Switch to: Citations

References in:

Minimal Disagreement

Philosophia:1-22 (forthcoming)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. De-Idealizing Disagreement, Rethinking Relativism.Katherina Kinzel & Martin Kusch - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (1):40-71.
    Relativism is often motivated in terms of certain types of disagreement. In this paper, we survey the philosophical debates over two such types: faultless disagreement in the case of gustatory conflict, and fundamental disagreement in the case of epistemic conflict. Each of the two discussions makes use of a implicit conception of judgement: brute judgement in the case of faultless disagreement, and rule-governed judgement in the case of fundamental disagreement. We show that the prevalent accounts work with unreasonably high levels (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Faultless Disagreement.Julia Zakkou - 2019 - Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland: Klostermann.
    People disagree frequently, about both objective and subjective matters. But while at least one party must be wrong in a disagreement about objective matters, it seems that both parties can be right when it comes to subjective ones: it seems that there can be faultless disagreements. But how is this possible? How can people disagree with one another if they are both right? And why should they? In recent years, a number of philosophers and linguists have argued that we must (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Faultless Disagreement, Assertions and the Affective-Expressive Dimension of Judgments of Taste.Filip Buekens - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):637-655.
    Contextualists and assessment relativists neglect the expressive dimension of assertoric discourse that seems to give rise to faultless disagreement. Discourse that generates the intuition makes public an attitudinal conflict, and the affective -expressive dimension of the contributing utterances accounts for it. The FD-phenomenon is an effect of a public dispute generated by a sequence of expressing opposite attitudes towards a salient object or state of affairs, where the protagonists are making an attempt to persuade the other side into joining the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1041 citations  
  • Living Words: Meaning Underdetermination and the Dynamic Lexicon.Peter Ludlow - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Peter Ludlow shows how word meanings are much more dynamic than we might have supposed, and explores how they are modulated even during everyday conversation. The resulting view is radical, and has far-reaching consequences for our political and legal discourse, and for enduring puzzles in the foundations of semantics, epistemology, and logic.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Disagreement About Taste: Commonality Presuppositions and Coordination.Teresa Marques & Manuel García-Carpintero - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):701-723.
    The paper confronts the disagreement argument for relativism about matters of taste, defending a specific form of contextualism. It is first considered whether the disagreement data might manifest an inviariantist attitude speakers pre-reflectively have. Semantic and ontological enlightenment should then make the impressions of disagreement vanish, or at least leave them as lingering ineffectual Müller-Lyer-like illusions; but it is granted to relativists that this does not fully happen. López de Sa’s appeal to presuppositions of commonality and Sundell’s appeal to metalinguistic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • The Role of Disagreement in Semantic Theory.Carl Baker - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):1-18.
    Arguments from disagreement often take centre stage in debates between competing semantic theories. This paper explores the theoretical basis for arguments from disagreement and, in so doing, proposes methodological principles which allow us to distinguish between legitimate arguments from disagreement and dialectically ineffective arguments from disagreement. In the light of these principles, I evaluate Cappelen and Hawthorne's [2009] argument from disagreement against relativism, and show that it fails to undermine relativism since it is dialectically ineffective. Nevertheless, I argue that an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Relativism and Disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
    The relativist's central objection to contextualism is that it fails to account for the disagreement we perceive in discourse about "subjective" matters, such as whether stewed prunes are delicious. If we are to adjudicate between contextualism and relativism, then, we must first get clear about what it is for two people to disagree. This question turns out to be surprisingly difficult to answer. A partial answer is given here; although it is incomplete, it does help shape what the relativist must (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   194 citations  
  • Context, Content, and Relativism.Michael Glanzberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):1--29.
    This paper argues against relativism, focusing on relativism based on the semantics of predicates of personal taste. It presents and defends a contextualist semantics for these predicates, derived from current work on gradable adjectives. It then considers metasemantic questions about the kinds of contextual parameters this semantics requires. It argues they are not metasemantically different from those in other gradable adjectives, and that contextual parameters of this sort are widespread in natural language. Furthermore, this paper shows that if such parameters (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   116 citations  
  • Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    John MacFarlane explores how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative. He provides new, satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis, including what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   203 citations  
  • Context Dependence, Disagreement, and Predicates of Personal Taste.Peter Lasersohn - 2005 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (6):643--686.
