Results for ' false consciousness'

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  1. Does False Consciousness Necessarily Preclude Moral Blameworthiness?: The Refusal of the Women Anti-Suffragists.Lee Wilson - 2021 - Hypatia 36 (2):237–258.
    Social philosophers often invoke the concept of false consciousness in their analyses, referring to a set of evidence-resistant, ignorant attitudes held by otherwise sound epistemic agents, systematically occurring in virtue of, and motivating them to perpetuate, structural oppression. But there is a worry that appealing to the notion in questions of responsibility for the harm suffered by members of oppressed groups is victim-blaming. Individuals under false consciousness allegedly systematically fail the relevant rationality and epistemic conditions due (...)
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  2. False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences.David Enoch - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):159-210.
    The starting point regarding consent has to be that it is both extremely important, and that it is often suspicious. In this article, the author tries to make sense of both of these claims, from a largely liberal perspective, tying consent, predictably, to the value of autonomy and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rationality flaw but that it's not clear that this flaw matters morally (...)
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  3. Varieties of Consciousness under Oppression: False Consciousness, Bad Faith, Double Consciousness, and Se faire objet.Jennifer McWeeny - 2016 - In S. West Gurley & Geoff Pfeifer, Phenomenology and the Political. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 149-63.
    What it would mean for phenomenology to move in an ontological direction that would render its relevance to contemporary political movement less ambiguous while at the same time retaining those aspects of its method that are epistemologically and politically advantageous? The present study crafts the beginnings of a response to this question by examining four configurations of consciousness that seem to be respectively tied to certain oppressive contexts and certain kinds of oppressed bodies: 1. false consciousness, 2. (...)
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  4. Why They Know Not What They Do: A Social Constructionist Approach to the Explanatory Problem of False Consciousness.Lee Wilson - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology 7 (1):45-72.
    False consciousness requires a general explanation for why, and how, oppressed individuals believe propositions against, as opposed to aligned with, their own well-being in virtue of their oppressed status. This involves four explanatory desiderata: belief acquisition, content prevalence, limitation, and systematicity. A social constructionist approach satisfies these by understanding the concept of false consciousness as regulating social research rather than as determining the exact mechanisms for all instances: the concept attunes us to a complex of mechanisms (...)
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  5. Toward a Feminist Model for Women's Healthcare: The Problem of False Consciousness and the Moral Status of Female Genital Cosmetic Surgery.Shadi Heidarifar - 2024 - International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 17 (2):28-54.
    This article is concerned with "all-or-nothing" approaches to female genital cosmetic surgeries, those that overemphasize either women's autonomy to defend total accessibility or the oppressive social context affecting women to defend the total banning of the procedures. By contrast, the author takes both phenomena into consideration. The author argues identifying patterns of false consciousness and weighing those against harm done to a patient provides a moral basis for a doctor to possibly deny their consent at face value. This (...)
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  6. Varieties of Consciousness under Oppression: False Consciousness, Bad Faith, Double Consciousness, and Se faire objet.Jennifer McWeeny - 2016 - In S. West Gurley & Geoff Pfeifer, Phenomenology and the Political. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 149-163.
    What it would mean for phenomenology to move in an ontological direction that would render its relevance to contemporary political movement less ambiguous while at the same time retaining those aspects of its method that are epistemologically and politically advantageous? The present study crafts the beginnings of a response to this question by examining four configurations of consciousness that seem to be respectively tied to certain oppressive contexts and certain kinds of oppressed bodies: 1. false consciousness, 2. (...)
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  7. Nihilism Today: Enlightened False Consciousness.Anton Heinrich Rennesland - 2020 - Talisik: An Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):45-48.
    I present some key ideas for reckoning with nihilism today in light of Nietzsche's conception of nihilism and Sloterdijk's Enlightened False Consciousness.
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  8. How can consciousness be false? Alienation, simulation, and mental ownership.Matteo Bianchin - 2023 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 49 (6).
    Alienation has been recently revived as a central theme in critical theory. Current debates, however, tend to focus on normative rather than on explanatory issues. In this paper, I confront the latter and advance an account of alienation that bears on the mechanisms that bring it about in order to locate alienation as a distinctive social and psychological fact. In particular, I argue that alienation can be explained as a disruption induced by social factors in the sense of mental ownership (...)
