Results for 'Second Godel Theorem'

998 found
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  1. Intensionality and the Gödel Theorems.David D. Auerbach - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (3):337--51.
    Philosophers of language have drawn on metamathematical results in varied ways. Extensionalist philosophers have been particularly impressed with two, not unrelated, facts: the existence, due to Frege/Tarski, of a certain sort of semantics, and the seeming absence of intensional contexts from mathematical discourse. The philosophical import of these facts is at best murky. Extensionalists will emphasize the success and clarity of the model theoretic semantics; others will emphasize the relative poverty of the mathematical idiom; still others will question the aptness (...)
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  2. Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems, Free Will and Mathematical Thought.Solomon Feferman - 2011 - In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy.
    The determinism-free will debate is perhaps as old as philosophy itself and has been engaged in from a great variety of points of view including those of scientific, theological, and logical character. This chapter focuses on two arguments from logic. First, there is an argument in support of determinism that dates back to Aristotle, if not farther. It rests on acceptance of the Law of Excluded Middle, according to which every proposition is either true or false, no matter whether the (...)
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  3.  13
    Application of "A Thing Exists If It's A Grouping" to Russell's Paradox and Godel's First Incompletness Theorem.Roger Granet - manuscript
    A resolution to the Russell Paradox is presented that is similar to Russell's “theory of types” method but is instead based on the definition of why a thing exists as described in previous work by this author. In that work, it was proposed that a thing exists if it is a grouping tying "stuff" together into a new unit whole. In tying stuff together, this grouping defines what is contained within the new existent entity. A corollary is that a thing, (...)
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  4. Incompleteness and Computability: An Open Introduction to Gödel's Theorems.Richard Zach - 2019 - Open Logic Project.
    Textbook on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and computability theory, based on the Open Logic Project. Covers recursive function theory, arithmetization of syntax, the first and second incompleteness theorem, models of arithmetic, second-order logic, and the lambda calculus.
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  5.  89
    Generalized Löb’s Theorem. Strong Reflection Principles and Large Cardinal Axioms.Jaykov Foukzon - 2013 - Advances in Pure Mathematics (3):368-373.
    In this article, a possible generalization of the Löb’s theorem is considered. Main result is: let κ be an inaccessible cardinal, then ¬Con( ZFC +∃κ) .
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  6. How to Say Things with Formalisms.David Auerbach - 1992 - In Michael Detlefsen (ed.), Proof, Logic, and Formalization. Routledge. pp. 77--93.
    Recent attention to "self-consistent" (Rosser-style) systems raises anew the question of the proper interpretation of the Gödel Second Incompleteness Theorem and its effect on Hilbert's Program. The traditional rendering and consequence is defended with new arguments justifying the intensional correctness of the derivability conditions.
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  7. Philosophical Consequences of the Gödel Theorem.Alfred Driessen - 2005 - In Eeva Martikainen (ed.), Human Approaches to the Universe. Luther-Agricola-Society.
    In this contribution an attempt is made to analyze an important mathematical discovery, the theorem of Gödel, and to explore the possible impact on the consistency of metaphysical systems. It is shown that mathematics is a pointer to a reality that is not exclusively subjected to physical laws. As the Gödel theorem deals with pure mathematics, the philosopher as such can not decide on the rightness of this theorem. What he, instead can do, is evaluating the general (...)
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  8. Wittgenstein’s ‘Notorious Paragraph’ About the Gödel Theorem.Timm Lampert - 2006 - In Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Societ. pp. 168-171.
    In §8 of Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (RFM), Appendix 3 Wittgenstein imagines what conclusions would have to be drawn if the Gödel formula P or ¬P would be derivable in PM. In this case, he says, one has to conclude that the interpretation of P as “P is unprovable” must be given up. This “notorious paragraph” has heated up a debate on whether the point Wittgenstein has to make is one of “great philosophical interest” revealing “remarkable insight” in (...)
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  9.  59
    Неразрешимост на първата теорема за непълнотата. Гьоделова и Хилбертова математика.Vasil Penchev - 2010 - Philosophical Alternatives 19 (5):104-119.
    Can the so-ca\led first incompleteness theorem refer to itself? Many or maybe even all the paradoxes in mathematics are connected with some kind of self-reference. Gбdel built his proof on the ground of self-reference: а statement which claims its unprovabllity. So, he demonstrated that undecidaЬle propositions exist in any enough rich axiomatics (i.e. such one which contains Peano arithmetic in some sense). What about the decidabllity of the very first incompleteness theorem? We can display that it fulfills its (...)
