Results for '��rsula Lied'

971 found
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  1. Lying by Promising. A Study on Insincere Illocutionary Acts.Neri Marsili - 2016 - International Review of Pragmatics 8 (2):271-313.
    This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit performative such as “I promise that Φ ” can count as an assertion of its content Φ . Second, I develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions a (...)
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  2. Lying: Knowledge or Belief?Neri Marsili - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1445-1460.
    A new definition of lying is gaining traction, according to which you lie only if you say what you know to be false. Drawing inspiration from “New Evil Demon” scenarios, I present a battery of counterexamples against this “Knowledge Account” of lying. Along the way, I comment upon the methodology of conceptual analysis, the moral implications of the Knowledge Account, and its ties with knowledge-first epistemology.
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  3. Lying, Misleading, and Dishonesty.Alex Barber - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (2):141-164.
    An important moral category—dishonest speech—has been overlooked in theoretical ethics despite its importance in legal, political, and everyday social exchanges. Discussion in this area has instead been fixated on a binary debate over the contrast between lying and ‘merely misleading’. Some see lying as a distinctive wrong; others see it as morally equivalent to deliberately omitting relevant truths, falsely insinuating, or any other species of attempted verbal deception. Parties to this debate have missed the relevance to their disagreement of the (...)
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  4. Lying as a Scalar Phenomenon.Neri Marsili - 2014 - In Sibilla Cantarini, Werner Abraham & Elizabeth Leiss (eds.), "Certainty-uncertainty – and the attitudinal space in between”,. John Benjamins Publishing.
    In the philosophical debate on lying, there has generally been agreement that either the speaker believes that his statement is false, or he believes that his statement is true. This article challenges this assumption, and argues that lying is a scalar phenomenon that allows for a number of intermediate cases – the most obvious being cases of uncertainty. The first section shows that lying can involve beliefs about graded truth values (fuzzy lies) and graded beliefs (graded-belief lies). It puts forward (...)
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  5. Lying, Accuracy and Credence.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):195-198.
    Traditional definitions of lying require that a speaker believe that what she asserts is false. Sam Fox Krauss seeks to jettison the traditional belief requirement in favour of a necessary condition given in a credence-accuracy framework, on which the liar expects to impose the risk of increased inaccuracy on the hearer. He argues that this necessary condition importantly captures nearby cases as lies which the traditional view neglects. I argue, however, that Krauss's own account suffers from an identical drawback of (...)
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  6. Lying, Speech Acts, and Commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.
    Not every speech act can be a lie. A good definition of lying should be able to draw the right distinctions between speech acts that can be lies and speech acts that under no circumstances are lies. This paper shows that no extant account of lying is able to draw the required distinctions. It argues that a definition of lying based on the notion of ‘assertoric commitment’ can succeed where other accounts have failed. Assertoric commitment is analysed in terms of (...)
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  7. Lies, Common Ground and Performative Utterances.Neri Marsili - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-12.
    In a recent book (Lying and insincerity, Oxford University Press, 2018), Andreas Stokke argues that one lies iff one says something one believes to be false, thereby proposing that it becomes common ground. This paper shows that Stokke’s proposal is unable to draw the right distinctions about insincere performative utterances. The objection also has repercussions on theories of assertion, because it poses a novel challenge to any attempt to define assertion as a proposal to update the common ground.
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  8. Sex, Lies, and Consent.Tom Dougherty - 2013 - Ethics 123 (4):717-744.
    How wrong is it to deceive someone into sex by lying, say, about one's profession? The answer is seriously wrong when the liar's actual profession would be a deal breaker for the victim of the deception: this deception vitiates the victim's sexual consent, and it is seriously wrong to have sex with someone while lacking his or her consent.
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  9. Lying and Knowing.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5351-5371.
    This paper defends the simple view that in asserting that p, one lies iff one knows that p is false. Along the way it draws some morals about deception, knowledge, Gettier cases, belief, assertion, and the relationship between first- and higher-order norms.
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  10. Lying, Fast and Slow.Angelo Turri & John Turri - 2019 - Synthese 198 (1):757-775.
    Researchers have debated whether there is a relationship between a statement’s truth-value and whether it counts as a lie. One view is that a statement being objectively false is essential to whether it counts as a lie; the opposing view is that a statement’s objective truth-value is inessential to whether it counts as a lie. We report five behavioral experiments that use a novel range of behavioral measures to address this issue. In each case, we found evidence of a relationship. (...)