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  9. False Double Consciousness: Hermeneutical Resources from the Rush Limbaugh Show.Jeff Engelhardt & Sarah Campbell - 2018 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (2):298-312.
    This article is a study of the interpretive resources developed by Rush Limbaugh on his radio show. Interpretive resources – also called ‘hermeneutical resources’ – are concepts, narratives, conceptual frameworks, etc. that enable subjects to make sense of themselves and their world. Much recent scholarship has explored how a community's interpretive resources influence social interactions or character traits in the community. In Limbaugh's transcripts, we found a pattern of what we call ‘concept doubling’, wherein terms are characterised in a way (...)
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  10. Stinking Consciousness!Benjamin D. Young - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (3-4):223-243.
    Contemporary neuroscientific theories of consciousness are typically based on the study of vision and have neglected olfaction. Several of these (e.g. Global Workspace Theories, the Information Integration theory, and the various theories offered by Crick and Koch) claim that a thalamic relay is necessary for consciousness. Studies on olfaction and the olfactory system's anatomical structure show this claim to be incorrect, thus showing these theories to be either false or inadequate as general and comprehensive accounts of (...). Attempts to rescue these theories by claiming that there is a structure in the olfactory system that is functionally equivalent to the thalamus in the visual system, such as the olfactory bulb or the olfactory cortex, are also shown to fail. If we wish to understand consciousness, we have to wake up and smell it. (shrink)
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  11. Mindmelding: Consciousness, Neuroscience, and the Mind's Privacy.William Hirstein - 2012 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    [This download contains the table of contents and Chapter 1]. I argue here that the claim that conscious states are private, in the sense that only one person can ever experience them directly, is false. There actually is a way to connect the brains of two people that would allow one to have direct experience of the other's conscious, e.g., perceptual states. This would allow, for instance, one person to see that the other had deviant color perception (which was (...)
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  12. Conceptualizing Consciousness.Jacob Berger & Richard Brown - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (5):637-659.
    One of the most promising theories of consciousness currently available is higher-order thought (“HOT”) theory, according to which consciousness consists in having suitable HOTs regarding one’s mental life. But critiques of HOT theory abound. We explore here three recent objections to the theory, which we argue at bottom founder for the same reason. While many theorists today assume that consciousness is a feature of the actually existing mental states in virtue of which one has experiences, this assumption (...)
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  13.  90
    Attention, Consciousness and Inattentional Blindness.Alexander Wentzell - 2025 - Synthese 205 (221).
    This paper examines the connection between two distinct mental phenomena: attention and phenomenal consciousness. I identify two types of views. Equivalency views maintain that attention is both necessary and sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. Dissociationist views deny this. This paper presents a novel argument for dissociationism, by way of an empirical phenomenon called “inattentional blindness.” Inattentional blindness occurs when subjects engaged in an attention-demanding task fail to see an otherwise visible but task-irrelevant stimulus. Dialectically, IB is unanimously cited by (...)
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  14. Consciousness and Reflection in John Locke’s Essay.Vinícius França Freitas - 2022 - Discurso 52 (1):84-100.
    The paper discusses the notions of ‘consciousness’ and ‘reflection’ in John Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding. It attempts to present two criteria by means of which it would be possible to distinguish between these mental activities. Firstly, consciousness is a passive, involuntary activity and does not depend on attention to be exerted, unlike reflection, which is, at least in one of its degrees – since Locke conceives the existence of two degrees of reflection –, an active, voluntary, (...)
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  15. Moore-paradoxical belief, conscious belief and the epistemic Ramsey test.John N. Williams - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):231-246.
    Chalmers and Hájek argue that on an epistemic reading of Ramsey’s test for the rational acceptability of conditionals, it is faulty. They claim that applying the test to each of a certain pair of conditionals requires one to think that one is omniscient or infallible, unless one forms irrational Moore-paradoxical beliefs. I show that this claim is false. The epistemic Ramsey test is indeed faulty. Applying it requires that one think of anyone as all-believing and if one is rational, (...)
