Results for ' epistemic value monism'

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  1. Epistemic Value, Duty, and Virtue.Guy Axtell - 2021 - In Brian C. Barnett (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Community.
    This chapter introduces some central issues in Epistemology, and, like others in the open textbook series Introduction to Philosophy, is set up for rewarding college classroom use, with discussion/reflection questions matched to clearly-stated learning objectives,, a brief glossary of the introduced/bolded terms/concepts, links to further open source readings as a next step, and a readily-accessible outline of the classic between William Clifford and William James over the "ethics of belief." The chapter introduces questions of epistemic value through Plato's (...)
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  2. Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.
    In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is (...)
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  3. On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.
    Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the epistemic value of things other than (...)
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  4. Perspectives, Questions, and Epistemic Value.Kareem Khalifa & Jared A. Millson - 2019 - In Michela Massimi (ed.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Springer Verlag. pp. 87-106.
    Many epistemologists endorse true-belief monism, the thesis that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. However, this view faces formidable counterexamples. In response to these challenges, we alter the letter, but not the spirit, of true-belief monism. We dub the resulting view “inquisitive truth monism”, which holds that only true answers to relevant questions are of fundamental epistemic value. Which questions are relevant is a function of an inquirer’s perspective, which is characterized (...)
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  5. Veritism and ways of deriving epistemic value.Ylwa Sjölin Wirling - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3617-3633.
    Veritists hold that only truth has fundamental epistemic value. They are committed to explaining all other instances of epistemic goodness as somehow deriving their value through a relation to truth, and in order to do so they arguably need a non-instrumental relation of epistemic value derivation. As is currently common in epistemology, many veritists assume that the epistemic is an insulated evaluative domain: claims about what has epistemic value are independent of (...)
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  6. Knowledge and Democracy: Are Epistemic Values Adversaries or Allies of Democracy?Meos Holger Kiik - 2023 - Etica E Politica (3):261-286.
    In this article I argue that including relaxed epistemic values in the justification of democracy through a pragmatist and non-monist approach is compatible with the democratic values of self-rule and pluralism (which are often seen as incompatible with "political truth"). First, I contend that pragmatist epistemology offers a more suitable approach to politics instead of the correspondence theory of finding "the one truth". Secondly, I argue that instead of choosing between monist (purely epistemic or procedural) accounts of justification (...)
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  7. Perspectives, Questions, and Epistemic Value.Kareem Khalifa & Jared A. Millson - 2019 - In Michela Massimi (ed.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Springer Verlag.
    Many epistemologists endorse true-belief monism, the thesis that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. However, this view faces formidable counterexamples. In response to these challenges, we alter the letter, but not the spirit, of true-belief monism. We dub the resulting view “inquisitive truth monism,” which holds that only true answers to relevant questions are of fundamental epistemic value. Which questions are relevant is a function of an inquirer’s perspective, which is characterized (...)
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  8. Truth monism without teleology.Kurt Sylvan - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):161-163.
    Some say the swamping problem confronts all who believe that true belief is the sole fundamental epistemic value. This, I say, is mistaken. The problem only confronts T-Monists if they grant two teleological claims: that all derived epistemic value is instrumental, and that it is the state of believing truly rather than the standard of truth in belief that is fundamentally epistemically valuable. T-Monists should reject and, and appeal to a non-teleological form of value derivation (...)
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  9. Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules.Marc-Kevin Daoust & Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1741-1765.
    We argue that there is a tension between two monistic claims that are the core of recent work in epistemic consequentialism. The first is a form of monism about epistemic value, commonly known as veritism: accuracy is the sole final objective to be promoted in the epistemic domain. The other is a form of monism about a class of epistemic scoring rules: that is, strictly proper scoring rules are the only legitimate measures of (...)
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  10. Cleaning up, and Moving Past, Simple Swamping.Timothy Perrine - 2021 - Theoria 87 (6):1548-1561.