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  11. Lying and Certainty.Neri Marsili - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford University Press. pp. 170-182.
    In the philosophical literature on the definition of lying, the analysis is generally restricted to cases of flat-out belief. This chapter considers the complex phenomenon of lies involving partial beliefs – beliefs ranging from mere uncertainty to absolute certainty. The first section analyses lies uttered while holding a graded belief in the falsity of the assertion, and presents a revised insincerity condition, requiring that the liar believes the assertion to be more likely to be false than true. The second section (...)
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  12. The Lying Test.Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (4):470-499.
    As an empirical inquiry into the nature of meaning, semantics must rely on data. Unfortunately, the primary data to which philosophers and linguists have traditionally appealed—judgments on the truth and falsity of sentences—have long been known to vary widely between competent speakers in a number of interesting cases. The present article constitutes an experiment in how to obtain some more consistent data for the enterprise of semantics. Specifically, it argues from some widely accepted Gricean premises to the conclusion that judgments (...)
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  13. Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating.Jessica Pepp - 2019 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter explores the prospects for justifying the somewhat widespread, somewhat firmly held sense that there is some moral advantage to untruthfully implicating over lying. I call this the "Difference Intuition." I define lying in terms of asserting, but remain open about what precise definition best captures our ordinary notion. I define implicating as one way of meaning something without asserting it. I narrow down the kind of untruthful implicating that should be compared with lying for purposes of evaluating whether (...)
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  14. Immoral Lies and Partial Beliefs.Neri Marsili - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):117-127.
    In a recent article, Krauss (2017) raises some fundamental questions concerning (i) what the desiderata of a definition of lying are, and (ii) how definitions of lying can account for partial beliefs. This paper aims to provide an adequate answer to both questions. Regarding (i), it shows that there can be a tension between two desiderata for a definition of lying: 'descriptive accuracy' (meeting intuitions about our ordinary concept of lying), and 'moral import' (meeting intuitions about what is wrong with (...)
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  15. Lying, Liars and Language.David Simpson - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):623-639.
    This paper considers the phenomenon of lying and the implications it has for those subjects who are capable of lying. It is argued that lying is not just intentional untruthfulness, but is intentional untruthfulness plus an insincere invocation of trust. Understood in this way, lying demands of liars a sophistication in relation to themselves, to language, and to those to whom they lie which exceeds the demands on mere truth-tellers.
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  16. Lying, Risk and Accuracy.Sam Fox Krauss - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):726-734.
    Almost all philosophers agree that a necessary condition on lying is that one says what one believes to be false. But, philosophers haven’t considered the possibility that the true requirement on lying concerns, rather, one’s degree-of-belief. Liars impose a risk on their audience. The greater the liar’s confidence that what she asserts is false, the greater the risk she’ll think she’s imposing on the dupe, and, therefore, the greater her blameworthiness. From this, I arrive at a dilemma: either the belief (...)
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  17. Lying, Uptake, Assertion, and Intent.Angelo Turri & John Turri - 2016 - International Review of Pragmatics 8 (2):314-333.
    A standard view in social science and philosophy is that a lie is a dishonest assertion: to lie is to assert something that you think is false in order to deceive your audience. We report four behavioral experiments designed to evaluate some aspects of this view. Participants read short scenarios and judged several features of interest, including whether an agent lied. We found evidence that ordinary lie attributions can be influenced by aspects of audience uptake, are based on judging (...)
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  18.  63
    Lying, Deception, and Dishonesty: Kant and the Contemporary Debate on the Definition of Lying.Stefano Bacin - forthcoming - In Luigi Caranti & Alessandro Pinzani (eds.), Kant and the Problem of Morality: Rethinking the Contemporary World. Routledge. pp. 73-91.
    Although Kant is one of the very few classical writers referred to in the current literature on lying, hardly any attention is paid to how his views relate to the contemporary discussion on the definition of lying. I argue that, in Kant’s account, deception is not the defining feature of lying. Furthermore, his view is able to acknowledge non-deceptive lies. Kant thus holds, I suggest, a version of what is currently labelled Intrinsic Anti-Deceptionism. In his specific version of such a (...)
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  19.  69
    Group Lies and the Narrative Constraint.Säde Hormio - forthcoming - Episteme 19 (First View):1-20.