    This paper argues that truth values of sentences containing predicates of “personal taste” such as fun or tasty must be relativized to individuals. This relativization is of truth value only, and does not involve a relativization of semantic content: If you say roller coasters are fun, and I say they are not, I am negating the same content which you assert, and directly contradicting you. Nonetheless, both our utterances can be true (relative to their separate contexts). A formal semantic theory (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   244 citations  
  • Necessitarian Propositions.Jonathan Schaffer - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):119-162.
    Kaplan (drawing on Montague and Prior, inter alia) made explicit the idea of world and time neutral propositions, which bear truth values only relative to world and time parameters. There was then a debate over the role of time. Temporalists sided with Kaplan in maintaining time neutral propositions with time relative truth values, while eternalists claimed that all propositions specify the needed time information and so bear the same truth value at all times. But there never was much of a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Disagreeing in Context.Teresa Marques - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6:1-12.
    This paper argues for contextualism about predicates of personal taste and evaluative predicates in general, and offers a proposal of how apparently resilient disagreements are to be explained. The present proposal is complementary to others that have been made in the recent literature. Several authors, for instance (López de Sa, 2008; Sundell, 2011; Huvenes, 2012; Marques and García-Carpintero, 2014; Marques, 2014a), have recently defended semantic contextualism for those kinds of predicates from the accusation that it faces the problem of lost (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Talking About Taste: Disagreement, Implicit Arguments, and Relative Truth.Isidora Stojanovic - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (6):691-706.
    In this paper, I take issue with an idea that has emerged from recent relativist proposals, and, in particular, from Lasersohn, according to which the correct semantics for taste predicates must use contents that are functions of a judge parameter rather than implicit arguments lexically associated with such predicates. I argue that the relativist account and the contextualist implicit argument-account are, from the viewpoint of semantics, not much more than notational variants of one another. In other words, given any sentence (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
  • Confessions of a Schmentencite: Towards an Explicit Semantics.Jonathan Schaffer - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-31.
    ABSTRACTNatural language semantics is heir to two formalisms. There is the extensional machinery of explicit variables traditionally used to model reference to individuals, and the intensional mach...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Perspective in Taste Predicates and Epistemic Modals.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
    Imagine that Ann, asked to name her favorite treat, answers: 1. Licorice is tasty Imagine that Ben, having hidden some licorice in the cupboard, whispers to Ann: 2. There might be licorice in the cupboard. What if any role is played by perspective—whom the licorice is tasty to, whose evidence allows for licorice in the cupboard—in the semantics of such sentences?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Subjectivity and Perspective in Truth-Theoretic Semantics.Peter Lasersohn - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This book explores linguistic and philosophical issues presented by sentences expressing personal taste, such as Roller coasters are fun, or Licorice is tasty. Standard semantic theories explain the meanings of sentences by specifying the conditions under which they are true; here, Peter Lasersohn asks how we can account for sentences that are concerned with matters of opinion rather than matters of fact. He argues that a truth-theoretic semantic theory is appropriate even for sentences like these, but that for such sentences, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Thinking How to Live.D. O. Brink - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):267-272.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   228 citations  
  • Value and Implicature.Stephen Finlay - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-20.
    Moral assertions express attitudes, but it is unclear how. This paper examines proposals by David Copp, Stephen Barker, and myself that moral attitudes are expressed as implicature (Grice), and Copp's and Barker's claim that this supports expressivism about moral speech acts. I reject this claim on the ground that implicatures of attitude are more plausibly conversational than conventional. I argue that Copp's and my own relational theory of moral assertions is superior to the indexical theory offered by Barker and Jamie (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   55 citations  
  • Varieties of Disagreement and Predicates of Taste.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):167-181.
    Predicates of taste, such as?fun? and?tasty?, have received considerable attention in recent debates between contextualists and relativists, with considerations involving disagreement playing a central role. Considerations involving disagreement have been taken to present a problem for contextualist treatments of predicates of taste. My goal is to argue that considerations involving disagreement do not undermine contextualism. To the extent that relativism was supposed to be motivated by contextualists being unable to deal with disagreement, this motivation is lacking. The argument against contextualism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • Disagreement Without Error.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):143-154.
