Ethical Sex: Sexual Choices and Their Nature and Meaning is a book-length exploration of the philosophy of sex. It engages with various approaches to the subject, covering natural law approaches and phenomenology as well as virtue ethics.

The presence of a human being/organism—a living human ‘whole’, with the defining tendency to promote its own welfare—has value in itself, as do the functions which compose it. Life is inseparable from health, since without some degree of healthy functionality the living whole would not exist. The value of life differs both within a single life and between lives. As with any other form of human flourishing, the value of life-and-health must be distinguished from the moral importance of human beings: (...) less fulfilled means not less important morally, but more in need of being fulfilled. That said, to say that life and health has value is not to say exactly what—if anything—that value requires by way of active promotion at a given time. Many factors must be taken into account in making health care decisions, even if the worth of all lives, and the dignity of all human beings, must in every case be acknowledged. (shrink)

The rare phenomenon in which a person desires amputation of a healthy limb, now often termed body integrity identity disorder, raises central questions for biomedical ethics. Standard bioethical discussions of surgical intervention in such cases fail to address the meaning of bodily integrity, which is intrinsic to a theological understanding of the goodness of the body. However, moral theological responses are liable to assume that such interventions necessarily represent an implicitly docetic manipulation of the body. Through detailed attention to the (...) ethics of mutilation and of surgery for psychiatric disorders, this article explores the theological and ethical significance of the body for human identity. (shrink)

In this essay, I outline fundamental anthropological and moral principles related to human sexuality and gender identity and then apply these principles to analyze and evaluate the views of several authors who attempt to carve out a “middle way” between liberal and traditionalist approaches to these issues. In doing so, I engage especially with the claim that gender dysphoria, rather than being a psychological issue, is a type of biological intersex condition in which one’s “brain sex” is out of line (...) with one’s genital and chromosomal sex. I argue that understanding the human person as a unity of body and soul and recognizing human sexuality as ordered toward the human good of marriage understood as inseparably unitive and procreative reveals the flaws in this position and helps to show why hormonal or surgical gender reassignment therapy is not a medically or ethically appropriate response to gender dysphoria. I also offer an alternative characterization of gender dysphoria and suggestions for responding with true compassion to those who suffer from it. (shrink)

Clinical guidelines now recommend hormonal and surgical interven­tions together with social affirmation for children who experience a gender identity that is discordant with their biological sex. However, fundamental questions regarding the safety, efficacy, and ethics of these approaches remain unanswered. There is an urgent need for high-quality research to establish the overall risks and benefits of the current treatment paradigm. While acknowledging the complexity of the problem, competing interests, and logistical challenges, ethical imperatives and acceptable boundaries for scientific investigation can (...) be set by considering the ultimate good of both the individual person and society as a whole. Within established guidelines for human experimentation, alternative approaches to treatment of gender dysphoria in children can be explored without compromising the dignity and bodily integrity of affected individuals. (shrink)

Conditional willing of morally impermissible actions like adultery tells us something about the moral agent, as does the liability to will such actions in certain unrealised contingencies. However, I argue, a liability to will wrongful actions in some circumstances need not (though it might) affect the moral permissibility of the act intended here and now e.g. terms of going through a marriage ceremony or enjoying sexual acts with one's spouse. This chapter explores the issue of conditional, preparatory or contingent intentions (...) of spouses with critical reference to work of John Finnis in this area. (shrink)