    A group is lying when it makes a statement that it believes to be untrue but wants the addressee(s) to believe. But how can we distinguish statements that the group believes to be untrue from honest group statements based on mistaken beliefs or confusion within the group? I will suggest a narrative constraint for honest group statements, made up of two components. Narrative coherence requires that a new group statement should not conflict with group knowledge on the matter, or beliefs (...)
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  20. Lying, Misleading, and Fairness.Emanuel Viebahn - 2022 - Ethics 132 (3):736-751.
    Sam Berstler defends a general moral advantage for misleading over lying by arguing that liars, but not misleaders, act unfairly toward the other members of their linguistic community. This article spells out three difficulties for Berstler’s account. First, though Berstler aims to avoid an error theory, it is dubitable that her account fits with intuitions on the matter. Second, there are some lies that do not exhibit the unfairness Berstler identifies. Third, fairness is not the only morally relevant difference between (...)
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  21. Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door... One More Time: Kant's Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis.Helga Varden - 2010 - Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (4):403-4211.
    Kant’s example of lying to the murderer at the door has been a cherished source of scorn for thinkers with little sympathy for Kant’s philosophy and a source of deep puzzlement for those more favorably inclined. The problem is that Kant seems to say that it’s always wrong to lie – even if necessary to prevent a murderer from reaching his victim – and that if one does lie, one becomes partially responsible for the killing of the victim. If this (...)
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  22. Lying and Fiction.Emar Maier - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 303-314.
    Lying and fiction both involve the deliberate production of statements that fail to obey Grice’s first Maxim of Quality (“do not say what you believe to be false”). The question thus arises if we can provide a uniform analysis for fiction and lies. In this chapter I discuss the similarities, but also some fundamental differences between lying and fiction. I argue that there’s little hope for a satisfying account within a traditional truth conditional semantic framework. Rather than immediately moving to (...)
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  23. The Truth About Lying.Angelo Turri & John Turri - 2015 - Cognition 138:161-168.
    The standard view in social science and philosophy is that lying does not require the liar’s assertion to be false, only that the liar believes it to be false. We conducted three experiments to test whether lying requires falsity. Overall, the results suggest that it does. We discuss some implications for social scientists working on social judgments, research on lie detection, and public moral discourse.
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  24. Lies, Control, and Consent: A Response to Dougherty and Manson.Danielle Bromwich & Joseph Millum - 2018 - Ethics 128 (2):446-461.
    Tom Dougherty argues that culpably deceiving another person into sex is seriously wrong no matter what the content about which she is deceived. We argue that his explanation of why deception invalidates consent has extremely implausible implications. Though we reject Dougherty’s explanation, we defend his verdict about deception and consent to sex. We argue that he goes awry by conflating the disclosure requirement for consent and the understanding requirement. When these are distinguished, we can identify how deceptive disclosure invalidates consent. (...)
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  25.  93
    Everybody Lies: Deception Levels in Various Domains of Life.Kristina Šekrst - forthcoming - Biosemiotics.
    The goal of this paper is to establish a hierarchical level of deception which does not apply only to humans and non-human animals, but also to the rest of the living world, including plants. We will follow the hierarchical categorization of deception, set forth by Mitchell (1986), in which the first level of deception starts with mimicry, while the last level of deception includes learning and intentionality, usually attributed to primates. We will show how such a hierarchy can be attributed (...)
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  26. Can a Robot Lie?Markus Kneer - manuscript
    The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers focus on the technical possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g. in education or health). In this short experimental paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: Robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment with 399 participants which explores the following three (...)
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  27. Intentionalism and Bald-Faced Lies.Daniel W. Harris - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    In Lying and Insincerity, Andreas Stokke argues that bald-faced lies are genuine lies, and that lies are always assertions. Since bald-faced lies seem not to be aimed at convincing addressees of their contents, Stokke concludes that assertions needn’t have this aim. This conflicts with a traditional version of intentionalism, originally due to Grice, on which asserting something is a matter of communicatively intending for one’s addressee to believe it. I argue that Stokke’s own account of bald-faced lies faces serious problems (...)
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  28.  70
    Can a Robot Lie? Exploring the Folk Concept of Lying as Applied to Artificial Agents.Markus Kneer - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (10):e13032.
    The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers explore the technical possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g., in education or health). In this short experimental paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment that investigates the following three questions: (a) Are ordinary (...)
