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We-attitudes and Social Institutions

In Georg Meggle (ed.), Social Facts and Collective Intentionality. Philosophische Forschung / Philosophical research. Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen (2002)

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  1. We-Intentions.Raimo Tuomela & Kaarlo Miller - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (3):367-389.
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  • Collective acceptance and collective social notions.Raimo Tuomela & Wolfgang Balzer - 1998 - Synthese 117 (2):175-205.
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  • A Theory of Social Action.Raimo Tuomela - 1988 - Noûs 22 (4):624-629.
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  • The Construction of Social Reality.John R. Searle - 1995 - Free Press.
    In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle argues that there are two kinds of facts--some that are independent of human observers, and some that require..
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  • The importance of us: a philosophical study of basic social notions.Raimo Tuomela - 1995 - Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
    This book develops a systematic philosophical theory of social action and group phenomena, in the process presenting detailed analyses of such central social notions as 'we-attitude' (especially 'we-intention' and mutual belief, social norm, joint action, and - most important - group goal, group belief, and group action). Though this is a philosophical work, it presents a unified conceptual framework that may be useful to social scientists, especially social psychologists, as well as philosophers. The book puts forward and defends a number (...)
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  • Psychological Knowledge: A Social History and Philosophy.Martin Kusch - 1998 - New York: Routledge.
    Psychologists and philosophers have assumed that psychological knowledge is knowledge about, and held by, the individual mind. _Psychological Knowledge_ challenges these views. It argues that bodies of psychological knowledge are social institutions like money or the monarchy, and that mental states are social artefacts like coins or crowns. Martin Kusch takes on arguments of alternative proposals, shows what is wrong with them, and demonstrates how his own social-philosophical approach constitutes an advance. We see that exists a substantial natural amount of (...)
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  • The Construction of Social Reality.John Searle - 1995 - Philosophy 71 (276):313-315.
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  • The Construction of Social Reality. Anthony Freeman in conversation with John Searle.J. Searle & A. Freeman - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (2):180-189.
    John Searle began to discuss his recently published book `The Construction of Social Reality' with Anthony Freeman, and they ended up talking about God. The book itself and part of their conversation are introduced and briefly reflected upon by Anthony Freeman. Many familiar social facts -- like money and marriage and monarchy -- are only facts by human agreement. They exist only because we believe them to exist. That is the thesis, at once startling yet obvious, that philosopher John Searle (...)
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