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The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.details
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On Leaving Out What It’s Like.Joseph Levine - 1993 - In Martin Ed Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), On Leaving Out What It’s Like. Blackwell. pp. 121-136.details
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Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.Jessica Wilson - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):598-602.details
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A theory of phenomenal concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-105.details
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A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:91-105.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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Précis of Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness.John Perry - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):172-181.details
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Frege on demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.details
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What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap?David Papineau - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):5-19.details
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Thinking about Consciousness.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):171-186.details
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Remarks on David Papineau's Thinking about Consciousness1.Christopher S. Hill - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):147-147.details
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Phenomenal States (Revised Version).Brian Loar - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives. MIT Press. pp. 219.details
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Materialism and qualia: The explanatory gap.Joseph Levine - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.details
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Materialism and the metaphysics of modality.David J. Chalmers - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):473-96.details
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Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation.David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.details
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Acquaintance with qualia.John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 1990 - Theoria 61 (3):129-147.details
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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.details
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Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.details
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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.details
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Acquaintance and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 2012 - In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. pp. 16-43.details
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Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.details
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Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.details
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What is a phenomenal concept?Janet Levin - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.details
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Realistic monism - why physicalism entails panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):3-31.details
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The components of content.David Chalmers - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.details
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The knowledge argument can be introduced through a variety of differ-ent illustrations. Here are three.(i) Consider a complete physical theory of the light spectrum, including the effects different wavelengths of light have on the neural systems of humans. There are also the phenomenal properties we experience when we. [REVIEW]John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 179.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.details
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On Leaving Out What It's Like.Joseph Levine - 1993 - In Martin Davies & Glyn W. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness: Psychological an Philosophical Essays. MIT Press. pp. 543--557.details
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