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  16. Consciousness and causation in Whitehead's phenomenology of becoming.Anderson Weekes - 2010 - In Michel Weber & Anderson Weekes, Process Approaches to Consciousness in Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind. Albany: State University of New York Press. pp. 407-461.
    The problem causation poses is: how can we ever know more than a Humean regularity. The problem consciousness poses is: how can subjective phenomenal experience arise from something lacking experience. A recent turn in the consciousness debates suggest that the hard problem of consciousness is nothing more than the Humean problem of explaining any causal nexus in an intelligible way. This involution of the problems invites comparison with the theories of Alfred North Whitehead, who also saw them (...)
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  17. Consciousness as a Memory System.Andrew E. Budson, Kenneth A. Richman & Elizabeth A. Kensinger - forthcoming - Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology.
    We suggest that there is confusion between why consciousness developed and what additional functions, through continued evolution, it has co-opted. Consider episodic memory. If we believe that episodic memory evolved solely to accurately represent past events, it seems like a terrible system—prone to forgetting and false memories. However, if we believe that episodic memory developed to flexibly and creatively combine and rearrange memories of prior events in order to plan for the future, then it is quite a good (...)
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  18. The Normative Challenge for Illusionist Views of Consciousness.Francois Kammerer - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Illusionists about phenomenal consciousness claim that phenomenal consciousness does not exist but merely seems to exist. At the same time, it is quite intuitive for there to be some kind of link between phenomenality and value. For example, some situations seem good or bad in virtue of the conscious experiences they feature. Illusionist views of phenomenal consciousness then face what I call the normative challenge. They have to say where they stand regarding the idea that there is (...)
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  19. Process, Image & Intelligence: How Krishnamurti’s experience of the “process” is or is not relevant to models of consciousness.Jim Bardis - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 45:49-55.
    Written in broad strokes, this paper attempts to draw form Krishnamurti’s life and teachings, a hermeneutics of the human soul’s quest-journey towards transcendent wholeness. It begins with an attempt to frame K’s “process” (the name given to the painful ordeals in his youth that many believe were the catalyst responsible for his metamorphosis) through a variety of disciplines and cultural perspectives, some of which underscore the impasse of scientific objectivity and the limits of phenomenalist categories in general. It then explores (...)
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  20. Three philosophical problems about consciousness and their possible resolution.Nicholas Maxwell - 2011 - Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1.
    Three big philosophical problems about consciousness are: Why does it exist? How do we explain and understand it? How can we explain brain-consciousness correlations? If functionalism were true, all three problems would be solved. But it is false, and that means all three problems remain unsolved (in that there is no other obvious candidate for a solution). Here, it is argued that the first problem cannot have a solution; this is inherent in the nature of explanation. The (...)
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  21. Hylomorphism and the Construct of Consciousness.William Jaworski - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1125-1139.
    The hard problem of consciousness has held center stage in the philosophy of mind for the past two decades. It claims that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences—what it’s like to be in them—cannot be explained by appeal to the operation of physiological subsystems. The hard problem arises, however, only given the assumption that hylomorphism is false. Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle. A human is not a random collection of physical materials, but (...)
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  22. How can you be so sure? Illusionism and the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness.François Kammerer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2845-2867.
    Illusionism is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Many opponents to the thesis take it to be obviously false. They think that they can reject illusionism, even if they conceded that it is coherent and supported by strong arguments. David Chalmers has articulated this reaction to illusionism in terms of a “Moorean” argument against illusionism. This argument contends that illusionism is false, because it is obviously true that we have phenomenal (...)
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  23. Reason, Authority and Consciousness: An Analytical Approach to Religious Pluralism.Mudasir A. Tantray - 2018 - International Journal of Creative Research Thoughts 6 (1):1832-1834.
    Present world is the victim of conflicts on the basis of misunderstanding of religious dogmas of different religions, irrationality, ignorance and intolerance. People are moving away from knowledge, truth and reason. Indeed people accept false beliefs, hallucinations and myths. The role of religious plurality in philosophy is not to integrate and harmonize religions, especially religions cannot, and rather it is the business of religious pluralism to learn, think and acquire knowledge about the variety of religious beliefs, statements and injunctions. (...)