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  10. Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Really Self-Defeating?Fabio Sterpetti - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):877-889.
    Evolutionary Debunking Arguments are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary genealogy of our beliefs to undermine their justification. Recently, Helen De Cruz and her co-authors supported the view that EDAs are self-defeating: if EDAs claim that human arguments are not justified, because the evolutionary origin of the beliefs which figure in such arguments undermines those beliefs, and EDAs themselves are human arguments, then EDAs are not justified, and we should not accept their conclusions about the fact that human (...)
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  11. Does Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem Prove That Truth Transcends Proof?Joseph Vidal-Rosset - 2006 - In Johan van Benthem, Gerhard Heinzman, M. Rebushi & H. Visser (eds.), The Age of Alternative Logics. Springer. pp. 51--73.
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  12. On the Philosophical Relevance of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (4):513-534.
    A survey of more philosophical applications of Gödel's incompleteness results.
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  13. Self-Reference and Gödel's Theorem: A Husserlian Analysis. [REVIEW]Albert Johnstone - 2003 - Husserl Studies 19 (2):131-151.
    A Husserlian phenomenological approach to logic treats concepts in terms of their experiential meaning rather than in terms of reference, sets of individuals, and sentences. The present article applies such an approach in turn to the reasoning operative in various paradoxes: the simple Liar, the complex Liar paradoxes, the Grelling-type paradoxes, and Gödel’s Theorem. It finds that in each case a meaningless statement, one generated by circular definition, is treated as if were meaningful, and consequently as either true or (...)
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  14. Kurt Gödel, Paper on the Incompleteness Theorems (1931).Richard Zach - 2005 - In Ivor Grattan-Guinness (ed.), Landmark Writings in Mathematics. Amsterdam: North-Holland. pp. 917-925.
    This chapter describes Kurt Gödel's paper on the incompleteness theorems. Gödel's incompleteness results are two of the most fundamental and important contributions to logic and the foundations of mathematics. It had been assumed that first-order number theory is complete in the sense that any sentence in the language of number theory would be either provable from the axioms or refutable. Gödel's first incompleteness theorem showed that this assumption was false: it states that there are sentences of number theory that (...)
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  15. The Gödel Incompleteness Theorems (1931) by the Axiom of Choice.Vasil Penchev - 2020 - Econometrics: Mathematical Methods and Programming eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 13 (39):1-4.
    Those incompleteness theorems mean the relation of (Peano) arithmetic and (ZFC) set theory, or philosophically, the relation of arithmetical finiteness and actual infinity. The same is managed in the framework of set theory by the axiom of choice (respectively, by the equivalent well-ordering "theorem'). One may discuss that incompleteness form the viewpoint of set theory by the axiom of choice rather than the usual viewpoint meant in the proof of theorems. The logical corollaries from that "nonstandard" viewpoint the relation (...)
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  16. The Gödel Paradox and Wittgenstein's Reasons.Francesco Berto - 2009 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2):208-219.
    An interpretation of Wittgenstein’s much criticized remarks on Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem is provided in the light of paraconsistent arithmetic: in taking Gödel’s proof as a paradoxical derivation, Wittgenstein was drawing the consequences of his deliberate rejection of the standard distinction between theory and metatheory. The reasoning behind the proof of the truth of the Gödel sentence is then performed within the formal system itself, which turns out to be inconsistent. It is shown that the features of paraconsistent arithmetics (...)
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  17. Truth, Proof and Gödelian Arguments: A Defence of Tarskian Truth in Mathematics.Markus Pantsar - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Helsinki
    One of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of mathematics concerns the relation between truth and formal proof. The position according to which the two concepts are the same is called deflationism, and the opposing viewpoint substantialism. In an important result of mathematical logic, Kurt Gödel proved in his first incompleteness theorem that all consistent formal systems containing arithmetic include sentences that can neither be proved nor disproved within that system. However, such undecidable Gödel sentences can be established (...)
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  18. What is Mathematics: Gödel's Theorem and Around (Edition 2015).Karlis Podnieks - manuscript
    Introduction to mathematical logic, part 2.Textbook for students in mathematical logic and foundations of mathematics. Platonism, Intuition, Formalism. Axiomatic set theory. Around the Continuum Problem. Axiom of Determinacy. Large Cardinal Axioms. Ackermann's Set Theory. First order arithmetic. Hilbert's 10th problem. Incompleteness theorems. Consequences. Connected results: double incompleteness theorem, unsolvability of reasoning, theorem on the size of proofs, diophantine incompleteness, Loeb's theorem, consistent universal statements are provable, Berry's paradox, incompleteness and Chaitin's theorem. Around Ramsey's theorem.