    The idea that there can be cases of faultless disagreement, cases of disagreement in which neither party is making a mistake, is frequently discussed in connection with relativist views in philosophy of language. My goal is to argue that we can make sense of faultless disagreement without being committed to any form of relativism if we recognise that disagreement sometimes involves attitudes other than belief, such as desires or preferences. Furthermore, this way of making sense of faultless disagreement allows us (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Faultless Disagreement.Max Kölbel - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.
    There seem to be topics on which people can disagree without fault. For example, you and I might disagree on whether Picasso was a better artist than Matisse, without either of us being at fault. Is this a genuine possibility or just apparent? In this paper I pursue two aims: I want to provide a systematic map of available responses to this question. Simultaneously, I want to assess these responses. I start by introducing and defining the notion of a faultless (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   171 citations  
  • Contextualist Answers to the Challenge From Disagreement.Dan Zeman - 2017 - Phenomenology and Mind 12:62-73.
    In this short paper I survey recent contextualist answers to the challenge from disagreement raised by contemporary relativists. After making the challenge vivid by means of a working example, I specify the notion of disagreement lying at the heart of the challenge. The answers are grouped in three categories, the first characterized by rejecting the intuition of disagreement in certain cases, the second by conceiving disagreement as a clash of non-cognitive attitudes and the third by relegating disagreement at the pragmatic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Coordinating Perspectives: De Se and Taste Attitudes in Communication.Dirk Kindermann - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):912-955.
    ABSTRACTThe received picture of linguistic communication understands communication as the transmission of information from speaker's head to hearer's head. This picture is in conflict with the attractive Lewisian view of belief as self-location, which is motivated by de se attitudes – first-personal attitudes about oneself – as well as attitudes about subjective matters such as personal taste. In this paper, I provide a solution to the conflict that reconciles these views. I argue for an account of mental attitudes and communication (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Absolutely Tasty: An Examination of Predicates of Personal Taste and Faultless Disagreement.Jeremy Wyatt - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (3):252-280.
    Debates about the semantics and pragmatics of predicates of personal taste have largely centered on contextualist and relativist proposals. In this paper, I argue in favor of an alternative, absolutist analysis of PPT. Theorists such as Max Kölbel and Peter Lasersohn have argued that we should dismiss absolutism due to its inability to accommodate the possibility of faultless disagreement involving PPT. My aim in the paper is to show how the absolutist can in fact accommodate this possibility by drawing on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Aesthetic Predicates: A Hybrid Dispositional Account.Teresa Marques - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (6):723-751, doi:10.1080/0020174X.20.
    This paper explores the possibility of developing a hybrid version of dispositional theories of aesthetic values. On such a theory, uses of aesthetic predicates express relational second-order dispositional properties. If the theory is not absolutist, it allows for the relativity of aesthetic values. But it may be objected to on the grounds that it fails to explain disagreement among subjects who are not disposed alike. This paper explores the possibility of adapting recent proposals of hybrid expressivist theories for moral predicates (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Which Concepts Should We Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Methodology of Philosophy.David Plunkett - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (7-8):828-874.
    This paper is about philosophical disputes where the literal content of what speakers communicate concerns such object-level issues as ground, supervenience, or real definition. It is tempting to think that such disputes straightforwardly express disagreements about these topics. In contrast to this, I suggest that, in many such cases, the disagreement that is expressed is actually one about which concepts should be employed. I make this case as follows. First, I look at non-philosophical, everyday disputes where a speaker employs a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • How to Spell Out Genuine Relativism and How to Defend Indexical Relativism.Max Kölbel - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):281 - 288.
    It was the explicit aim of my paper ‘Indexical Relativism versus Genuine Relativism’ to ‘characterize and compare’ (p. 297) two different forms of relativism. One form, exemplified by Harman’s and Dreier’s moral relativism (Harman, 1975 and Dreier, 1990), involves the claim that certain sentences express different propositions in different contexts of utterance, much like indexical sentences – hence the name ‘indexical relativism’. The other form involves the claim that the truth-value of certain contents or propositions depends on certain non-standard parameters, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Transient Truths: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Propositions.Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Transient Truths provides the first book-length exposition and defense of the opposing view, temporalism: these are contents that can change their truth-values along with changes in the world.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Belief in propositions has had a long and distinguished history in analytic philosophy. Three of the founding fathers of analytic philosophy, Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and G. E. Moore, believed in propositions. Many philosophers since then have shared this belief; and the belief is widely, though certainly not universally, accepted among philosophers today. Among contemporary philosophers who believe in propositions, many, and perhaps even most, take them to be structured entities with individuals, properties, and relations as constituents. For example, the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   145 citations  
  • Faultless Disagreement.Dan Zeman - 2020 - In Martin Kusch (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge. pp. 486-495.