    Many philosophers believe that true belief is of epistemic value, but that knowledge is of even more epistemic value. Some claim that this surplus value is instrumentally valuable to the value of true belief. I call the conjunction of these claims the Instrumentalist’s Conjunction. The so-called “Swamping Problem” is meant to show that Instrumentalist’s Conjunction is inconsistent. Crudely put, the problem is that if knowledge only has surplus value to the value of (...)
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  11. Miejsce i znaczenie problematyki normatywnej w analitycznej epistemologii w erze postgettierowskiej.Marek Pepliński - 2014 - Filo-Sofija 14 (27):67-86.
    I present argument for different than traditional continental classification of epistemological issues. Paper has two parts, first concerned with K. Ajdukiewicz and J. Woleński conception of epistemology and its branches and with different methods of epistemological inquiry based on different task posed for epistemology. Second part discuss main important topics of current postgettieral analytic epistemology like virtue epistemology, ethics of belief, problems of epistemic value, epistemic value monism and pluralism, metaepistemology and concludes that in traditional (...)
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  12. Duhem–Quine virtue epistemology.Abrol Fairweather - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):673-692.
    The Duhem-Quine Thesis is the claim that it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation because any empirical test requires assuming the truth of one or more auxiliary hypotheses. This is taken by many philosophers, and is assumed here, to support the further thesis that theory choice is underdetermined by empirical evidence. This inquiry is focused strictly on the axiological commitments engendered in solutions to underdetermination, specifically those of Pierre Duhem and W. V. Quine. Duhem resolves underdetermination by (...)
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  13. The Structural Links Between Ecology, Evolution and Ethics: The Virtuous Epistemic Circle.Donato Bergandi (ed.) - 2013 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    Abstract - Evolutionary, ecological and ethical studies are, at the same time, specific scientific disciplines and, from an historical point of view, structurally linked domains of research. In a context of environmental crisis, the need is increasingly emerging for a connecting epistemological framework able to express a common or convergent tendency of thought and practice aimed at building, among other things, an environmental policy management respectful of the planet’s biodiversity and its evolutionary potential. -/- Evolutionary biology, ecology and ethics: at (...)
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  14. Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    William James famously tells us that there are two main goals for rational believers: believing truth and avoiding error. I argues that epistemic consequentialism—in particular its embodiment in epistemic utility theory—seems to be well positioned to explain how epistemic agents might permissibly weight these goals differently and adopt different credences as a result. After all, practical versions of consequentialism render it permissible for agents with different goals to act differently in the same situation. -/- Nevertheless, I argue (...)
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  15. The epistemic value of metaphysics.Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo & Jonas R. Becker Arenhart - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):337.
    It is sometimes argued that, given its detachment from our current most successful science, analytic metaphysics has no epistemic value because it contributes nothing to our knowledge of reality. Relatedly, it is also argued that metaphysics properly constrained by science can avoid that problem. In this paper we argue, however, that given the current understanding of the relation between science and metaphysics, metaphysics allegedly constrained by science suffers the same fate as its unconstrained sister; that is, what is (...)
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  16. Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale.J. Adam Carter & Robert D. Rupert - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9243-9272.
    A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology—one with origins in Plato’s Meno—concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level, the level at which states of subjects or agents, as (...)
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  17. The Epistemic Value of Photographs.Catharine Abell - 2010 - In Catharine Abell & Katerina Bantinaki (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    There is a variety of epistemic roles to which photographs are better suited than non-photographic pictures. Photographs provide more compelling evidence of the existence of the scenes they depict than non-photographic pictures. They are also better sources of information about features of those scenes that are easily overlooked. This chapter examines several different attempts to explain the distinctive epistemic value of photographs, and argues that none is adequate. It then proposes an alternative explanation of their epistemic (...)
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  18. Value Monism, Richness, And Environmental Ethics.Chris Kelly - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):110-129.
    The intuitions at the core of environmental ethics and of other neglected value realms put pressure on traditional anthropocentric ethics based on monistic value theories. Such pressure is so severe that it has led many to give up on the idea of monistic value theories altogether. I argue that value monism is still preferable to value pluralism and that, indeed, these new challenges are opportunities to vastly improve impoverished traditional theories. I suggest an alternative (...)