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  19. Hayek, Gödel, and the Case for Methodological Dualism.Ludwig M. P. van den Hauwe - 2011 - Journal of Economic Methodology 18 (4):387-407.
    On a few occasions F.A. Hayek made reference to the famous Gödel theorems in mathematical logic in the context of expounding his cognitive and social theory. The exact meaning of the supposed relationship between Gödel's theorems and the essential proposition of Hayek's theory of mind remains subject to interpretation, however. The author of this article argues that the relationship between Hayek's thesis that the human brain can never fully explain itself and the essential insight provided by Gödel's theorems in mathematical (...)
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  20. Representation Theorems and the Foundations of Decision Theory.Christopher J. G. Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663.
    Representation theorems are often taken to provide the foundations for decision theory. First, they are taken to characterize degrees of belief and utilities. Second, they are taken to justify two fundamental rules of rationality: that we should have probabilistic degrees of belief and that we should act as expected utility maximizers. We argue that representation theorems cannot serve either of these foundational purposes, and that recent attempts to defend the foundational importance of representation theorems are unsuccessful. As a result, (...)
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  21. Torkel Franzén, Gödel's Theorem: An Incomplete Guide to its Use and Abuse. [REVIEW]R. Zach - 2005 - History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (4):369-371.
    On the heels of Franzén's fine technical exposition of Gödel's incompleteness theorems and related topics (Franzén 2004) comes this survey of the incompleteness theorems aimed at a general audience. Gödel's Theorem: An Incomplete Guide to its Use and Abuse is an extended and self-contained exposition of the incompleteness theorems and a discussion of what informal consequences can, and in particular cannot, be drawn from them.
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  22. Deflationism and Gödel’s Theorem – a Comment on Gauker.Panu Raatikainen - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):85–87.
    In his recent article Christopher Gauker (2001) has presented a thoughtprovoking argument against deflationist theories of truth. More exactly, he attacks what he calls ‘T-schema deflationism’, that is, the claim that a theory of truth can simply take the form of certain instances of the T-schema.
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  23. Kurt Gödel and Computability Theory.Richard Zach - 2006 - In Arnold Beckmann, Ulrich Berger, Benedikt Löwe & John V. Tucker (eds.), Logical Approaches to Computational Barriers. Second Conference on Computability in Europe, CiE 2006, Swansea. Proceedings. Berlin: Springer. pp. 575--583.
    Although Kurt Gödel does not figure prominently in the history of computabilty theory, he exerted a significant influence on some of the founders of the field, both through his published work and through personal interaction. In particular, Gödel’s 1931 paper on incompleteness and the methods developed therein were important for the early development of recursive function theory and the lambda calculus at the hands of Church, Kleene, and Rosser. Church and his students studied Gödel 1931, and Gödel taught a seminar (...)
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  24. Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
    In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue for the converse claim. After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation (using "systematicity" and "independence" conditions, respectively), we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem (stated for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second result. Although (...)
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  25.  25
    A New Reading and Comparative Interpretation of Gödel’s Completeness (1930) and Incompleteness (1931) Theorems.Vasil Penchev - 2016 - Логико-Философские Штудии 13 (2):187-188.
    Peano arithmetic cannot serve as the ground of mathematics for it is inconsistent to infinity, and infinity is necessary for its foundation. Though Peano arithmetic cannot be complemented by any axiom of infinity, there exists at least one (logical) axiomatics consistent to infinity. That is nothing else than a new reading at issue and comparative interpretation of Gödel’s papers (1930; 1931) meant here. Peano arithmetic admits anyway generalizations consistent to infinity and thus to some addable axiom(s) of infinity. The most (...)
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  26. The General Theory of Second Best Is More General Than You Think.David Wiens - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (5):1-26.
    Lipsey and Lancaster's "general theory of second best" is widely thought to have significant implications for applied theorizing about the institutions and policies that most effectively implement abstract normative principles. It is also widely thought to have little significance for theorizing about which abstract normative principles we ought to implement. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, I show how the second-best theorem can be extended to myriad domains beyond applied normative theorizing, and in particular to more abstract theorizing (...)