    In this entry, I tackle the phenomenon known as "faultless disagreement", considered by many authors to pose a challenge to the main views on the semantics of subjective expressions. I first present the phenomenon and the challenge, then review the main answers given by contextualist, absolutist and relativist approaches to the expressions in question. I end with signaling two issues that might shape future discussions about the role played by faultless disagreement in semantics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Disagreement as Interpersonal Incoherence.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):245-268.
    In a narrow sense of ‘disagreement,’ you and I disagree iff we believe inconsistent propositions. But there are numerous cases not covered by this definition that seem to constitute disagreements in a wider sense: disagreements about what to do, disagreements in attitude, disagreements in credence, etc. This wider sense of disagreement plays an important role in metaethics and epistemology. But what is it to disagree in the wider sense? On the view I’ll defend, roughly, you and I disagree in the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Disagreement and Dispute.Delia Belleri - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):289-307.
    In this paper, I will trace a distinction between two different ways of thinking about doxastic conflicts. The first way emphasises what is going on at the level of semantics, when two subjects disagree by uttering certain sentences or accepting certain contents. The second way emphasises some aspects that are epistemic in kind, which concern what subjects are rationally required to do whenever they disagree with someone. The semantics-oriented and epistemically-oriented notions will serve for the purpose of assessing some aspects (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Merely Verbal Disputes.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):11-30.
    Philosophers readily talk about merely verbal disputes, usually without much or any explicit reflection on what these are, and a good deal of methodological significance is attached to discovering whether a dispute is merely verbal or not. Currently, metaphilosophical advances are being made towards a clearer understanding of what exactly it takes for something to be a merely verbal dispute. This paper engages with this growing literature, pointing out some problems with existing approaches, and develops a new proposal which builds (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Doxastic Disagreement.Teresa Marques - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):121-142.
    This paper explores some alternative accounts of doxastic disagreement, and shows what problems each faces. It offers an account of doxastic disagreement that results from the incompatibility of the content of doxastic attitudes, even when that content’s truth is relativized. On the best definition possible, it is argued, neither non-indexical contextualism nor assessment-relativism have an advantage over contextualism. The conclusion is that conflicts that arise from the incompatibility (at the same world) of the content of given doxastic attitudes cannot be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Emotional Disagreement: The Role of Semantic Content in the Expression of, and Disagreement Over, Emotional Values: Dialogue.Isidora Stojanovic - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):99-117.
    ABSTRACT: When we describe an event as sad or happy, we attribute to it a certain emotional value. Attributions of emotional value depend essentially on an agent ; and yet, people readily disagree over such values. My aim in this paper is to explain what happens in the case of “emotional disagreement”, and, more generally, to provide some insight into the semantics of value-attributions. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Relative Truth and the First Person.Friederike Moltmann - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):187-220..
    In recent work on context­dependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. Thus, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Perspectival Thought: A Plea for Moderate Relativism.François Recanati - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Our thought and talk are situated. They do not take place in a vacuum but always in a context, and they always concern an external situation relative to which they are to be evaluated. Since that is so, François Recanati argues, our linguistic and mental representations alike must be assigned two layers of content: the explicit content, or lekton, is relative and perspectival, while the complete content, which is absolute, involves contextual factors in addition to what is explicitly represented. Far (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   105 citations  
  • Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):109-111.
    The beginning of the twenty-first century saw something of a comeback for relativism within analytical philosophy. Relativism and Monadic Truth has three main goals. First, we wished to clarify what we take to be the key moving parts in the intellectual machinations of self-described relativists. Secondly, we aimed to expose fundamental flaws in those argumentative strategies that drive the pro-relativist movement and precursors from which they draw inspiration. Thirdly, we hoped that our polemic would serve as an indirect defence of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   160 citations  
  • Conversations About Taste, Contextualism, and Non-Doxastic Attitudes.Marián Zouhar - 2018 - Tandf: Philosophical Papers 47 (3):429-460.
