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  1. Self-Knowledge and Moore's Paradox.David M. Rosenthal - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):195 - 209.
    As G. E. Moore famously observed, sentences such as 'It's raining but I don't think it is', though they aren't contradictory, cannot be used to make coherent assertions.' The trouble with such sentences is not a matter of their truth conditions; such sentences can readily be true. Indeed, it happens often enough with each of us that we think, for example, that it isn't raining even though it is. This shows that such sentences are not literally contradictory. But even though (...)
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  • More on Moore.Michael Welbourne - 1992 - Analysis 52 (4):237 - 241.
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  • Inferential Justification and the Infinite Regress.Richard Foley - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (4):311 - 316.
    It is commonly thought that the requirements of inferential justification are such that necessarily the process of inferentially justifying a belief will come to an end. But, If this is so, We should be able to pick out those requirements of justification which necessitate an end to the justification process. Unfortunately, Although there is nearly unanimous agreement as to the need for such an end, It is by no means clear which particular requirements of justification impose this need. I examine (...)
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