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  27. Hilbert's Program Then and Now.Richard Zach - 2007 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), Philosophy of Logic. Amsterdam: North Holland. pp. 411–447.
    Hilbert’s program was an ambitious and wide-ranging project in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In order to “dispose of the foundational questions in mathematics once and for all,” Hilbert proposed a two-pronged approach in 1921: first, classical mathematics should be formalized in axiomatic systems; second, using only restricted, “finitary” means, one should give proofs of the consistency of these axiomatic systems. Although Gödel’s incompleteness theorems show that the program as originally conceived cannot be carried out, it had many (...)
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  28. Questioning Gödel's Ontological Proof: Is Truth Positive?Gregor Damschen - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (1):161-169.
    In his "Ontological proof", Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property φ: If φ is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads into a paradox when we apply it to the following self-reflexive sentences: (A) The truth value of A is not positive; (B) The truth value of B is (...)
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  29. Философия на квантовата информация.Vasil Penchev - 2009 - Sofia: BAS: IPhR.
    The book is devoted to the contemporary stage of quantum mechanics – quantum information, and especially to its philosophical interpretation and comprehension: the first one of a series monographs about the philosophy of quantum information. The second will consider Be l l ’ s inequalities, their modified variants and similar to them relations. The beginning of quantum information was in the thirties of the last century. Its speed development has started over the last two decades. The main phenomenon is (...)
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  30. The Gödelian Argument: Turn Over the Page.John R. Lucas - 2003 - Etica E Politica 5 (1):1.
    In this paper Lucas suggests that many of his critics have not read carefully neither his exposition nor Penrose’s one, so they seek to refute arguments they never proposed. Therefore he offers a brief history of the Gödelian argument put forward by Gödel, Penrose and Lucas itself: Gödel argued indeed that either mathematics is incompletable – that is axioms can never be comprised in a finite rule and so human mind surpasses the power of any finite machine – or there (...)
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  31. Gödel's Slingshot Revisited: Does Russell's Theory of Descriptions Really Evade the Slingshot.João Daniel Dantas - 2016 - Dissertation, UFRN
    “Slingshot Arguments” are a family of arguments underlying the Fregean view that if sentences have reference at all, their references are their truth-values. Usually seen as a kind of collapsing argument, the slingshot consists in proving that, once you suppose that there are some items that are references of sentences (as facts or situations, for example), these items collapse into just two items: The True and The False. This dissertation treats of the slingshot dubbed “Gödel’s slingshot”. Gödel argued that there (...)
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  32.  50
    Automated Theorem Proving and Its Prospects. [REVIEW]Desmond Fearnley-Sander - 1995 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 2.
    REVIEW OF: Automated Development of Fundamental Mathematical Theories by Art Quaife. (1992: Kluwer Academic Publishers) 271pp. Using the theorem prover OTTER Art Quaife has proved four hundred theorems of von Neumann-Bernays-Gödel set theory; twelve hundred theorems and definitions of elementary number theory; dozens of Euclidean geometry theorems; and Gödel's incompleteness theorems. It is an impressive achievement. To gauge its significance and to see what prospects it offers this review looks closely at the book and the proofs it presents.
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  33. INVENTING LOGIC: THE LÖWENHEIM-SKOLEM THEOREM AND FIRST- AND SECOND-ORDER LOGIC.Valérie Lynn Therrien - 2012 - Pensées Canadiennes 10.
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  34. A Logic for Frege's Theorem.Richard Heck - 2011 - In Frege’s Theorem: An Introduction. Oxford University Press.
    It has been known for a few years that no more than Pi-1-1 comprehension is needed for the proof of "Frege's Theorem". One can at least imagine a view that would regard Pi-1-1 comprehension axioms as logical truths but deny that status to any that are more complex—a view that would, in particular, deny that full second-order logic deserves the name. Such a view would serve the purposes of neo-logicists. It is, in fact, no part of my view (...)
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  35. There is No Standard Model of ZFC and ZFC2. Part II.Jaykov Foukzon & Elena Men’Kova - 2019 - Advanced in Pure Mathematic 9 (9):685-744.
    In this article we proved so-called strong reflection principles corresponding to formal theories Th which has omega-models or nonstandard model with standard part. An posible generalization of Lob’s theorem is considered.Main results are: (i) ConZFC  Mst ZFC, (ii) ConZF  V  L, (iii) ConNF  Mst NF, (iv) ConZFC2, (v) let k be inaccessible cardinal then ConZFC  .