    Volume 47, Issue 3, November 2018, Page 429-460.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Nature of Ethical Disagreement.Charles L. Stevenson - 1998 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • IX—Presupposition, Disagreement, and Predicates of Taste.Josh Parsons - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (2pt2):163-173.
    ABSTRACTI offer a simple‐minded analysis of presupposition in which if a sentence has a presupposition, then both that sentence and its negation logically entail the presupposition; and in which sentence with failed presuppositions are neither true nor false. This account naturally generates an analysis of what it takes to disagree and what it takes to be at fault in a disagreement. A simple generalization gives rise to the possibility of disagreements in which no party is at fault, as is required (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The Many Relativisms and the Question of Disagreement.Dan López de Sa - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):269 – 279.
    What different relativist claims about a given domain are to be distinguished? Which of them is best placed to account for intuitive facts about disagreement in that domain? In a recent paper in this journal, ‘Indexical Relativism versus Genuine Relativism’ (2004), Max Kölbel distinguishes two forms of relativism, andargues that one of them, indexical relativism, faces problems in accounting for disagreement. In the first part of this discussion I present my own taxonomy of relativist positions in a given domain, which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Towards a Unified Notion of Disagreement.Delia Belleri & Michele Palmira - 2013 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 88 (1):139-159.
    The recent debate on Semantic Contextualism and Relativism has definitely brought the phenomenon of disagreement under the spotlight. Relativists have considered disagreement as a means to accomplish a defence of their own position regarding the semantics of knowledge attributions, epistemic modals, taste predicates, and so on. The aim of this paper is twofold: first, we argue that several specific notions of disagreement can be subsumed under a common “schema” which provides a unified and overarching notion of disagreement. Secondly, we avail (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms.David Plunkett & Timothy Sundell - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13.
    In constructing semantic theories of normative and evaluative terms, philosophers have commonly deployed a certain type of disagreement -based argument. The premise of the argument observes the possibility of genuine disagreement between users of a certain normative or evaluative term, while the conclusion of the argument is that, however differently those speakers employ the term, they must mean the same thing by it. After all, if they did not, then they would not really disagree. We argue that in many of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   121 citations  
  • Presuppositions of Commonality: An Indexical Relativist Account of Disagreement.Dan López de Sa - 2008 - In G. García-Carpintero & M. Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 297-310.
    This chapter defends a version of the indexical contextualist form of moderate relativism: the attempt to endorse appearances of faultless disagreement within the framework in which a sentence at a context at the index of the context determines its appropriate truth-value. Many object that any such an indexical proposal would fail to account for intuitions of (genuine) disagreement as revealed in ordinary disputes in the domain. The defence from this objection exploits presuppositions of commonality to the effect that the addressee (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Ambiguity.Adam Sennet - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):381-381.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • A Non‐Alethic Approach to Faultless Disagreement.Lenny Clapp - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (4):517-550.
    This paper motivates and describes a non-alethic approach to faultless disagreement involving predicates of personal taste. In section 1 I describe problems faced by Sundell's indexicalist approach, and MacFarlane's relativist approach. In section 2 I develop an alternative, non-alethic, approach. The non-alethic approach is broadly expressivist in that it endorses both the negative semantic thesis that simple sentences containing PPTs do not semantically encode complete propositions and the positive pragmatic thesis that such sentences are used to express evaluative mental states. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Discourse Contextualism: A Framework for Contextualist Semantics and Pragmatics.Alex Silk - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    This book investigates context-sensitivity in natural language by examining the meaning and use of a target class of theoretically recalcitrant expressions. These expressions-including epistemic vocabulary, normative and evaluative vocabulary, and vague language -exhibit systematic differences from paradigm context-sensitive expressions in their discourse dynamics and embedding properties. Many researchers have responded by rethinking the nature of linguistic meaning and communication. Drawing on general insights about the role of context in interpretation and collaborative action, Silk develops an improved contextualist theory of CR-expressions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations