  • Logic and the Nature of God.Stephen T. Davis - 1985 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (1):95-96.
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  • The God of the Philosophers.Anthony Kenny - 1980 - Philosophy 55 (213):418-420.
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  • The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes.Thomas V. Morris - 1993 - Noûs 27 (3):391-395.
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  • Soft facts and Harsh realities: Reply to William Craig: John Martin Fischer.John Martin Fischer - 1991 - Religious Studies 27 (4):523-539.
    . In a number of papers I have sought to discuss and cast some doubt on a certain strategy of response to an argument that purports to show that God's foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. This argument proceeds from the alleged ‘fixity of the past’ to the conclusion that God's foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. William Lane Craig has criticized my approach to these issues. Here I should like to respond to some of Craig's claims. My goal is (...)
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  • The Eternity Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge.Michael Rota - 2010 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2 (1):165 - 186.
    In this paper I defend the eternity solution to the problem of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. After motivating the problem, I sketch the basic contours of the eternity solution. I then consider several objections which contend that the eternity solution falsely implies that we have various powers (e.g., to change God’s beliefs, or to affect the past) which, according to the objector, we do not in fact have.
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  • Foreknowledge and Freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):567-586.
    The bulk of the essay “Truth and Freedom” (Philosophical Review 118 [2009]: 29–57) opposes fatalism, which is the claim that if there is a true proposition to the effect that an action A will occur, then A will not be free. But that essay also offers a new way to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human freedom. In “The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to Merricks” (Philosophical Review 120 [2011]: 97–115), John Martin Fischer and Patrick Todd raise a number of objections (...)
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  • Hasker on Omniscience.Bruce Reichenbach - 1987 - Faith and Philosophy 4 (1):86-92.
    I contend that William Hasker’s argument to show omniscience incompatible with human freedom trades on an ambiguity between altering and bringing about the past, and that it is the latter only which is invoked by one who thinks they are compatible. I then use his notion of precluding circumstances to suggest that what gives the appearance of our inability to freely bring about the future (and hence that omniscience is incompatible with freedom) is that, from God’s perspective of foreknowledge, it (...)
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  • ``Facts, Freedom, and Foreknowledge".Eddy M. Zemach & David Widerker - 1987 - Religious Studies 23 (1):19-28.
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  • Time travel and changing the past: (Or how to kill yourself and live to tell the tale).G. C. Goddu - 2003 - Ratio 16 (1):16–32.
    According to the prevailing sentiment, changing the past is logically impossible. The prevailing sentiment is wrong. In this paper, I argue that the claim that changing the past entails a contradiction ultimately rests upon an empirical assumption, and so the conclusion that changing the past is logically impossible is to be resisted. I then present and discuss a model of time which drops the empirical assumption and coherently models changing the past. Finally, I defend the model, and changing the past, (...)
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  • Miracles.C. S. Lewis - 1947
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  • Prepunishment and Explanatory Dependence: A New Argument for Incompatibilism about Foreknowledge and Freedom.Patrick Todd - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):619-639.
    The most promising way of responding to arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom (in one way or another) invokes a claim about the order of explanation: God knew (or believed) that you would perform a given action because you would, in fact, perform it, and not the other way around. Once we see this result, many suppose, we'll see that divine foreknowledge ultimately poses no threat to human freedom. This essay argues that matters are not so (...)
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  • The supervenience of truth: freewill and omniscience.Storrs McCall - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):501-506.
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  • Truth and freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.
    Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t . Those arguments do not require the complex machinery (...)
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  • Freedom and foreknowledge.John Martin Fischer - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):67-79.
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  • Praying about the past.Geoffrey Brown - 1985 - Philosophical Quarterly 35 (138):83-86.
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  • Recent contributions to the theory of innate ideas.Noam Chomsky - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):2-11.
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