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  36.  75
    A Note on Gödel, Priest and Naïve Proof.Massimiliano Carrara - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
    In the 1951 Gibbs lecture, Gödel asserted his famous dichotomy, where the notion of informal proof is at work. G. Priest developed an argument, grounded on the notion of naïve proof, to the effect that Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem suggests the presence of dialetheias. In this paper, we adopt a plausible ideal notion of naïve proof, in agreement with Gödel’s conception, superseding the criticisms against the usual notion of naïve proof used by real working mathematicians. We explore the connection (...)
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  37. Remarks on Wittgenstein, Gödel, Chaitin, Incompleteness, Impossiblity and the Psychological Basis of Science and Mathematics.Michael Richard Starks - 2019 - In Remarks on Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason in Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych, Berto, Floyd, Moyal. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 24-38.
    It is commonly thought that such topics as Impossibility, Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason are disparate scientific physical or mathematical issues having little or nothing in common. I suggest that they are largely standard philosophical problems (i.e., language games) which were resolved by Wittgenstein over 80 years ago. -/- Wittgenstein also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or language or our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather than as (...)
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  38.  90
    On the Second Law of Thermodynamics.Andreas Henriksson - manuscript
    In this article, it is argued that, given an initial uncertainty in the state of a system, the information possessed about the system, by any given observer, tend to decrease exponentially until there is none left. By linking the subjective, i.e. observer dependent, concepts of information and entropy, the statement of information decrease represent an alternative formulation of the second law of thermodynamics. With this reformulation, the connection between the foundations of statistical mechanics and classical mechanics is clarified. In (...)
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  39. Condorcet’s jury theorem: General will and epistemic democracy.Miljan Vasić - 2018 - Theoria: Beograd 61 (4):147-170.
    My aim in this paper is to explain what Condorcet’s jury theorem is, and to examine its central assumptions, its significance to the epistemic theory of democracy and its connection with Rousseau’s theory of general will. In the first part of the paper I will analyze an epistemic theory of democracy and explain how its connection with Condorcet’s jury theorem is twofold: the theorem is at the same time a contributing historical source, and the model used by (...)
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  40.  63
    Tarski Undefinability Theorem Terse Refutation.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Both Tarski and Gödel “prove” that provability can diverge from Truth. When we boil their claim down to its simplest possible essence it is really claiming that valid inference from true premises might not always derive a true consequence. This is obviously impossible.
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  41.  62
    Deepening the Automated Search for Gödel's Proofs.Adam Conkey - unknown
    Gödel's incompleteness theorems establish the stunning result that mathematics cannot be fully formalized and, further, that any formal system containing a modicum of number or set theory cannot establish its own consistency. Wilfried Sieg and Clinton Field, in their paper Automated Search for Gödel's Proofs, presented automated proofs of Gödel's theorems at an abstract axiomatic level; they used an appropriate expansion of the strategic considerations that guide the search of the automated theorem prover AProS. The representability conditions that allow (...)
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  42. All Properties Are Divine or God Exists.Frode Bjørdal - 2018 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 3 (27):329-350.
    A metaphysical system engendered by a third order quantified modal logic S5 plus impredicative comprehension principles is used to isolate a third order predicate D, and by being able to impredicatively take a second order predicate G to hold of an individual just if the individual necessarily has all second order properties which are D we in Section 2 derive the thesis (40) that all properties are D or some individual is G. In Section 3 theorems 1 to (...)
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  43.  46
    Was bedeuten Parakonsistente, Unentscheidbar, Zufällig, Berechenbar und Unvollständige? Eine Rezension von „Godels Weg: Exploits in eine unentscheidbare Welt“ (Godels Way: Exploits into a unecidable world) von Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria, Newton C.A. da Costa 160p (2012).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Willkommen in der Hölle auf Erden: Babys, Klimawandel, Bitcoin, Kartelle, China, Demokratie, Vielfalt, Dysgenie, Gleichheit, Hacker, Menschenrechte, Islam, Liberalismus, Wohlstand, Internet, Chaos, Hunger, Krankheit, Gewalt, Künstliche Intelligenz, Krieg. Las Vegas, NV , USA: Reality Press. pp. 1171-185.
