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Reasons explanations of action: Causalist versus noncausalist accounts.Carl Ginet - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 386-405.details
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Two Faces of Responsibility.Gary Watson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):227-248.details
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Freedom within Reason.Gary Watson - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):890.details
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Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and ability to do otherwise: A reply to Fischer.Kadri Vihvelin - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):pp. 343-372.details
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Verbs and times.Zeno Vendler - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (2):143-160.details
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Book Review: Moral appraisability: Puzzles, proposals and perplexities. [REVIEW]Brian Rosebury - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (1):132-135.details
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Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.John Martin Fischer - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):526-531.details
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The Consequence argument and the Mind argument.Dana Nelkin - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):107-115.details
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Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Putting the lie on the control condition for moral responsibility.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):29 - 37.details
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Responsibility and Control. [REVIEW]Michael McKenna - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):93-100.details
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The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will and Freedom.Hugh McCann - 1998 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.details
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Are we free to break the laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.details
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Free Will and Values.Mark Bernstein - 1989 - Noûs 23 (4):557-559.details
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Free will as involving determination and inconceivable without it.R. E. Hobart - 1934 - Mind 43 (169):1-27.details
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The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom.Carl Ginet & Hugh J. McCann - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):632.details
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Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.details
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Free Will, Chance, and Mystery.L. Ekstrom - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (2):153-180.details
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Ethical particularism and morally relevant properties.Jonathan Dancy - 1983 - Mind 92 (368):530-547.details
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Autonomous Agents: From Self Control to Autonomy.Alfred R. Mele - 1995 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Local miracle compatibilism.Helen Beebee - 2003 - Noûs 37 (2):258-277.details
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Truth.J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson & D. R. Cousin - 1950 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 24 (1):111-172.details
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Freedom Within Reason.Susan R. Wolf - 1990 - New York: Oup Usa.details
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Moral appraisability: puzzles, proposals, and perplexities.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Events in the Semantics of English: A Study in Subatomic Semantics.Terence Parsons - 1990 - MIT Press.details
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Challenging Moral Particularism.Matjaž Potrc, Vojko Strahovnik & Mark Lance (eds.) - 2007 - New York: Routledge.details
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Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.Timothy O'Connor - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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An enquiry concerning human understanding and other writings.David Hume (ed.) - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):543-545.details
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Truth.J. L. Austin - 1999 - In Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.), Truth. Oxford University Press.details
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Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):308-310.details
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Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1981 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will. Oxford University Press.details
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The logical form of action sentences.Donald Davidson - 1967 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 81--95.details
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An Action Can be Both Uncaused and Up to the Agent.Carl Ginet - 2007 - In Lumer (ed.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy. Ashgate. pp. 243--255.details
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Free Will and Values.R. Kane - 1988 - Behaviorism 16 (2):149-157.details
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Freedom and necessity.A. J. Ayer - 1954 - In Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 271-284.details
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Truth.J. L. Austin - 1950 - Aristotelian Society Supp 24 (1):111--29.details
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