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  29.  58
    Lies, Gaslighting & Propaganda.G. Alex Sinha - 2020 - Buffalo Law Review 68 (4):1037-1116.
    It is commonplace to observe that digital technologies facilitate our access to information on a scale unimaginable in previous eras, leading many to call this the “Information Age.” The vaunted advantages of unprecedented data flow obscure a dark corollary: the more modes of engaging with data are available to a people, the more modes are available for manipulating them. Whether through social media, blogs, email, newspaper headlines, or doctored images and videos, the public is indeed bombarded by information, and much (...)
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  30. Administrative Lies and Philosopher-Kings.David Simpson - 1996 - Philosophical Inquiry 18 (3-4):45-65.
    The question of whether lies by those who govern are acceptable receives a clear focus and an ideal case in the Republic. Against C. D. C. Reeve, and T. C. Brickhouse and N. D Smith, I argue that the Republic’s apparent recommendation of administrative lies is incoherent. While lies may be a necessary part of the City’s administration, the process and practice of lying undermines that nature which is necessary for any suitable ruler – rendering the ideal impossible. I argue (...)
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  31. Lying.James Edwin Mahon - 2006 - In D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Reference. pp. 2--618.
    Short survey of philosophical literature on the definition of lying and the ethics of lying.
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  32. Sex, Lies and Pornography.Ann Garry - 2002 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. Blackwell.
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  33. Lies, Half-Truths, and Falsehoods About Tarski’s 1933 “Liar” Antinomies.John Corcoran & Joaquin Miller - 2012 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):140-141.
    We discuss misinformation about “the liar antinomy” with special reference to Tarski’s 1933 truth-definition paper [1]. Lies are speech-acts, not merely sentences or propositions. Roughly, lies are statements of propositions not believed by their speakers. Speakers who state their false beliefs are often not lying. And speakers who state true propositions that they don’t believe are often lying—regardless of whether the non-belief is disbelief. Persons who state propositions on which they have no opinion are lying as much as those who (...)
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  34. Paternalistic Lying and Deception.Andreas Stokke - 2018 - In Kalle Grill & Jason Hanna (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Paternalism. Oxford, UK: Routledge.
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  35.  85
    Saying, Commitment, and the Lying – Misleading Distinction.Neri Marsili & Guido Löhr - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
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  36. You Don't Say! Lying, Asserting and Insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield
    This thesis addresses philosophical problems concerning improper assertions. The first part considers the issue of defining lying: here, against a standard view, I argue that a lie need not intend to deceive the hearer. I define lying as an insincere assertion, and then resort to speech act theory to develop a detailed account of what an assertion is, and what can make it insincere. Even a sincere assertion, however, can be improper (e.g., it can be false, or unwarranted): in the (...)
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  37. The Reality of Lies.Venanzio Raspa - 2013 - Filozofija I Društvo 24 (2):105-131.
    A lie is neither a false proposition, nor a mistake, nor a mere fiction; it is a type of fiction, an act, and precisely an intentional act. An act calls for a subject, and therefore a lie is inseparable from its subject. Together, they make up a real object: it has to be real, since a lie produces effects, and the cause-effect relationship only holds between real beings. Like every real object, a lie unfolds in a context. But there is (...)
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  38. Partition Lies, Advaita Vedanta and Bhisham Sahni’s Tamas.Subhasis Chattopadhyay - 2016 - In Pinaki Roy & Ashim Kumar Sarkar (eds.), Portrayal of the Indian Partition in History, Literature, and Media.
    This is a re-look at the (Indian) Partition event through the lens of Advaita Vedanta.
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  39. What’s the Good of Language? On the Moral Distinction Between Lying and Misleading.Sam Berstler - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):5-31.
    I give a new argument for the moral difference between lying and misleading. First, following David Lewis, I hold that conventions of truthfulness and trust fix the meanings of our language. These conventions generate fair play obligations. Thus, to fail to conform to the conventions of truthfulness and trust is unfair. Second, I argue that the liar, but not the misleader, fails to conform to truthfulness. So the liar, but not the misleader, does something unfair. This account entails that bald-faced (...)
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  40. The Father of Lies?Hud Hudson - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 5:147-166.
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  41.  79
    Computation of Higher Order Lie Derivatives on the Infinity Computer.Felice Iavernaro, Francesca Mazzia, Marat Mukhametzhanov & Yaroslav Sergeyev - 2021 - Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 383:113135.