    In "Godel es Way" diskutieren drei namhafte Wissenschaftler Themen wie Unentschlossenheit, Unvollständigkeit, Zufälligkeit, Berechenbarkeit und Parakonsistenz. Ich gehe diese Fragen aus Wittgensteiner Sicht an, dass es zwei grundlegende Fragen gibt, die völlig unterschiedliche Lösungen haben. Es gibt die wissenschaftlichen oder empirischen Fragen, die Fakten über die Welt sind, die beobachtungs- und philosophische Fragen untersuchen müssen, wie Sprache verständlich verwendet werden kann (die bestimmte Fragen in Mathematik und Logik beinhalten), die entschieden werden müssen, indem man sich anschaut,wie wir Wörter in (...)
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  44. Second Order Inductive Logic and Wilmers' Principle.M. S. Kliess & J. B. Paris - 2014 - Journal of Applied Logic 12 (4):462-476.
    We extend the framework of Inductive Logic to Second Order languages and introduce Wilmers' Principle, a rational principle for probability functions on Second Order languages. We derive a representation theorem for functions satisfying this principle and investigate its relationship to the first order principles of Regularity and Super Regularity.
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  45.  37
    Frege's Theorem in Plural Logic.Simon Hewitt - manuscript
    We note that a plural version of logicism about arithmetic is suggested by the standard reading of Hume's Principle in terms of `the number of Fs/Gs'. We lay out the resources needed to prove a version of Frege's principle in plural, rather than second-order, logic. We sketch a proof of the theorem and comment philosophically on the result, which sits well with a metaphysics of natural numbers as plural properties.
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  46.  80
    There May Be Many Arithmetical Gödel Sentences.Kaave Lajevardi & Saeed Salehi - forthcoming - Philosophia Mathematica:nkaa041.
    We argue that, under the usual assumptions for sufficiently strong arithmetical theories that are subject to Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem, one cannot, without impropriety, talk about *the* Gödel sentence of the theory. The reason is that, without violating the requirements of Gödel’s theorem, there could be a true sentence and a false one each of which is provably equivalent to its own unprovability in the theory if the theory is unsound.
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  47. Wolpert, Chaitin and Wittgenstein on Impossibility, Incompleteness, the Limits of Computation, Theism and the Universe as Computer-the Ultimate Turing Theorem.Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).
    I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the universe as computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a single citation and so I present this very brief summary. Wolpert proved some stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are independent of the device doing the computation, and even (...)
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  48. Two Types of Ontological Frame and Gödel’s Ontological Proof.Sergio Galvan - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2):147--168.
    The aim of this essay is twofold. First, it outlines the concept of ontological frame. Secondly, two models are distinguished on this structure. The first one is connected to Kant’s concept of possible object and the second one relates to Leibniz’s. Leibniz maintains that the source of possibility is the mere logical consistency of the notions involved, so that possibility coincides with analytical possibility. Kant, instead, argues that consistency is only a necessary component of possibility. According to Kant, something (...)
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  49.  44
    Wolpert, Chaitin et Wittgenstein sur l’impossibilité, l’incomplétude, le paradoxe menteur, le théisme, les limites du calcul, un principe d’incertitude mécanique non quantique et l’univers comme ordinateur, le théorème ultime dans Turing Machine Theory (révisé 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Bienvenue en Enfer sur Terre : Bébés, Changement climatique, Bitcoin, Cartels, Chine, Démocratie, Diversité, Dysgénique, Égalité, Pirates informatiques, Droits de l'homme, Islam, Libéralisme, Prospérité, Le Web, Chaos, Famine, Maladie, Violence, Intellige. Las Vegas, NV , USA: Reality Press. pp. 185-189.
    J’ai lu de nombreuses discussions récentes sur les limites du calcul et de l’univers en tant qu’ordinateur, dans l’espoir de trouver quelques commentaires sur le travail étonnant du physicien polymathe et théoricien de la décision David Wolpert, mais n’ont pas trouvé une seule citation et je présente donc ce résumé très bref. Wolpert s’est avéré quelques théoricaux d’impossibilité ou d’incomplétude renversants (1992 à 2008-voir arxiv dot org) sur les limites de l’inférence (computation) qui sont si généraux qu’ils sont indépendants de (...)
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  50. Frege's Basic Law V and Cantor's Theorem.Manuel Bremer - manuscript
    The following essay reconsiders the ontological and logical issues around Frege’s Basic Law (V). If focuses less on Russell’s Paradox, as most treatments of Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (GGA)1 do, but rather on the relation between Frege’s Basic Law (V) and Cantor’s Theorem (CT). So for the most part the inconsistency of Naïve Comprehension (in the context of standard Second Order Logic) will not concern us, but rather the ontological issues central to the conflict between (BLV) and (CT). (...)
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