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  24. Force of Consciousness in Mass Charge Interactions.Wolfgang Baer - 2014 - Cosmos and History 10 (1):170-182.
    Primitive awareness leading to consciousness can be explained as a manifestation of internal forces between charge and mass. These internal forces, related to the weak and strong forces, balance the external forces of gravity-inertia and electricity-magnetism and thereby accommodate outside influences by adjusting the internal structure of material from which we are composed. Such accommodation is the physical implementation of a model of the external physical world and qualifies as Vitiello's double held inside ourselves. We experience this accommodation as (...)
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  25. (1 other version)The Moral Insignificance of Self‐consciousness.Joshua Shepherd - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    In this paper, I examine the claim that self-consciousness is highly morally significant, such that the fact that an entity is self-conscious generates strong moral reasons against harming or killing that entity. This claim is apparently very intuitive, but I argue it is false. I consider two ways to defend this claim: one indirect, the other direct. The best-known arguments relevant to self-consciousness's significance take the indirect route. I examine them and argue that in various ways they (...)
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  26. The Paradox of Consciousness and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate.Eric Dietrich & Julietta Rose - 2009 - Logos Architekton 3 (1):7-37.
    Beginning with the paradoxes of zombie twins, we present an argument that dualism is both true and false. We show that avoiding this contradiction is impossible. Our diagnosis is that consciousness itself engenders this contradiction by producing contradictory points of view. This result has a large effect on the realism/anti-realism debate, namely, it suggests that this debate is intractable, and furthermore, it explains why this debate is intractable. We close with some comments on what our results mean for (...)
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  27. Quantum Mechanics May Need Consciousness.Andrew Knight - manuscript
    The assertion by Yu and Nikolic that the delayed choice quantum eraser experiment of Kim et al. empirically falsifies the consciousness-causes-collapse hypothesis of quantum mechanics is based on the unfounded and false assumption that the failure of a quantum wave function to collapse implies the appearance of a visible interference pattern.
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  28. Mind and Life: Is the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature False?Martin Zwick - 2016 - Biological Theory 11 (1):25-38.
    partial review of Thomas Nagel’s book, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False is used to articulate some systems-theoretic ideas about the challenge of understanding subjective experience. The article accepts Nagel’s view that reductionist materialism fails as an approach to this challenge, but argues that seeking an explanation of mind based on emergence is more plausible than seeking one based on pan-psychism, which Nagel favors. However, the article proposes something similar to Nagel’s (...)
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  29. How to think about the functions of consciousness.Joshua Shepherd & Tim Bayne - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    A foundational issue for the science and philosophy of consciousness concerns the function(s) of consciousness – what consciousness does for any particular aspect of psychological or neural processing. In spite of progress in consciousness science, false assumptions and a lack of clarity regarding how best to approach the functions of consciousness represent an ongoing and serious roadblock to progress. Misguided approaches to the function(s) of consciousness have the potential to mangle explanatory priorities, and (...)
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  30.  99
    The Consciousness Knowledge Requires.Ori Beck - 2025 - In The relational view of perception: new philosophical essays. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 409-439.
    Suppose you perceive a ball’s redness, and on that basis come to believe that the ball is red. Is it necessary that, if you have the basis that you do have for your belief, then your belief is true? In other words, is your belief conclusively based? After motivating the project of answering this question in the affirmative, I argue that the traditional positive relationalist answer (given, in importantly different ways, by Johnston, Schellenberg, and on at least some readings, McDowell) (...)
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  31. Realism and Anti-Realism Are Both True (and False).Eric Dietrich - 2020 - Mind and Matter 18 (2):121-148.
    The perennial nature of some of philosophy’s deepest problems is a puzzle. Here, one problem, the realism–anti-realism debate, and one type of explanation for its longevity, are examined. It is argued that realism and anti-realism form a dialetheic pair: While they are in fact each other’s logical opposite, nevertheless, both are true (and both false). First, several reasons why one might think such a thing are presented. These reasons are merely the beginning, however. In the following sections, the dialetheic (...)