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  19. Epistemic values and their phenomenological critique.Mirja Helena Hartimo - 2022 - In Sara Heinämaa, Mirja Hartimo & Ilpo Hirvonen (eds.), Contemporary Phenomenologies of Normativity: Norms, Goals, and Values. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 234-251.
    Husserl holds that the theoretical sciences should be value-free, i.e., free from the values of extra-scientific practices and guided only by epistemic values such as coherence and truth. This view does not imply that to Husserl the sciences would be immune to all criticism of interests, goals, and values. On the contrary, the paper argues that Husserlian phenomenology necessarily embodies reflection on the epistemic values guiding the sciences. The argument clarifies Husserl’s position by comparing it with the (...)
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  20. The Epistemic Value of Understanding-why.Xingming Hu - 2023 - Episteme 20 (1):125-141.
    Some philosophers (e.g., Pritchard, Grimm, and Hills) recently have objected that veritism cannot explain the epistemic value of understanding-why. And they have proposed two anti-veritist accounts. In this paper, I first introduce their objection and argue that it fails. Next, I consider a strengthened version of their objection and argue that it also fails. After that, I suggest a new veritist account: Understanding-why entails believing the truth that what is grasped is accurate (or accurate enough), and it is (...)
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  21. How non-epistemic values can be epistemically beneficial in scientific classification.Soohyun Ahn - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 84:57-65.
    The boundaries of social categories are frequently altered to serve normative projects, such as social reform. Griffiths and Khalidi argue that the value-driven modification of categories diminishes the epistemic value of social categories. I argue that concerns over value-modified categories stem from problematic assumptions of the value-free ideal of science. Contrary to those concerns, non-epistemic value considerations can contribute to the epistemic improvement of a scientific category. For example, the early history of (...)
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  22. The Epistemic Value of Speculative Fiction.Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz - 2015 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):58-77.
    Speculative fiction, such as science fiction and fantasy, has a unique epistemic value. We examine similarities and differences between speculative fiction and philosophical thought experiments in terms of how they are cognitively processed. They are similar in their reliance on mental prospection, but dissimilar in that fiction is better able to draw in readers (transportation) and elicit emotional responses. By its use of longer, emotionally poignant narratives and seemingly irrelevant details, speculative fiction allows for a better appraisal of (...)
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  23. The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):344-361.
    According to an influential Enlightenment ideal, one shouldn't rely epistemically on other people's say-so, at least not if one is in a position to evaluate the relevant evidence for oneself. However, in much recent work in social epistemology, we are urged to dispense with this ideal, which is seen as stemming from a misguided focus on isolated individuals to the exclusion of groups and communities. In this paper, I argue that that an emphasis on the social nature of inquiry should (...)
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  24. The epistemic value of good sense.Abrol Fairweather - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):139-146.
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  25. Epistemic Value and the Primacy of What We Care About.Linda Zagzebski - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (3):353-377.
    Abstract In this paper I argue that to understand the ethics of belief we need to put it in a context of what we care about. Epistemic values always arise from something we care about and they arise only from something we care about. It is caring that gives rise to the demand to be epistemically conscientious. The reason morality puts epistemic demands on us is that we care about morality. But there may be a (small) class of (...)
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  26. Salience and metaphysical explanation.Phil Corkum - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10771-10792.
    Metaphysical explanations, unlike many other kinds of explanation, are standardly thought to be insensitive to our epistemic situation and so are not evaluable by cognitive values such as salience. I consider a case study that challenges this view. Some properties are distributed over an extension. For example, the property of being polka-dotted red on white, when instantiated, is distributed over a surface. Similar properties have been put to work in a variety of explanatory tasks in recent metaphysics, including: providing (...)
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  27. Reflection, Epistemic Value and Human Flourishing.Waldomiro Silva Filho & Felipe Rocha - 2016 - Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 19 (1):129-144.