    In this paper, we deal with the computation of Lie derivatives, which are required, for example, in some numerical methods for the solution of differential equations. One common way for computing them is to use symbolic computation. Computer algebra software, however, might fail if the function is complicated, and cannot be even performed if an explicit formulation of the function is not available, but we have only an algorithm for its computation. An alternative way to address the problem is to (...)
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  42. Does the Lie Contradict the Truth?Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 2010 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 20 (33).
    The main task of this work is not to determine the bases for a moral evaluation of the lie; neither is it to describe its negative qualification. We are interested rather in the very problemate of the truth and the lie itself, considered as a juxtaposition of two of its notions: the truth and the lie, one that aims to provide a positive – as it would seem obvious – answer to the question contained in the title of the present (...)
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  43. On How Religions Could Accidentally Incite Lies and Violence: Folktales as a Cultural Transmitter.Quan-Hoang Vuong, Ho Manh Tung, Nguyen To Hong Kong, La Viet Phuong, Vuong Thu Trang, Vu Thi Hanh, Nguyen Minh Hoang & Manh-Toan Ho - manuscript
    This research employs the Bayesian network modeling approach, and the Markov chain Monte Carlo technique, to learn about the role of lies and violence in teachings of major religions, using a unique dataset extracted from long-standing Vietnamese folktales. The results indicate that, although lying and violent acts augur negative consequences for those who commit them, their associations with core religious values diverge in the final outcome for the folktale characters. Lying that serves a religious mission of either Confucianism or Taoism (...)
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  44. Why Shouldn't I Lie? Ten Preliminaries.Shahrar Ali - 2011 - Ethical Record 116 (10):6-10.
    I introduce the reader to the character and complexity of lying, in terms of how the lie should be defined as a particular type of intentionally deceptive utterance, whether or not the deceiver succeeded in that aim, and examine how we might usefully avoid prejudging the justifiability of the lying utterance when compared to alternative forms of intentional deception and the overall outcome sought.
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  45. The Meaning of White Lie.Hossein Atrak - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 7 (12):1-25.
    There is no doubt that “lying” is an unethical practice. But, in some situations, such as; where the life of an innocent person to be at risk, it is considered permissible by both the intelligence and law. The “white lie”, for ordinary people, is the lie that is permissible. But this term has become a victim of personal interpretations. As a result, many of non-permissible lies in the intelligence and law's view, because of the personal interpretation of white lie, have (...)
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  46. Sexual Consent and Lying About One’s Self.Jennifer Matey - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):380-400.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView. Despite the acknowledgement of the moral significance of consent there is still much work to be done in determining which specific sexual encounters count as unproblematically consensual. This paper focuses on the impact of deception. It takes up the specific case of deception about one's self. It may seem obvious that one ought not to lie to a sexual partner about who one is, but determining which features of oneself are most relevant, as well as (...)
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  47. Understanding the Interplay of Lies, Violence, and Religious Values in Folktales.Quan-Hoang Vuong, Viet-Phuong La & Hong-Kong T. Nguyen - manuscript
    This research employs the Bayesian network modeling approach, and the Markov chain Monte Carlo technique, to learn about the role of lies and violence in teachings of major religions, using a unique dataset extracted from long-standing Vietnamese folktales. The results indicate that, although lying and violent acts augur negative consequences for those who commit them, their associations with core religious values diverge in the outcome for the folktale characters. Lying that serves a religious mission of either Confucianism or Taoism (but (...)
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  48. Old Lies, New Media A Review of "A Defense of Simulated Experience: New Noble Lies" by Mark Silcox. [REVIEW]Nele Van de Mosselaer & Stefano Gualeni - 2019 - Journal of the Philosophy of Games 2 (1).
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  49. Dispositions and Ethics.Rani Lill Anjum, Svein Anders Noer Lie & Stephen Mumford - manuscript
    What is the connection between dispositions and ethics? Some might think very little and those who are interested in dispositions tend to be metaphysicians whose interests are far from value. However, we argue in this paper that dispositions and dispositionality are central to ethics, indeed a precondition. Ethics rests on a number of notions that are either dispositional in nature or involve real dispositions or powers at work. We argue for a dispositional account of value that offers an alternative to (...)
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  50. And If It Takes Lying: The Ethics of Blood Donor Non-Compliance.Kurt Blankschaen - 2021 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 31 (4):373-404.
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