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The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?Niko Kolodny - 2008 - Ethics 118 (3):437-463.details
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Normative requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.details
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Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality.Nicholas Southwood - 2008 - Ethics 119 (1):9-30.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Narrow-Scoping for Wide-Scopers.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2617-2646.details
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Moral reasons, epistemic reasons, and rationality.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.details
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Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.details
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Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Ethics 122 (3):489-515.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.details
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``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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The Coherent and the Rational.Errol Lord - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):151-175.details
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Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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How Does Coherence Matter?Niko Kolodny - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt3):229 - 263.details
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In Defense of the Wrong Kind of Reason.Christopher Howard - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):53-62.details
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The Wrong Kind of Reason.Pamela Hieronymi - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.details
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Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
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Subjective and Objective Justification in Ethics and Epistemology.Richard Feldman - 1988 - The Monist 71 (3):405-419.details
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On overrating oneself... And knowing it.Adam Elga - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):115-124.details
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Incoherence and irrationality.Donald Davidson - 1985 - Dialectica 39 (4):345-54.details
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Incoherence and Irrationality.Donald Davidson - 1985 - Dialectica 39 (4):345-354.details
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Impartial reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press.details
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Impartial Reason by Stephen Darwall. [REVIEW]Onora O'Neill - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):60-64.details
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Putting logic in its place: formal constraints on rational belief.David Phiroze Christensen - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Rational Probabilistic Incoherence.Michael Caie - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):527-575.details
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From Normativity to Responsibility.Joseph Raz - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Structural Irrationality.Thomas Scanlon - 2007 - In Geoffrey Brennan, Robert Goodin, Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Common Minds: Themes From the Philosophy of Philip Pettit. Clarendon Press.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Isolating Correct Reasoning.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality.Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.details
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Reasons.John Broome - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press. pp. 2004--28.details
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