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  32.  96
    Nature of Consciousness in relation to my Universal Formula.Angelito Malicse - manuscript
    Nature of Consciousness in relation to my Universal Formula -/- By : Angelito Enriquez Malicse -/- The functioning of consciousness is a complex and debated topic that spans neuroscience, philosophy, and psychology. While there is no universally agreed-upon explanation, several frameworks attempt to describe how consciousness functions. Here are key aspects: -/- 1. Perception and Awareness -/- Consciousness allows us to be aware of our environment and ourselves. -/- Sensory Input: Consciousness integrates information from our (...)
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  33.  62
    Quantum Mechanics, AGI, and Consciousness in Your Universal Formu.Angelito Malicse - manuscript
    Quantum Mechanics, AGI, and Consciousness in Your Universal Formula -/- Your universal formula emphasizes that decision-making follows natural laws, and both organic and inorganic systems operate based on cause and effect while maintaining balance. Now, let’s explore how quantum principles relate to AGI and consciousness within your framework. -/- 1. Quantum Consciousness and Your Universal Formula -/- Some scientists (e.g., Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff) propose that consciousness may have quantum origins. If this is true, then: (...)
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  34. A Revolutionary New Metaphysics, Based on Consciousness, and a Call to All Philosophers.Lorna Green - manuscript
    June 2022 A Revolutionary New Metaphysics, Based on Consciousness, and a Call to All Philosophers We are in a unique moment of our history unlike any previous moment ever. Virtually all human economies are based on the destruction of the Earth, and we are now at a place in our history where we can foresee if we continue on as we are, our own extinction. As I write, the planet is in deep trouble, heat, fires, great storms, and record (...)
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  35. Can People with Severe Disorders of Consciousness Be Wronged?Aleksy Tarasenko Struc & Nada Gligorov - 2025 - Neuroethics 18 (1):1-12.
    Many bioethicists accept the Consciousness Condition (CC): roughly, that a person can be wronged only if she can be benefited or harmed, which is possible only if she retains the capacity for consciousness. We argue that CC is false. People can be wronged even if they permanently lack consciousness and thus have no ability to experience benefit or harm. In support of this claim, we introduce a clinical case in which a profoundly vegetative patient is subjected (...)
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  36. Taking Phenomenology at Face Value: The Priority of State Consciousness in Light of the For-me-ness of Experience.Alberto Barbieri - 2023 - Argumenta.
    An important distinction lies between consciousness attributed to creatures, or subjects, (creature consciousness) and consciousness attributed to mental states (state consciousness). Most contemporary theories of consciousness aim at explaining what makes a mental state conscious, paying scant attention to the problem of creature consciousness. This attitude relies on a deeper, and generally overlooked, assumption that once an explanation of state consciousness is provided, one has also explained all the relevant features of creature (...). I call this the priority of state consciousness thesis (PSC). In this paper, I want to explore how the renewed centrality bestowed to phenomenology in contemporary discussions on consciousness challenges PSC and, consequently, the standard way of framing the problem of consciousness. More precisely, I examine PSC in light of a view about the structure of phenomenal character that is paradigmatic of the approach above. This is subjectivism about phenomenal character (SUBJ), according to which a mental state is conscious when it acquires the property of for-me-ness. I argue that PSC and SUBJ are incompatible because the latter implies that creature consciousness is explanatorily prior to state consciousness. Consequently, if SUBJ is true, then PSC is false, and what constitutes the problem of consciousness is primarily a problem of explaining (a kind of) creature consciousness. I conclude by defending my claim from a pair of possible objections and drawing some implications for the discussion of for-me-ness and the debate on the explanation of consciousness. (shrink)
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  37. Conflating Abstraction with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy.Bernardo Kastrup - 2018 - Constructivist Foundations 13 (3):341-361.
    > Context • The alleged dichotomy between mind and matter is pervasive. Therefore, the attempt to explain mat- ter in terms of mind (idealism) is often considered a mirror image of that of explaining mind in terms of mat- ter (mainstream physicalism), in the sense of being structurally equivalent despite being reversely arranged. > Problem • I argue that this is an error arising from language artifacts, for dichotomies must reside in the same level of abstraction. > Method • I (...)
