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Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883-890.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.details
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Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.details
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Norms of assertion.Matthew Weiner - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):187–195.details
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``Must we Know What we Say?".Matt Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Must we know what we say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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Prompting challenges.John Turri - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):456-462.details
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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168-172.details
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Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning. [REVIEW]Mandy Simons - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):152.details
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Testimony, knowledge, and epistemic goals.Steven L. Reynolds - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (2):139 - 161.details
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Treating something as a reason for action.Ram Neta - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):684-699.details
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Making it Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.details
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Assertion, practical reason, and pragmatic theories of knowledge.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.details
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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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Knowledge and the norms of assertion.John Koethe - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):625-638.details
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The road to Larissa.John Hyman - 2010 - Ratio 23 (4):393-414.details
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How knowledge works.John Hyman - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):433-451.details
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Knowledge and evidence.John Hyman - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):891-916.details
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Paul Horwich (ed.): Meaning. [REVIEW]Jaroslav Peregrin - 2000 - Erkenntnis 53 (3):415-422.details
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Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief.Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):120-122.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW]David Jehle - 2006 - Studia Logica 84 (1):161-165.details
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Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Brute rationality.Joshua Gert - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):417–446.details
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Second-hand knowledge.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):592–618.details
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Second-Hand Knowledge.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):592-618.details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Truth.Pascal Engel - 2002 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.details
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Truth.Pascal Engel - 2002 - Routledge.details
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VIII.—Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-162.details
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Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.details
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VIII.—Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:141-162.details
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Truth.Michael Dummett - 1968 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 33 (1):148-148.details
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Probability and Assertion.V. H. Dudman - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):204 - 211.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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``Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.details
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The knowledge Norm for assertion.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):89-103.details
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Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.details
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