    In this paper, we discuss two recurring themes in Sosa’s work, reexamined in Judgment and Agency (SOSA, 2015) from a new angle, i.e. the place and importance of reflection in the cognitive economy of the epistemic agent, and epistemic value. Regarding the latter, Sosa suggests that knowing full well, which necessarily involves reflection, has value because it contributes to human flourishing. Although Sosa’s “new virtue epistemology” appears very promising in explaining different intuitions regarding epistemology and demonstrating (...)
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  28. Can the Epistemic Value of Natural Kinds Be Explained Independently of Their Metaphysics?Catherine Kendig & John Grey - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):359-376.
    The account of natural kinds as stable property clusters is premised on the possibility of separating the epistemic value of natural kinds from their underlying metaphysics. On that account, the co-instantiation of any sub-cluster of the properties associated with a given natural kind raises the probability of the co-instantiation of the rest, and this clustering of property instantiation is invariant under all relevant counterfactual perturbations. We argue that it is not possible to evaluate the stability of a cluster (...)
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  29. A puzzle about epistemic value and steps towards a solution.Timothy Perrine - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12103-12119.
    This paper exposits and makes steps towards solving a puzzle about epistemic value. The puzzle is that several principles about the epistemic value of true beliefs and epistemic disvalue of false beliefs are, individually, plausible but, collectively, contradictory. My solution claims that sometimes false beliefs are epistemically valuable. I nonetheless show how my solution is not in deep tension with the Jamesian idea that true beliefs are epistemically valuable and false beliefs are epistemically disvaluable. I (...)
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  30. Conceptions of Epistemic Value.Timothy Perrine - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):213-231.
    This paper defends a conception of epistemic value that I call the “Simpliciter Conception.” On it, epistemic value is a kind of value simpliciter and being of epistemic value implies being of value simpliciter. I defend this conception by criticizing two others, what I call the Formal Conception and the Hybrid Conception. While those conceptions may be popular among epistemologists, I argue that they fail to explain why anyone should care that things (...)
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  31. The epistemic value of intuitive moral judgements.Albert W. Musschenga - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):113-128.
    In this article, I discuss whether intuitive moral judgements have epistemic value. Are they mere expressions of irrational feelings that should be disregarded or should they be taken seriously? In section 2, I discuss the view of some social psychologists that moral intuitions are, like other social intuitions, under certain conditions more reliable than conscious deliberative judgements. In sections 3 and 4, I examine whether intuitive moral judgements can be said not to need inferential justification. I outline a (...)
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  32. Feldman on the Epistemic Value of Truth.Timothy Perrine - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):515-529.
    Most epistemologists maintain that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. However, Richard Feldman is a rare philosopher who is skeptical that true beliefs are of final epistemic value. The aim of this paper is to evaluate Feldman’s criticisms. I’ll argue that Feldman’s arguments ultimately turn on a view about the relation between epistemic duties and epistemic value that is implausible and underdeveloped.
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  33. On the Epistemic Value of Reflection.Pranav Ambardekar - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy:1-43.
    Against philosophical orthodoxy, Hilary Kornblith has mounted an empirically grounded critique of the epistemic value of reflection. In this paper, I argue that this recent critique of the epistemic value of reflection fails even if we concede that (a) the empirical facts are as Kornblith says they are and (b) reliability is the only determinant of epistemic value. The critique fails because it seeks to undermine the reliability of reflection in general but targets only (...)
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  34. The Epistemic Value of Conscious Acquaintance: A Problem for Reductive Physicalism.Adam Pautz - manuscript
    We take it that conscious acquaintance has great epistemic value. I develop a new problem for reductive physicalism concerning the epistemic value of acquaintance. The problem concerns "multiple candidate cases". (This develops a theme of my paper *The Significance Argument for the Irreducibility of Consciousness", Philosophical Perspectives 2017.).
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  35. Epistemic Value.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - In Andrew Cullison (ed.), A Companion to Epistemology. New York: Continuum Press. pp. 270-287.