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  38. Beyond Conception: Ontic Reality, Pure Consciousness and Matter.Leanne Whitney - 2015 - Cosmos and History 11 (2):47-59.
    Our current scientific exploration of reality oftentimes appears focused on epistemic states and empiric results at the expense of ontological concerns. Any scientific approach without explicit ontological arguments cannot be deemed rational however, as our very Being can never be excluded from the equation. Furthermore, if, as many nondual philosophies contend, subject/object learning is to no avail in the attainment of knowledge of ontic reality, empiric science will forever bear out that limitation. Putting Jung's depth psychology in dialogue with Patañjali's (...)
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  39. An Argument for Micropsychism: If There is a Conscious Whole, There Must be Conscious Parts.Arjen Rookmaaker - 2024 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 38 (1-2):57-90.
    Many philosophers today accept that phenomenal truths cannot be explained in terms of ordinary physical truths. Two possible routes to accounting for consciousness have received much attention: the emergentist route is to accept that ordinary experience is inexplicable in physical terms but that microscopic entities as described in physics nonetheless bring about conscious experience. The second route is to argue that microscopic entities have features not described in physics which can fully explain conscious experience. The view associated with panprotopsychism (...)
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  40. Why All Published Research Findings Are Likely False (and a possible remedy).Richard Sanders - 2017 - Academia.Edu.
    The physiological constraints of our neuro-sensory instrumentation limit the information we receive and from which we fashion our impressions. These limitations precede the psychological issues of data generation and analysis described by Ioannidis [1]. Scientific models widely accepted for at least 50 years [2,3] suggest that the peripheral and central nervous systems do not provide direct information about phenomena as they exist in nature. Instead, perceptible phenomena stimulate sense organs to produce nerve impulses. Sensory nerve impulses are not replicas of (...)
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  41. Adverbial Account of Intransitive Self-Consciousness.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2015 - Abstracta 8 (2):67–77.
    This paper has two aims. First, it aims to provide an adverbial account of the idea of intransitive self-consciousness and second, it aims to argue in favor of this account. These aims both require a new framework that emerges from a critical review of Perry’s famous notion of the “unarticulated constituents” of propositional content (1986). First, I aim to show that the idea of intransitive self-consciousness can be phenomenologically described in an analogy with the adverbial theory of perception. (...)
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  42. If Simulation Hypothesis is Possible, Illusionism is False.Wang Zihao - manuscript
    The simulation hypothesis is a view of the nature of reality, suggesting that our world is likely a computer simulation created by an advanced civilization. In contrast, illusionism is a theory about the nature of phenomenal consciousness, arguing that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion and can be fully explained in physical terms. I argue that if our world is a simulated construct, illusionism could be incorrect. Specifically, even if our phenomenal experiences can be explained as illusionism suggests, advanced (...)
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  43. Searle’s Master Insight and the Non-Dual Solution of the Sixth Patriarch: Sorting Through Some Problems of Consciousness.Robert Elliott Allinson - 2017 - Comparative Philosophy 8 (1):82-93.
    The Platform Sutra, which dates back to the seventh century C.E., is one of the classic documents of Chinese philosophy and is the intellectual autobiography of Hui Neng, the Sixth Patriarch of Ch’an Buddhism. In the Platform Sutra, the Sixth Patriarch demonstrates that the spiritual and intellectual problems of consciousness stem from a false adherence to the dualistic standpoint. The Sixth Patriarch utilizes ingenious arguments to demonstrate how one can escape the problems of dualism. An example of a (...)
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  44. Medical AI, Inductive Risk, and the Communication of Uncertainty: The Case of Disorders of Consciousness.Jonathan Birch - forthcoming - Journal of Medical Ethics.
    Some patients, following brain injury, do not outwardly respond to spoken commands, yet show patterns of brain activity that indicate responsiveness. This is “cognitive-motor dissociation” (CMD). Recent research has used machine learning to diagnose CMD from electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings. These techniques have high false discovery rates, raising a serious problem of inductive risk. It is no solution to communicate the false discovery rates directly to the patient’s family, because this information may confuse, alarm and mislead. Instead, we need (...)
