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What a Loaded Generalization: Generics and Social Cognition.Daniel Wodak, Sarah-Jane Leslie & Marjorie Rhodes - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (9):625-635.details
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Can Objectivists Account for Subjective Reasons?Daniel Wodak - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3):259-279.details
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No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.details
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Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori.Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (1):1-22.details
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Knowledge from falsehood.Ted A. Warfield - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):405–416.details
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Some Good and Bad News for Ethical Intuitionism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):489–511.details
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Moral disagreement and moral skepticism.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333.details
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What apparent reasons appear to be.Kurt Sylvan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.details
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Perceptual Knowledge of Nonactual Possibilities.Margot Strohminger - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):363-375.details
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Having reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):57 - 71.details
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The cultural evolution of prosocial religions.Ara Norenzayan, Azim F. Shariff, Will M. Gervais, Aiyana K. Willard, Rita A. McNamara, Edward Slingerland & Joseph Henrich - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:e1.details
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Thinking about Cases.Shelly Kagan - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):44.details
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The obscure object of hallucination.Mark Johnston - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83.details
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Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer (ed.) - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Gerald Vision - 2002 - Mind 111 (444):866-869.details
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Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.details
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Logic and reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1984 - Synthese 60 (1):107-127.details
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Strengthening the case for knowledge from falsehood.Branden Fitelson - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):666-669.details
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Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects.Chaz Firestone & Brian J. Scholl - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-72.details
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A hard look at moral perception.David Faraci - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2055-2072.details
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The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.details
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The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.details
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Reasons as Defaults.John F. Horty - 2012 - Oxford, England: Oup Usa.details
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Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-135.details
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Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):234-237.details
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The grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism.Ralf M. Bader - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.details
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Knowing Right From Wrong.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Metaphysical Relations in Metaethics.Gideon Rosen - 2017 - In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge. pp. 151-169.details
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Essence and natural kinds: When science meets preschooler intuition.Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:108-66.details
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The Mark of the Plural: Generic Generalizations and Race.Daniel Wodak & Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2017 - In Paul C. Taylor, Linda Martín Alcoff & Luvell Anderson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Race. Routledge. pp. 277-289.details
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Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism.David Christensen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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Reasons as Defaults.John Horty - 2007 - Philosophers' Imprint 7:1-28.details
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