    Epistemology is normative. This normativity has been widely recognized for a long time, but it has recently come into direct focus as a central topic of discussion. The result is a recent and large turn towards focusing on epistemic value. I’ll start by describing some of the history and motivations of this recent value turn. Then I’ll categorize the work within the value turn into three strands, and I’ll discuss the main writings in those strands. Finally, (...)
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  36. Retweeting: its linguistic and epistemic value.Neri Marsili - 2021 - Synthese 198:10457–10483.
    This paper analyses the communicative and epistemic value of retweeting (and more generally of reposting content on social media). Against a naïve view, it argues that retweets are not acts of endorsement, motivating this diagnosis with linguistic data. Retweeting is instead modelled as a peculiar form of quotation, in which the reported content is indicated rather than reproduced. A relevance-theoretic account of the communicative import of retweeting is then developed, to spell out the complex mechanisms by which retweets (...)
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  37. The Epistemic Value of Democratic Deliberation.David Estlund - 2018 - In André Bächtiger, Jane Mansbridge, John Dryzek & Mark Warren (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford University Press.
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  38. The epistemic value of explanation.Andrés Páez - manuscript
    In this paper I defend the idea that there is a sense in which it is meaningful and useful to talk about objective understanding, and that to characterize that notion it is necessary to formulate an account of explanation that makes reference to the beliefs and epistemic goals of the participants in a cognitive enterprise. Using the framework for belief revision developed by Isaac Levi, I analyze the conditions that information must fulfill to be both potentially explanatory and epistemically (...)
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  39. Truth and epistemic value.Nick Treanor - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1057-1068.
    The notion of more truth, or of more truth and less falsehood, is central to epistemology. Yet, I argue, we have no idea what this consists in, as the most natural or obvious thing to say—that more truth is a matter of a greater number of truths, and less falsehood is a matter of a lesser number of falsehoods—is ultimately implausible. The issue is important not merely because the notion of more truth and less falsehood is central to epistemology, but (...)
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  40. Sosa on epistemic value: a Kantian obstacle.Matthew McGrath - 2018 - Synthese 197 (12):5287-5300.
    In recent work, Sosa proposes a comprehensive account of epistemic value based on an axiology for attempts. According to this axiology, an attempt is better if it succeeds, better still if it is apt (i.e., succeeds through competence), and best if it is fully apt, (i.e., guided to aptness by apt beliefs that it would be apt). Beliefs are understood as attempts aiming at the truth. Thus, a belief is better if true, better still if apt, and best (...)
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  41. Three Strategies for Salvaging Epistemic Value in Deep Neural Network Modeling.Philippe Verreault-Julien - manuscript
    Some how-possibly explanations have epistemic value because they are epistemically possible; we cannot rule out their truth. One paradoxical implication of that proposal is that epistemic value may be obtained from mere ignorance. For the less we know, then the more is epistemically possible. This chapter examines a particular class of problematic epistemically possible how-possibly explanations, viz. *epistemically opaque* how-possibly explanations. Those are how-possibly explanations justified by an epistemically opaque process. How could epistemically opaque how-possibly explanations (...)
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  42. The Epistemic Value of Civil Disagreement in advance.Christopher W. Love - 2021 - Social Theory and Practice 47 (4):629-656.
    In this article, I argue that the practice of civil disagreement has robust epistemic benefits and that these benefits enable meaningful forms of reconciliation—across worldview lines and amid the challenging information environment of our age. I then engage two broad groups of objections: either that civil disagreement opposes, rather than promotes, clarity, or else that it does little to help it. If successful, my account gives us reason to include civil disagreement among what Mill calls “the real morality of (...)
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  43. Inclusive Education and Epistemic Value in the Praxis of Ethical Change.Ignace Haaz - 2019 - In Obiora F. Ike, Justus Mbae & Chidiehere Onyia (eds.), Mainstreaming Ethics in Higher Education Research Ethics in Administration, Finance, Education, Environment and Law Vol. 1. Globethics. net. pp. 259-290.