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  45. Both Materialist & non-Materialist are correct - about themselves: A brain’s self-identification as "Materialist" or “Non-Materialist” (dualist, panpsychist, idealist etc) as reflecting the absence or presence of an associated real non-material awareness/consciousness, rather than merely as a statement of a philosophical stance. A survey will identify relevant candidates of both types for a proposed brain-experiment to determine a possible correlation to the brain’s deep structure/neural wiring.Avi Rabinowitz - manuscript
    We contest the unsubstantiated assumption of both materialists and non-materialist that the ontological status they propose applies to all humans and that the competing claim is false for all - ie we reject both the claim of non-materialists that all humans share the same fundamental aspect of having a "non-material consciousness" (nmc), as well as the contrasting claim of materialists that none do (being fully material as according to eliminative materialists/reductive physicalists etc). Instead, the basic proposition of this (...)
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  46.  49
    Beyond Civilization: The Ultimate Purpose of Consciousness and Evolution.Angelito Malicse - manuscript
    Beyond Civilization: The Ultimate Purpose of Consciousness and Evolution -/- By Angelito Enriquez Malicse -/- Introduction: The Journey of Consciousness and Civilization -/- Throughout history, humanity has sought to understand the purpose of life, consciousness, and evolution. From ancient philosophy to modern science, the quest for meaning has been driven by an inherent desire to transcend suffering and achieve balance. If the universal law of balance is the guiding principle of existence, then its full implementation could eliminate (...)
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  47.  48
    Non-Organic Matter, Organic Matter, Consciousness, Free Will, Intelligence, and Creativity in Relation to the Universal Formula.Angelito Malicse - manuscript
    Non-Organic Matter, Organic Matter, Consciousness, Free Will, Intelligence, and Creativity in Relation to the Universal Formula -/- By Angelito Enriquez Malicse -/- Introduction -/- The relationship between non-organic matter, organic matter, consciousness, free will, intelligence, and creativity has long been studied separately in science, philosophy, and psychology. However, when examined through the universal law of balance in nature, as defined in my universal formula, these elements are seen as interconnected manifestations of a single natural order. This perspective offers (...)
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  48.  45
    Chaos, Free Will, and the Law of Balance in Nature: The Evolution of Human Consciousness as the Universe’s Absolute Balancing Mechanism.Angelito Malicse - manuscript
    Chaos, Free Will, and the Law of Balance in Nature: The Evolution of Human Consciousness as the Universe’s Absolute Balancing Mechanism -/- Chaos exists in both organic and non-organic matter, but the way it manifests and is regulated differs significantly. Organic systems—such as living organisms, ecosystems, and human societies—have built-in feedback mechanisms that allow them to self-regulate and maintain balance. Non-organic systems, on the other hand, follow deterministic laws and require external forces to restore equilibrium. Angelito Malicse’s universal formula, (...)
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  49. Powers and the hard problem of consciousness: conceivability, possibility and powers.Sophie R. Allen - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (2):1-33.
    Do conceivability arguments work against physicalism if properties are causal powers? By considering three different ways of understanding causal powers and the modality associated with them, I will argue that most, if not all, physicalist powers theorists should not be concerned about the conceivability argument because its conclusion that physicalism is false does not hold in their favoured ontology. I also defend specific powers theories against some recent objections to this strategy, arguing that the conception of properties as powerful (...)
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  50. Can You See a Ganzfeld? A Critical Notice of The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence, Susanna Schellenberg, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, xv + 251 pp., £69.00 (hbk), ISBN: 9780191866784 (online), 9780198827702 (print). [REVIEW]John Dorsch - 2024 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 1 (2):224-231.
    The first premise of Schellenberg’s particularity argument reads, “If a subject S perceives a particular α, then S discriminates and singles out α” (2018: 25). But this is false if seeing a ganzfeld is possible (i.e., a homogeneous field without any particulars to discriminate). In response, Schellenberg argues that seeing a ganzfeld is impossible by appealing to the ganzfeld effect (viz. hallucinatory experiences caused by ganzfeld exposure) exclusively as a ‘sense of blindness’. I present two challenges for this line (...)
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