    In many universities and related knowledge transmission organisations, professional focus on empirical data shows as in vocational education that preparation for real life technical work is important, as one would expect from “career education”. University is as the name shows on the contrary focusing on the universality of some sort of education, which is neither a technical one, nor much concerned by preparing oneself for a career. The scope of this chapter is to propose an analysis of inclusion as the (...)
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  44. Bayesian epistemic values: focus on surprise, measure probability!J. M. Stern & C. A. De Braganca Pereira - 2014 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 22 (2):236-254.
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  45. The procedural epistemic value of deliberation.Fabienne Peter - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1253-1266.
    Collective deliberation is fuelled by disagreements and its epistemic value depends, inter alia, on how the participants respond to each other in disagreements. I use this accountability thesis to argue that deliberation may be valued not just instrumentally but also for its procedural features. The instrumental epistemic value of deliberation depends on whether it leads to more or less accurate beliefs among the participants. The procedural epistemic value of deliberation hinges on the relationships of (...)
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  46. Phenomenal Grounds of Epistemic Value.Uriah Kriegel - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12888.
    Imagine a zombie world that looks “from the outside” just like ours, but where there is no phenomenal consciousness. Creatures that look like us move about just as we do and make the same noises we do, but nobody experiences or feels anything. How much of the epistemic value that’s exemplified in our world survives in that one? The short answer is: any kind of epistemic value that requires the occurrence of consciousness for its exemplification cannot (...)
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  47. Realism, Naturalism, and Hazlett’s Challenge Concerning Epistemic Value.Timothy Perrine - 2024 - Journal of Value Inquiry 58 (1):73-91.
    According to Realism about Epistemic Value, there is such a thing as epistemic value and it is appropriate to evaluate things—e.g., beliefs—for epistemic value because there is such a thing as epistemic value. Allan Hazlett's A Luxury of the Understanding is a sustained critique of Realism. Hazlett challenges proponent of Realism to answer explanatory questions while not justifiably violating certain constraints, including two proposed naturalistic constraints. Hazlett argues they cannot. Here I defend (...)
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  48. Propaganda, Misinformation, and the Epistemic Value of Democracy.Étienne Brown - 2018 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 30 (3-4):194-218.
    If citizens are to make enlightened collective decisions, they need to rely on true factual beliefs, but misinformation impairs their ability to do so. Although some cases of misinformation are deliberate and amount to propaganda, cases of inadvertent misinformation are just as problematic in affecting the beliefs and behavior of democratic citizens. A review of empirical evidence suggests that this is a serious problem that cannot entirely be corrected by means of deliberation.
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  49. What’s Wrong with Social Simulations?Eckhart Arnold - 2014 - The Monist 97 (3):359-377.
    This paper tries to answer the question why the epistemic value of so many social simulations is questionable. I consider the epistemic value of a social simulation as questionable if it contributes neither directly nor indirectly to the understanding of empirical reality. To examine this question, two classical social simulations are analyzed with respect to their possible epistemic justification: Schelling’s neighborhood segregation model and Axelrod’s reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma simulations of the evolution of cooperation. It is (...)
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  50. Does Pyrrhonism Have Practical or Epistemic Value?Diego E. Machuca - 2019 - In Giuseppe Veltri, Racheli Haliva, Stephan Franz Schmid & Emidio Spinelli (eds.), Sceptical Paths: Scepticisms from Antiquity through Early Modern Period and Beyond. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 43-66.
    My purpose in this paper is to examine whether Pyrrhonian skepticism, as this stance is described in Sextus Empiricus’s extant works, has practical or epistemic value. More precisely, I would like to consider whether the Pyrrhonist’s suspension of judgment (ἐποχή) and undisturbedness (ἀταραξία) can be deemed to be of practical or epistemic value. By ‘practical’ value I mean both moral value and prudential value. Moral value refers to moral rightness and wrongness; prudential (...)
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